Exports from Ukraine to the European Union : macro-, micro- and political economy determinants by Sleptsova, Evghenia
  
EXPORTS FROM UKRAINE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION: 
MACRO-, MICRO- AND POLITICAL ECONOMY DETERMINANTS 
by 
EVGHENIA SLEPTSOVA 
 
A thesis submitted to 
the University of Birmingham 
for the degree of 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 
Centre for Russian and East European Studies 
School of Social Sciences 
The University of Birmingham 
November 2010 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
 ii
ABSTRACT 
This thesis deals with the exporting performance of Ukraine. Focusing on the reorientation of 
merchandise exports, both in terms of geography – from East to West – and in terms of 
commodity composition, it explores the multi-level determinants of the observed picture. 
While until 2003-2004 reorientation from East to West appeared to be a steady trend, in 2005 
this trend reversed and CIS re-emerged as a leading destination market for Ukraine’s exports. 
The commodity composition in trade with the EU has also hardly improved, and was more 
positive in trade with the CIS. Marginal improvements were observed on a more 
disaggregated level.  
These findings were confirmed in the macro-level analysis – Ukraine tends to under-trade 
with the external trade blocs – EU-15 and the then CEFTA, and over-trade with the internal 
trade bloc of CIS. On a micro-level, the analysis has not revealed that trade with the EU has 
been associated with firm-level industrial upgrading, although FDI does increase the 
likelihood to export to the EU. Trade with the CIS has been associated with higher 
commodity diversification, which in turn is known to be associated with higher growth 
potential. On the level of policy lobbying, on the other hand, business elites have shown an 
increasing interest in the Western vector of integration. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Research context 
This thesis deals with the exporting performance of a transition economy. Focusing on the 
reorientation of merchandise exports, both in terms of geographical distribution – from East to 
West – and in terms of commodity composition, it explores the multi-level factors that may 
have determined the observed picture.  
Ukraine was chosen as a case study, being an interesting example of a large young economy, 
which gained independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and since then has been 
going through a thorny process of geopolitical and economic self-determination. On the one 
hand, the dissolution of a closely integrated economic bloc created conditions for restoring 
more natural levels of economic integration with the rest of the world, and in particular with a 
large market of the neighbouring European Union, where clearly there was an under-realised 
potential due to previous political isolation.1 On the other hand, reality has shown that old 
economic and even older historical and political links die hard. Although policy initiatives for 
closer integration with the EU are developing, economic integration has been following an 
inconsistent, an inverted U-shaped, path.2 The commodity structure in trade with the EU has 
not improved either, and remains heavily dominated by the exchange of resource-intensive 
products for capital-intensive products from the EU, which is a typical North-South 
relationship. Moreover, by 2009 Ukraine had the lowest share of exports going to the EU of 
all CIS countries that are part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative (Ivan and Ghinea, 
2010).3   
This is contrasting with the path followed by the Central and East European countries 
(CEECs)4, which reoriented their trade away from the former Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (Comecon) towards the European Union early on, having seen their share in extra-
EU trade double between 1993 and 2003 and becoming the second major trading partner of 
                                                          
1 Moreover, already in 1998 Ukraine declared its intention to join the European Union. While in practice foreign 
policy stance varied, officially the EU integration has remained the leading line in Ukraine’s foreign policy 
discourse ever since. 
2 After an initial increase from 24 to 34 percent in 1996-2004, in 2007 the share of the EU-27 in total Ukraine’s 
exports was down to 28 percent, while that of the CIS recovered to 38 percent (see Table 1 on page 67). 
3 Eastern Partnership Initiative is described in more detail in section 1.2.2. 
4 By CEECs we refer to the ten EU new member states – Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland and Romania. Most of them experienced a significant reorientation in 
terms of direction and structure of trade, although some – e.g. Romania and Bulgaria – were less successful with 
upgrading the commodity composition of trade.  
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the EU after the USA (Bussiere et al., 2005).5 The commodity structure of their trade with the 
EU has also undergone substantial change, moving from a largely North-South structure of 
trade that existed prior to the fall of ‘iron curtain’, to a North-North type of trade, whereby 
they exchange similar, mainly capital- and technology-intensive goods with the EU.  
The reasons for such an asymmetrical performance between CEECs and CIS economies are 
numerous, and range from historical, policy, institutional to pure economic factors. 
Historically, admittedly, the CEECs were less integrated with the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance throughout the Soviet times than the republics of the USSR.6 On the 
other hand, Baltic countries – Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – were even more dependent on 
intra-USSR trade than Ukraine, but have successfully reintegrated with the EU.7 Therefore the 
degree of initial openness to the rest of the world does not seem to explain the degree of 
eventual reorientation.  
Generally, a consensus seems to emerge from the literature that successful trade reorientation 
in CEECs was driven by a combination of two broad factors: initial conditions – geographic 
proximity and cheap and educated labour, and dynamic factors – fast reform record and a 
prospect of EU enlargement. The latter encouraged strong inflows of FDI, which 
subsequently generated high levels of intra-industry trade through the inclusion of host 
countries into the transnational value chains. This argument essentially sums up the main 
institutional (EU integration factor), policy (internal reforms) and economic (FDI) factors 
behind the success of reorientation of CEECs.  
In very broad terms, each of these, although working as a mirror reflection, can be argued to 
have prevented successful reorientation of the Ukrainian trade. Thus, Ukraine lacked the 
positive market signal and reform incentive in the form of the prospect of EU accession. It 
delayed many of the crucial reforms until mid-1990s. It also did not share the first-mover 
advantage enjoyed by the CEECs, when the announcement of prospective EU accession 
served as a strong incentive for both market-seeking and export-oriented inward FDI, which 
in turn facilitated the upgrading of product composition of exports. In the absence of these, 
                                                          
5 The share of the EU in exports of Visegrad countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak 
Republic – increased from about 40 percent to 70 percent between 1989 and 1995 (Hoekman and Djankov, 
1996). 
6 The share of intraregional trade varied from 21 percent in Romania to 47 percent in Czechoslovakia, while for 
the republics of USSR intra-union trade accounted for 80-90 percent of total trade See Michalopoulos and Tarr 
(1996) for a detailed account of early trade reorientation record in CEECs and FSU.  
7 With the share of intra-union trade of around 90 percent, compared to 82 percent for Ukraine. 
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geographic proximity and educated labour seem to have been insufficient conditions for a 
closer integration with the EU.  
The reform record has implications for a broad range of issues, which ultimately affect the 
general economic development and international competitiveness of a country. As discussed 
in CHAPTER 3, delayed trade liberalisation, macroeconomic stabilisation and structural 
reforms in the early years of transition negatively affected the business and investment 
climate in Ukraine. These reforms had subsequent implications for a whole range of supply-
side factors in export performance: quality and composition of products, productivity, quality 
of transport infrastructure and trade-related institutions, attractiveness for FDI and 
participation in transnational manufacturing chains, financial intermediation and tax 
collection, as well as managerial and marketing culture, all of which affect the ability of a 
country to enter more advanced markets.8   
On the demand side, admittedly Ukraine has not enjoyed the free trade regime granted by the 
EU to CEECs in early 1990s, has not benefited from regional and structural funds that 
facilitated institutional reforms and the upgrading of transport infrastructure, and has not 
enjoyed the flow of FDI that was driven to CEECs by their accession prospects, hence 
missing the opportunity of upgrading product quality towards standards that would meet the 
demand and tastes of the EU consumers.  
All of the above are only some of the potential explanatory variables in the export 
performance equation. While acknowledging the variety and complexity of these factors, this 
study primarily focuses on a set of macro- and micro- (or firm-level) economic forces that are 
customary to trade reorientation literature. Acknowledging the specifics of Ukrainian business 
environment, where several large oligarch-controlled financial-industrial groups account for 
over 40 percent of exports, the thesis also extends the study to the role of business elites in 
trade policy formation between the EU and Ukraine.  
The institutional environment of bilateral relations with the EU and CIS could justifiably be 
treated as another explanatory variable of the direction of Ukrainian exports. However, in the 
case of the EU-Ukraine-CIS triangle the institutional setting is characterised by a much more 
complicated dynamics, rather than being an exogenously defined explanatory variable. While 
in terms of trade policy of the EU Ukraine is still treated as most other third countries (not 
                                                          
8 Thus, Vandycke (2003) finds that business environments, trade infrastructure (both physical and institutional), 
and local marketing skills present major challenges for foreign investors willing to include the CIS producers 
in their international value chains. 
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benefiting from a free trade regime), the geopolitical context is more far-reaching and may (or 
may not) imply a much closer political and economic integration in the future, where trade is 
only one of the pillars. Rather than policy affecting trade, the desire to expand trade and other 
economic links may in part be driving the policy of EU integration in Ukraine. Hence the 
institutional environment appears to be an endogenous variable. EU-Ukraine integration is 
therefore treated as a motivation and a point of departure of this thesis. It is however worth 
informing the rest of the study by describing the evolution of the institutional framework of 
relations with the EU and the CIS.  
1.2. Institutional background to Ukraine’s economic relations with 
the CIS and the EU 
1.2.1. Ukraine-CIS 
The Commonwealth of Independent States was founded in 1991 by the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine and Belarus, and joined later by the rest of the former republics of USSR except the 
Baltic states. Ukraine, however, has never ratified the next founding document – the CIS 
Charter, signed in 1994 – and therefore de jure remains a non-member of the CIS, although de 
facto it is an active participant. Economic cooperation within the CIS has been characterised 
by continuous efforts to save the deep integration that existed during the Soviet times, which 
were often driven by the Russian Federation. In the absence of supranational political bodies 
(which were nearly impossible to create on the backdrop of the newly regained sovereignty by 
individual FSU republics), economic route effectively became the main vehicle of integration 
and mutual influence. In 1994 a plurilateral agreement establishing a CIS-wide FTA was 
signed by all CIS members except Turkmenistan. However it was never ratified by Russia and 
hence remained inoperative.  
A multilateral FTA was replaced by a patchwork (or a ‘spaghetti bowl’)9 of bilateral FTAs 
signed between most CIS members during the 1990s. These agreements are aimed at 
liberalising all trade in goods and services; however they operate with numerous exemptions 
and with an active use of contingent measures and quantitative restrictions, especially by 
Russia in its trade relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and more lately even with a 
traditional ally Belarus.10 Between 1999 and 2003 Russia and Ukraine engaged in a series of 
                                                          
9 e.g Broadman (2005), p. 161.  
10 The FTA between Russia and Ukraine excludes about 200 categories of goods, some of which are major 
Ukrainian export categories. Against the spirit of an FTA in 1997-1998 Russia introduced VAT and tariffs on 
foodstuffs and alcoholic drinks from CIS countries that were not members of the customs union.As a result 
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trade wars, and more recently Russia has been resorting to bans on imports of broad product 
categories from Ukraine, often the ones where Ukraine had a particular comparative 
advantage.11  
While these rows had left the international community largely uninterested, the gas rows that 
erupted between Russia and Ukraine in January 2006 and in 2009, and resulted in the 
interruption of gas supplies to many parts of Western Europe, attracted a lot of attention and 
became a major security issue for the EU.  
The reason Russia never ratified a CIS-wide FTA is believed to be its preference for a 
customs union over an FTA. Ever since the collapse of the USSR, it has been promoting the 
establishment of a “Russo-centric” customs union with varying membership. The first attempt 
was the CIS Economic Union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (later joined by 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) created in 1995, which was formalised into a customs union in 
1999. As a next step in an incremental move towards policy harmonisation the same countries 
established the Eurasian Economic Community (or Eurasec) in 2000. Ukraine and Moldova 
became observers in Eurasec in 2002. A year later, in 2003, another regional agreement was 
established – Single Economic Space – which was meant to include only the biggest 
economies of CIS: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. Integration within this 
organisation has not moved very far due to Ukraine’s resistance to go as far as customs union. 
After a while this initiative has lost momentum and Eurasec remained the only effectively 
operating organisation.12  
For Ukraine participation in the customs union with the CIS states has always been less 
desirable in view of its aspirations to join the European Union, which would be impossible as 
a country cannot be a member of two customs unions at a time. Participation in the SES 
would be incompatible even with an FTA with the EU, as Ukraine would have to give up its 
sovereignty over certain trade policies to a supranational SES decision-making body (CEPS, 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Ukrainian exports of sugar declined by 55 percent and those of alcohol by more than two thirds. (Clement, 1999, 
p. 292) 
11 Russia was targeting Ukrainian steel pipes, zinc, steel, some metal products and confectionery (through higher 
tariffs and/or antidumping measures), and Ukraine targeting imports of electric filaments, a variety of products 
from light and chemical industries, and automobiles from Russia, using quotas, higher tariffs and antidumping 
measures as a tool (World Bank, 2004). Since 2006 Russia imposed a ban on imports of all livestock and dairy 
products from Ukraine, all in all 20 products. http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/Quality-Safety/Russian-
import-ban-hits-Ukraine-dairy-industry , retrieved on 20 August 2010.  
12 After Ukraine’s consistent refusal to participate in a customs union within CIS, Russia finally brokered the 
establishment of the customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan in early 2010. Since harmonisation of external 
tariffs had been in process long before this agreement was signed, this union, unlike previous initiatives, seemed 
to start functioning at the time of writing. 
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2006: 56). However a customs union within CIS has been argued to have potential negative 
implications for all of its members. In terms of static effects, customs union envisages a 
harmonisation of external tariffs at the level closer to Russian import tariffs, which are 
generally higher than those of smaller and hence more open CIS members. This would be 
trade diverting, as goods from the union would displace previously cheaper goods from third 
countries, which is why tariff harmonisation was one of the major stumbling blocks in all 
previous negotiations. Dynamic effects of a customs union with relatively high common 
external tariffs are also likely to be negative, as members of the customs union are likely to 
become locked in with locally produced technology, while lower competition from outside of 
the union might have negative implications on firms’ efficiency, productivity and innovation 
(Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1997). Moreover, as Hare (2000) argues, both FTA and customs 
union among CIS countries are likely to be economically disadvantageous as, unlike EU or 
NAFTA13, this union would not be large or competitive enough to gain significant benefits 
from economies of scale and specialisation within the region.14  
Even before looking at the progress of cooperation with the EU, the existing evidence shows 
that economic integration within the CIS is heavily distorted by the abundant use of 
contingent measures. The apparent divergence of Ukraine from the Russo-centric deep 
economic integration project suggests that politically and institutionally Ukraine has been 
gradually moving away from the East in its foreign economic relations.  
1.2.2. Ukraine-EU 
The European Union built its relations with the former Soviet Union countries (except Baltic 
countries) on the basis of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA). The PCA with 
Ukraine was signed in 1994 and was ratified by all EU member states in 1998, and in the 
same year Ukraine declared EU membership as its strategic goal. The European Union, 
however, has drawn a clear line between its relations with the CEECs and the former Soviet 
Union (FSU), never providing a membership perspective to either of the latter. Although PCA 
was meant to promote institutional, legal and administrative reforms, lack of a strong 
                                                          
13 North American Free Trade Agreement. 
14 Another complicating layer in the customs union formula has been the intention of perspective members to 
harmonise their trade policies prior to WTO accession. Ukraine indicated unambiguously that WTO accession 
would be a priority for Ukraine over CES. As of 2005-2006 Ukraine intensified the adoption of reforms 
necessary for WTO accession, agreeing to bind its tariffs at a level much lower than that of Russia, and in 2008 
joined the WTO. This effectively froze the development of CES and prompted the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus to focus on establishing the customs union on the basis of Eurasec (Cooper, 2007). 
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incentive – as e.g. EU membership – and its legally non-binding nature made it a largely 
ineffective tool in promoting any domestic change in Ukraine and in other CIS countries.  
As far as trade in goods is concerned, although EU average tariff is rather low – just over 4 
percent – and Ukraine enjoys additional trade preferences through the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP), the regime still masks significant tariff peaks on ‘sensitive’ products, in 
particular on agricultural products, where tariffs can reach 100 percent (e.g. dairy products are 
subject to 93 percent duty, Francois and Rombout, 2001: 10). However higher quality and 
technical requirements than those in the CIS and developing economies make non-tariff 
barriers not less if not more important than tariff protection. In a survey of Ukrainian 
exporters, Jakubiak et al. (2006) found that costs incurred to meet EU technical and quality 
requirements amount up to 14 of total production costs, while certification costs add up to 
further 4 percent. The anti-dumping measures are also actively used by both sides15. It is 
unfortunate that no similar estimates are available on the costs of non-tariff barriers, in 
particular of contingent protection, in the Ukrainian-Russian trade. On a micro-level, 
however, they certainly exceeded 18 percent of total production costs for certain producers, 
affected by the Russian ban on imports of Ukrainian products, as they were losing up to 50 
percent of their annual export revenues (thus most likely exceeding the production costs) by 
losing the Russian market.  
As long as Ukraine, as well as Moldova and Georgia, which also demanded accession 
prospects, remained away from the EU borders, the EU had little interest in, or commitment 
to, deepening the economic relations with these countries. The approaching eastern 
enlargement, however, changed this perspective and the EU sought to project its 
‘transformative power’ (Grabbe, 2006) on the countries beyond its new eastern border 
(Wolczuk, 2009). In order to do this in 2004 it launched the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) targeting its neighbours in the FSU and the Mediterranean. The ENP was aimed to 
make a bigger difference in the region by promoting ‘security and prosperity’ in return for a 
stronger incentive – ‘access to the internal market’ (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2004: 2-3). At the same time, Ukrainian December 2004 ‘Orange’ revolution 
                                                          
15 According to WTO, Ukraine ranked 14th in the world as a target of AD investigations between 1995 and 2008, 
with 61 investigations initiated against it (a share of total investigations about ten times greater than Ukraine’s 
share of world trade). The European Union has been mainly applying AD measures against Ukraine’s 
metallurgical and chemical products. By the end of 2008 Ukraine had eight AD measures against the EU in 
force, covering fabrics, steel pipes, screw compressor installations, incandescent lamps, laminated fiberboards. 
(European Commission, 2010. Seventh Annual Report from the Commission to the European Parliament. 
Overview of third country trade defence actions against the European Union. Available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/june/tradoc_146274.pdf , accessed on 10th of October 2010). 
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brought to power a pro-Western leadership, which, in addition to a strong demand for EU 
membership, promised to embark on a path of comprehensive reforms. This was in line with 
the EU’s goal of creating an area of ‘stability and prosperity’ on its borders, and therefore 
made the case for stronger EU involvement. 
Although the PCA envisages ‘considerable projection of EU rules’ as it introduces 
commitments that require changes in the domestic legislation in Ukraine (Dimitrova and 
Dragneva, 2009), either due to the lack of strong conditionality, or due to the lack of sufficient 
political will, it remained largely an ineffective tool for promoting domestic change in 
Ukraine. The ENP uses principles built into the PCA, but adds ‘normative’ (Wolczuk, 2009) 
or ‘soft power’ (Cremona and Hillion, 2006) character through its main implementation tool – 
the Action Plan. The EU-Ukraine Action Plan, signed in February 2005, contains a detailed 
list of measures that Ukraine needs to implement in order to benefit from the incentives 
offered by the EU – liberalisation of trade in goods and services, facilitation of free movement 
of people, bigger financial assistance and participation in the EU programmes and projects. 
Moreover, it provided for a limited period of implementation – only three years.16 While 
admittedly at that stage the incentives were less clearly defined than Ukraine’s ‘to do list’,17 in 
2006 the EU offered Ukraine to establish a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA), 
the first of its kind to be offered to a non-candidate country.18 Along with visa facilitation 
talks, DCFTA became the main incentive for the reform process in Ukraine. Moreover, in 
March 2007 the EU and Ukraine launched negotiations on a new enhanced agreement to 
replace the PCA, and in September 2008 during the EU-Ukraine Summit it was decided to 
name it the ‘Association Agreement’, which would envisage both economic integration and 
political association.19  
While the conditions of the Association Agreement and of DCFTA in particular are still being 
negotiated, a certain critical opinion of the ENP has formed among Ukrainian leadership and 
in the academic fora early on. Ukraine’s official immediate and henceforth consistent 
response to the ENP has been negative, as it did not offer membership prospects and proposed 
                                                          
16 When negotiated during Kuchma presidency, the AP foresaw implementation within five years, after Orange 
revolution it was decided to shorten it to three years.  
17 Most core incentives - ‘enhanced preferential trade relations’, ‘increased financial assistance’ and in particular 
‘a stake in the internal market’ – were not clearly defined and presumed only long-term effect.  
18 Being part of the offer of ‘access to the internal market’, it is currently present only in Ukraine’s and 
Moldova’s Action Plans.  
19 In the process of negotiating the Association Agreement, on 23rd of November 2009 the sides agreed to 
strengthen the content of the Action Plan and replaced it with the Association Agenda (“EU-Ukraine Association 
Agenda to prepare and facilitate the implementation of the Association Agreement”, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ukraine/index_en.htm , retrieved on 25th of January 2010).  
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a universal approach to very different neighbours – from Northern African countries, which 
would never seek EU membership, to Belarus, whose democratic record has been one of the 
worst in Europe. More broadly, the ENP has been criticised for its weakness in promoting 
‘stability and prosperity’ due to its vaguely defined incentives, long-term character of rewards 
in return for short-term costs, lack of sanctions and assumption of administrative capacities 
where they were lacking.20  
At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that WTO accession was accelerated by the EU 
making it a precondition for the start of negotiations on the DCFTA.21 As Wolczuk (2009) 
argues, despite the political instability in Ukraine and the lack of consistent political will, the 
level of effectiveness and accountability of the government was sufficient, and ‘pro-European 
enclaves within the state apparatus’ (p. 202) managed to achieve substantial progress in the 
implementation of the Action Plan (AP) – a process she labels ‘implementation without 
coordination’. Melnykovska (2008) suggests that the combined effort of EU-oriented enclaves 
and that of business groups accelerated the AP implementation.   
Although the impact of the progress in AP implementation on the exporting performance of 
Ukrainian enterprises is hard and too early to assess, in certain areas the positive effects can 
be inferred. Thus, simultaneously with the adoption of the AP, in February 2005 the EU 
granted market economy status to Ukraine, improving the position of Ukraine in the 
resolution of anti-dumping investigations. Accession to the WTO, which was accelerated by 
the prospect of launching the DCFTA negotiations, removed quantitative restrictions (quotas) 
on imports of Ukrainian steel products by the EU. An already undertaken legal approximation 
in certain areas and harmonisation of standards in the area of customs administration and 
technical standards, even if immediate effects are unknown, carries substantial dynamic 
positive effects as part of trade facilitation efforts. Further legal approximation with the 
acquis will improve access of Ukrainian products to the markets of all developed economies, 
not only those of the EU, as essentially legal harmonisation implies the adoption of best 
international standards.  
Several conclusions relevant to the rest of this thesis emerge from the above discussion: 
                                                          
20 See Borzel (2009), Mayer and Schimmelfenning (2007), Noutcheva and Emerson (2007), Delcour and 
Tulments (2009) for an analysis of weaknesses of the ENP.  
21 As stipulated in the ‘10 points’ strengthening the Action Plan, proposed by Javier Solana and Benita Ferrero-
Waldner. General Affairs External Relations Council (2005) “EU-Ukraine – Strengthening the Strategic 
Partnership”. MEMO/05/57, Brussels, 23 February 2005, available at 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/ukraine/intro/index.htm , retrieved on 20 September 2006.  
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§ Ukraine is already enjoying free trade agreements with most CIS economies, while 
trade with the EU is still protected by tariff and non-tariff barriers, and adoption of a 
free trade regime might take a few years to achieve. Moreover, some sensitive 
products might still be excluded from the DCFTA.  
§ Although average import tariff in the EU is low, ‘sensitive’ agricultural products, in 
some of which Ukraine has comparative advantage, are subject to tariff peaks of up to 
100 percent. At the same time, with CIS members Ukraine enjoys pragmatic economic 
relations already built on the basis of a free trade regime. However, the de jure free 
trade with Russia, the most important destination country for Ukrainian exports, de 
facto is marred by numerous distortions – exemptions from free trade, tariff quotas, 
anti-dumping measures and, most importantly, contingent protection, whereby imports 
of some of the most important Ukrainian export products are suspended for prolonged 
periods of time. By adding a huge element of insecurity and uncertainty, this affects 
not only the current export revenues, but also enterprises’ future output, thus 
producing a downward pressure on future GDP growth.  
§ As far as deeper integration efforts are concerned, integration within the CIS – as 
promoted by Russia, through the creation of the customs union – mainly implies 
harmonisation of external import tariffs with those of Russia,22 which has a potential 
trade diverting effect and negative dynamic effects through locking in trade among 
less technologically advanced partners. Initiatives to adopt a single currency or 
coordinate macroeconomic policies and WTO accession reforms proved unrealistic 
and have been abandoned. Since Ukraine repeatedly rejected the idea of joining a 
customs union with Russia and other CIS members, the only option currently (2010) 
on the Ukrainian agenda is preserving a free trade regime with the CIS, which is 
clearly in its interests. This may, however, change with time should Ukrainian 
government return to the idea of a customs union with Russia and other CIS members.  
§ On the other hand, deeper integration with the EU, in the form of a deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreement, is a very slow process, with numerous demands 
on the Ukrainian side and no incentive in the form of membership prospects, and few 
other effective tools for accelerating the implementation. Despite these weaknesses, 
Ukraine is making progress in implementing the trade-related reforms envisaged by 
                                                          
22 Although by the time Ukraine joined WTO (in 2008) this would be impossible as at the time of accession it 
bound its tariffs at an agreed level, which is lower than that of Russia.  
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the Action Plan (see e.g. Razumkov Centre, 2007). In the long-term, this integration 
entails large positive dynamic gains – improvement of the business and investment 
climate, which would encourage industrial and product upgrading and attract inward 
FDI, gaining access to the largest market in the world, as well as general benefits of 
more advanced democracy and human rights. As will be discussed in CHAPTER 2 
below, integration with a technologically more advanced market is also expected to 
bring about technological upgrading, innovation, and improved productivity. Despite 
the weaknesses of the institutional setting of EU integration, early evidence of 
implementation during 2005-2008 suggests that even non-enforceable EU 
conditionality can bring about slow but positive domestic change.  
§ In an analysis of legal institutional powers of the EU and CIS in their relations with 
Ukraine, Dimitrova and Dragneva (2009: 858) also conclude that EU’s external 
governance “is clearly more advanced in using institutions to structure governance and 
to project policies”. However, Ukraine’s interdependence with Russia may limit this 
ability. Since this interdependence is weaker in trade relations than in e.g. foreign 
policy and energy, it is precisely through this channel that the EU is trying to promote 
‘rule transfer’. Freinkman et al. (2004) also suggest that despite the existing 
possibilities for a deeper trade integration within the CIS, institutional and legal 
weaknesses of the regime prevented any progress in this direction.  
Therefore, it appears that integration with the EU, even if slow, is preferable to integration 
within CIS that goes beyond free trade agreements.  This has been the policy choice made by 
successive Ukrainian governments. It is, therefore, forming a background to this research. The 
discussion also suggests that institutional setting is a complex and endogenous variable in the 
EU-Ukraine trade relations. In this thesis, however, the author pursues the aim of exploring 
the factors that have determined Ukraine’s trade performance so far, before the trade 
liberalisation with the EU has taken place, and shedding light on the ground-level economic 
and political economy forces.  
The next section will review the relevant approaches in the literature that have been used to 
study Ukraine’s export performance, while section 1.4 will explain the approach taken in this 
thesis.  
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1.3. Review of the relevant literature 
Reorientation of Ukrainian exports has received a lot of attention in the literature. At the risk 
of over-simplification, in terms of the analytical approaches this literature can largely be 
divided into four strands:  
§ General political economy analysis of Ukrainian (or CIS) trade;23  
§ Europeanisation literature, which analyses the institutional and political science 
considerations of Ukraine’s political and economic integration with the EU, where 
trade and investment play a central role;24  
§ Literature based on computational modelling of the consequences of trade 
liberalisation, or ex ante analysis (which is sometimes used to support the arguments 
in the Europeanisation literature);25 
§ Empirical literature, or ex post analysis, which looks at the determinants of past export 
performance on the basis of statistical analysis or structural indices and/or indicators. 
The first strand of literature concerns a broad range of aspects relating to trade reorientation, 
and is drawn upon in various parts of this thesis; therefore its review is beyond the scope of 
this chapter. Analysis stemming from the Europeanisation literature has partially been 
reflected in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 above, and concerns mostly institutional and political 
science aspects of integration, which, as has already been mentioned, is viewed as an 
endogenous rather than exogenous variable for the purposes of this thesis, and therefore is not 
reviewed in more detail here. The third approach effectively refers to the dependent variable – 
the extent of reorientation of Ukrainian trade to the EU and, more specifically, the effects of 
further liberalisation of this trade. The fourth directly relates to the approach pursued in this 
thesis.  
Studies based on computable general equilibrium models focus on how the existing trade 
patterns (and general welfare) would change in the future, should trade with the EU be 
liberalised.  
The universal conclusion from these studies (CEPS, 2006; IER, 2006a; Ecorys and Case, 
2007) is that free trade agreement that involves only elimination of tariffs by both Ukraine 
                                                          
23 e.g. World Bank (2004), Quaisser and Vincentz (2001), CEPS (2006), and as far as trade with CIS countries 
are concerned, Michalopoulos and Tarr  (1994, 1997), Freinkman et al. (2004), Broadman (2005), Cooper 
(2007).   
24 e.g. Wolczuk (2005, 2008, 2009), Vinhas de Souza et al. (2005), Dodini and Fantini (2006)  
25 E.g. CEPS (2006), Ecorys and CASE Ukraine (2007), IER (2006a, b), Harbuzyuk and Lutz (2004).  
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and the EU will not lead to either increase in exports or to welfare gains for either of the 
parties. This is due to the asymmetry in the existing levels of protection – on average much 
lower in the EU than in Ukraine – and, secondly, due to the EU’s tendency not to fully 
liberalise certain sensitive agricultural imports, some of which are Ukraine’s comparative 
advantage (e.g. dairy products). Thus, a study by CEPS (2006) finds that overall welfare gains 
are negligible in case of a simple FTA, but significantly positive in the case of a DCFTA – 
ranging from 7-10 percent of GDP in static effects, and two to three times higher if improved 
institutional quality is achieved (dynamic effects). 
While studies based on CGE modelling seek to explore future levels of trade after preferential 
liberalisation, gravity model analysis seeks to explain the observed levels of trade and 
compare them with the ‘natural’ levels. From early years of transition, and yet before the 
collapse of the USSR, scholars had been wondering how much did the political and economic 
isolation distorted the volumes of trade between members of Comecon and Western 
economies, and how these volumes were expected to change once the barriers were 
eliminated (e.g. Hamilton and Winters, 1992; Baldwin, 1994; Piazolo, 1996; Gros and 
Dautrebande, 1992). Gravity modelling was the typical analytical tool applied to answer this 
question.  
Kaminski et al. (1996) estimated that in 1985 the degree of inter-state exports for Ukraine 
should decline from the actual level of 85 percent to the predicted level of 33 percent. Indeed, 
by 2001 Ukraine’s exports to the CIS amounted to 30 percent, suggesting that the country 
reached the normal level of trade with the FSU. In another early study on trade reorientation 
Brenton and Gros (1997) highlighted that as of 1995, unlike CEECs, both Ukraine and Russia 
were lagging behind in reorienting their trade towards the EU. Ukraine’s normal levels of 
exports to the EU would be expected to be around 40 percent of total exports, and the same 
share of imports would be expected to originate from the EU. They note that at that point only 
10 percent of Ukrainian exports were going to the EU. It is important to note that they were 
referring to the then 15 members of the EU. While as a trade bloc of 27 countries the EU is 
often cited as Ukraine’s most important trade partner, followed by Russia (e.g. IER, 2006)26, 
it is remarkable that the share of the EU-15 never exceeded 21.2 percent (in 1999), and in 
                                                          
26 Thus, in 2005 the share of EU-27 in total Ukrainian exports was 29.8%, while that of Russia 21.9%. Although 
this comparison is valid if one compares strictly the customs territories, as a preferential trade area, even if only 
on bilateral basis, CIS appears to be a more intuitive comparator. And in this case the share of CIS exceeds that 
of the EU-27 – 31.3% in 2005 vs 29.8% respectively, a gap which widened even further by 2008 – 35.6% vs 
27% respectively. These and other trade patterns will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.  
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2008 amounted to only 14.4 percent of total exports. Hence, even if the estimate of 40 percent 
was exaggerated, the observed shares suggest that the expected level of trade reorientation 
was never reached in Ukraine. The common conclusion that seems to emerge from these and 
other studies (e.g. Freinkman et al., 2004; Broadman, 2005) is that Ukraine does not over-
trade with the EU, but, given the bias towards the CIS and other partners (e.g. China and 
Turkey), some rebalancing towards the EU-15 would still be reasonable to expect.  
This thesis shifts the focus of the analysis from over- or under-trading to whether, other things 
being equal, membership in a specific trade bloc (EU or CIS) is associated with relatively 
higher or lower levels of Ukrainian exports.  
All macro-level studies, however, are concerned with countries (or industries), but do not 
capture the specifics of firms – the actual entities that conduct trade. Firm-level analysis has 
found its way into the trade-related literature relatively recently – since early 2000s – and 
research of this kind focusing on Ukraine is still very scarce. A few studies that have been 
done mainly looked at the general internationalisation of Ukrainian firms, rather than 
destination-specific internationalisation (that would distinguish between exports to the EU 
and CIS). Thus, Wright et al. (2002) and Filatotchev et al. (2001) found a strong positive 
relationship between foreign investments and export intensity in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. 
The latter study also found positive effect of product innovation and previous export 
experience on the likelihood of the firm to internationalise. A more recent study (Shevtsova, 
2010) looked at destination-specific internationalisation, and found that entry to both the EU 
and CIS markets by Ukrainian firms leads to post-entry productivity gains, however the gains 
are higher in trade with the EU than those in trade with the CIS. Evidence on the 
internationalisation of Ukrainian firms is still very patchy, and this thesis intends to shed more 
light on this issue by making use of the two newly available datasets.  
The next section outlines the general approach followed in the rest of the thesis.  
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1.4. Approach in this thesis 
The research in this thesis adds to the existing body of literature by taking a multi-level 
approach to export determinants, exploring macro-, micro- and political economy factors. 
This will hopefully add coherence to what is now a very patchy picture of determinants of 
Ukraine’s integration into the global economy, and by bridging various approaches will 
reinforce the conclusions from each of the angles.  
The principal subject of this research is export performance of Ukraine, as a special case of a 
transition economy undergoing a process integration and trade liberalisation with the 
European Union, at the same time maintaining deep economic links with its historical 
neighbours – former Soviet Union republics. As opposed to many studies that seek to explore 
the implications of greater integration with the West versus the East, this analysis takes an ex 
post approach, arguing that understanding the forces that have been driving Ukraine’s export 
performance so far is equally important for the ongoing and future policy-making.  
The objective of this research is two-fold. Firstly, to assess the degree of Ukraine’s 
reintegration with the global economy, departing from the assumption suggested by theory 
that higher trade with the European Union is desirable for Ukraine in view of the economic 
benefits that stem from integration with a more advanced market.27 This is done by looking at 
the history of trade liberalisation since independence and the evolving geographical and 
commodity distribution of exports; and by undertaking a further structural analysis of exports 
by their factor content and by revealed comparative advantage, to reveal any positive 
dynamics in the country’s export profile. Secondly, to explore the reasons that lay behind the 
observed evolution and the degree of this reintegration. Knowing these reasons better might 
help in understanding the prospects for future deeper integration, and the obstacles that 
Ukraine is facing in this process.  
While the dependent variable in this research is export performance and destination of exports 
in particular, the explanatory variables are: macro-economic and trade bloc effects, firm-level 
characteristics and interest group lobbying. A more detailed description of research questions 
and hypotheses is provided in the conceptual framework in CHAPTER 2. 
Essentially, by the end of this multi-level analysis, the thesis will have shed light on the 
following conceptually simple research questions:  
                                                          
27 A motivation for this assumption is described in Chapter 2.  
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§ Does Ukraine under-trade with the EU as a trade bloc, as opposed to the traditional 
market of CIS, after controlling for basic economic and geographic factors? Are there 
any signs of trade diversion occurring as a result of EU Eastern enlargement? 
§ Are Ukrainian enterprises exporting to the EU larger, more dynamic, more innovative 
and more likely to have foreign links – as theory would predict – as opposed to 
enterprises serving the CIS market? 
§ Do large oligarchic businesses influence EU-Ukraine trade policy-making? Are they 
interested in the EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation and the EU integration in general? If 
so, how is this interest demonstrated? 
To the best of our knowledge, such an integrated multi-level approach is novel to the study of 
export performance, and should enrich the existing body of literature by a set of new 
interrelated findings. 
1.5. Methodology 
This section briefly maps the ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations 
of the thesis.  
The thesis represents an empirical, rather than a theoretical, inquiry into the reorientation of 
exports using an example of a single country. An empirical approach presumes an ex-post 
rather than ex-ante view.  
Single-country studies carry with them both advantages and disadvantages. They can be 
considered comparative if they employ or develop concepts that are applicable to other 
countries (Rose, 1991), or if they explore changes over time. Such studies are useful for 
generating hypotheses for theories that are yet to be fully specified or as ‘plausibility probes’ 
(Eckstein, 1975: 108).  They also constitute the most intensive of the comparative methods. 
The disadvantage of single-country studies is their susceptibility to problems of selection bias, 
introduction of too many variables with insufficient observations, and indeterminate research 
designs that yield less secure inferences than the other modes of comparison (Landman, 
2003). 
At the same time, this thesis aspires to prioritise the depth of the analysis and comprises a 
range of within-country comparative approaches. Firstly, it is a multi-level analysis, exploring 
the determinants of exports at different levels – essentially macro and micro. Secondly, 
sectoral comparisons constitute an important part of macro-level studies (the former 
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differentiating between steel- and non-steel exports). Thirdly, the study contains a temporal 
analysis, exploring how Ukraine’s competitiveness on advanced and traditional markets has 
changed since the start of transition. The different levels of analysis – micro or individual 
level, and macro, or system level – in political science literature gave rise to what is 
sometimes called the ‘structure-agency’ problem (Hay, 1995, 2002). Micro-analysis assumes 
that the world is shaped by the actions of ‘structureless-agents’, while macro-analysts believe 
that the world is shaped by the unstoppable process of ‘agentless-structures’. Thus, the macro-
level approach in trade literature looks at the system or economy level, and ignores the 
individual role played by firms. In this thesis an attempt was made to bridge these two 
approaches to inform the conclusions with insights from both systemic and firm levels.  
The analysis of these different levels of export determinants necessitates the use of methods 
appropriate for each of the explored levels. Mixed-method research strategies have become 
well-established in social sciences since the second half of the twentieth century, and 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998: 18) specifically distinguish “designs with multi-level use of 
approaches” as one of the possible mixed-method strategies. Bryman (2004a: 681) highlights 
that mixed-method research offers advantages in terms of increasing the validity of an 
investigation, however can pose problems of interpretation, especially if findings are 
inconsistent.  
The macro- and firm-level chapters attempt to infer some generative mechanisms and the 
relationships between the level of and the likelihood of exporting to the EU (as opposed to the 
CIS) and certain macro-economic and firm-level factors. Both the nature of the data available 
on these two levels and the dominant tradition of research in trade literature suggest a 
quantitative method for analysing these questions. In contrast, in exploring the role of 
business elites in trade policy-making a qualitative method is required, as the primary aim of 
this inquiry is not to infer generalisable conclusions and mechanisms, but rather to obtain a 
better understanding of the behavioural and contextual aspects that may explain the observed 
role of business elites in the EU-Ukraine trade. Besides, this part of the thesis is looking at a 
small number of objects of enquiry (large or ‘oligarchic’ businesses), in which case causal 
relationships are much harder to establish. As Bryman (2004b: 508) puts it,  
...employing both quantitative and qualitative research may provide a means of 
bridging the macro-micro gulf. Quantitative research can often tap large-scale, 
structural features of social life, while qualitative research tends to address small-
scale, behavioural aspects. When research seeks to explore both levels, integrating 
quantitative and qualitative research may be necessary.  
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This is exactly the strategy that is pursued in this thesis.  
The quantitative and qualitative inquiries are unavoidably informed by different ontological 
and epistemological roots. Ontologically, the fundamental purpose of quantitative research is 
to avoid subjectivity. The qualitative research, however, will be by definition subjective, even 
though the author’s aspiration was to be as objective as possible. 
Epistemologically, in their broader meaning, quantitative approach takes its philosophical 
roots in the positivist, while the qualitative – in the interpretivist tradition. However, the 
philosophical traditions that have developed in between these two ends of the scale can drive 
both quantitative and qualitative inquiries.  
While the orthodox view about quantitative research is fundamentally based on a positivist 
epistemology, whereby measurement is valid, reliable and can be generalised with clear 
anticipation of cause and effect (Cassell and Symon, 1994), the author of this thesis is more 
inclined towards a critical realist epistemology, which challenges some of these 
assumptions. While ‘positivists take the view that the scientist’s conceptualisation of reality 
actually directly reflects that reality, realists argue the scientist’s conceptualisation is simply 
a way of knowing that reality’ (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 18). The critical realist perspective 
recognises that all observation is fallible and has error and that all theory is revisable28, and 
looks beyond the observed relationships to explore the structures at work that generate those 
events.  
Although there is still no broad consensus as to the methodology of application of critical 
realism in economics, it does not preclude the application of quantitative methods.29 Either the 
methods applied can be different from those applied in orthodox quantitative approaches, or 
the way inferences are made. E.g. in econometrics, time series analysis is seen as superior to 
simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (e.g. Downward, 2003). 
While the quantitative part of thesis still largely relies on OLS or similar techniques (OLS in 
the macro-level analysis and panel data and logit regression analysis in the micro-level 
chapter), the method of drawing inferences is modified in the micro-level chapter. 
Recognising the limited explanation that the regression analysis is providing with regard to 
the given effect of exogenous variables, the approach in this thesis was to look at the 
underlying trade data that was driving the results and try to inform the interpretation of results 
                                                          
28 http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/positvsm.php , Research Methods Knowledge Base. Positivism & 
Post-Positivism. Retrieved on 10/08/2010.  
29 E.g. see Downward, 2003 for a review of perspectives on critical realism in applied economics.  
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by this additional information. As a result, the study gives the idea of both the broad 
determinants of export performance and of the structures at work that generate those events. 
Both macro- and micro-level analyses were carried out using a deductive approach.  
The study of the role of business elites in trade policy-making, on the other hand, was 
conducted using an inductive qualitative approach, with no strong hypotheses formed before 
the fieldwork. During the fieldwork the author conducted a range of in-depth unstructured 
interviews in Brussels, Kiev and Donetsk (15 in total), as well an analysis of media 
documents on the topic. At the end of the fieldwork the interviews and other findings were 
transcribed and analysed in a simple narrative way. The findings, however, provided little 
systematic picture, which made it difficult to arrive at a comprehensive academic analysis. A 
further analysis of political economy, economics and political science literature yielded a 
useful insight into certain stand-alone facts and allowed developing a conceptual framework 
that streamlined the findings from the fieldwork.  
Some important comments need to be made about the data used in this thesis. The macro-
level chapter benefits from being based on a dataset put together by the author, rather than 
using a ready-made dataset that could contain incompatibility or missed observations 
problems. However, since it was conducted at the early stage of the research, in the summer 
of 2006, it made use of the latest available data at that point, therefore covering the period 
from 1996 until only 2004. The micro-level data, on the other hand, was a great challenge to 
obtain. The readily available World Bank/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS) dataset provides a wide range of explanatory variables, but 
only differentiates between exporters and non-exporters (without distinguishing between 
destination markets) and therefore was not useful for analysing the determinants of export 
reorientation. After a series of failed attempts to obtain funding for a tailored survey of 
Ukrainian enterprises, incidentally the author received a dataset from a project funded by the 
European Commission grant on Economic and Social Consequences of Industrial 
Restructuring in Russia and Ukraine, which distinguished between destination markets. This 
dataset allowed exploring only a limited number of explanatory variables, but was the best 
data available on Ukraine at that period of time, and without it an envisaged multi-level study 
would not be possible. The data that was obtained from the interviews and used in the chapter 
on the role of business actors in trade policy-making was useful and informative, however the 
specificity of elite interviews should be borne in mind – the informants may not be willing to 
comment on politically sensitive issues.  
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Overall, the conceptual significance of the evidence was increased by the use of multi-level 
analysis and a ‘multi-layered’ approach in the micro-level and political economy of lobbying 
chapters. Even though the political and economic situation in Ukraine changed substantially 
after 2008 (due to the economic crisis and the change of government), the conceptual 
framework developed in CHAPTER 7 should remain a useful tool for analysing any given 
constellation of power among business and political elite, and not only in Ukraine but in any 
other country.   
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CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter sets out the theoretical foundations that form the basis for this study, and 
describes the conceptual framework used for the exploration of factors that explain the 
observed patterns of Ukraine’s export performance since independence and the degree of 
reorientation towards the EU.  
The first section provides the theoretical background against which the empirical part of this 
thesis should be interpreted. It reviews the relevant trade theoretical literature and explains 
why analysing export performance is important, why the geography and the commodity 
composition of exports matter, and what might be the best combination of those.  
The second section builds on the theoretical framework discussed in the first section and 
describes the conceptual framework employed in this thesis for the empirical analysis of the 
research question under investigation – factors that determine the trajectory of Ukrainian 
exports and their geographic and commodity composition since independence. The 
framework is based on the supposition that supporting the quantitative analysis of macro-level 
factors by firm-level quantitative analysis, and supporting the latter by a qualitative analysis 
of large financial-industrial groups (firms that cannot be explored in a quantitative manner) 
will provide a more comprehensive picture of Ukraine’s export determinants than the one 
available in the existing body of literature. 
The chapter as a whole, in the words of Leshem and Trafford (2007: 99), is meant to serve the 
following purpose: 
- Integrate the theories that offer explanations of the issue under investigation; 
- Serve as a bridge between paradigms which explain the research issue and the 
practice of investigating that issue; and 
- Provide traceable connections between the theoretical perspectives and research 
strategy and design.  
It is important to note that the theoretical perspectives described below motivate the study and 
provide the context for the empirical analysis. They do not, however, form the direct subject 
of the empirical part of the research. Apart from introducing the subject of research, the 
conceptual framework will ultimately help to conceptualise the conclusions within the 
respective theoretical context.  
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2.2. Theoretical background 
The broad aim of this thesis is to explore the factors that determine the degree of Ukraine’s 
integration with the EU as opposed to the integration with the traditional market of the CIS, as 
reflected through merchandise exports. In order to interpret the findings of the empirical part 
of this thesis correctly, it is essential to put the empirical approach in a broader theoretical 
context.  
2.2.1. Why focus on exports? 
First of all, it is important to explain why this thesis is about exports. Exports reflect the 
country’s role and place in the global economy. While the volume of exports reflects the 
degree of the country’s openness and the extent of integration with the global economy, the 
commodity structure shows the role it plays in this global setting and the gains that it reaps 
from trade. Exports may directly contribute to the economic growth of a country. Although 
there has been significant debate about the causality between exports (or overall trade) and 
growth, there is little disagreement over the positive association between these two 
processes.30 The channels through which exports may induce growth are numerous. Giles and 
Williams (2000) provide an extensive survey of the empirical literature on this subject. In the 
most direct way, export growth may represent an increase in the demand for the country’s 
products and thus help to increase its real output. New trade theory suggests that increased 
competition and economies of scale may lead to increased specialisation in exported products, 
which may then boost the productivity level and the level of skills, contributing to higher 
growth. Export expansion may also lead to industrial upgrading (Chow, 1987). Endogenous 
growth literature underlines the importance of access to technologies, learning-by-doing 
effects and better management practices, leading to further efficiency gains (e.g. Hart, 1983; 
Krugman, 1987; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990). In a similar vein, Lal and Rajapatirana (1987) 
suggest that export-oriented strategy may boost entrepreneurial activity, which will feed into a 
more dynamically developing economy.  
                                                          
30 Earlier studies (Sachs and Warner, 1995; Dollar 1992; Edwards, 1992; Frankel and Romer, 1999) found a 
strong and consistent relationship between exports (or trade) and economic growth. Development of new 
econometric techniques allowed scrutinising these findings and, although the positive relationship and the 
causality were not universally rejected, the link has been argued to be weaker than previously thought. In some 
cases (e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996, for Canada or Konya 2004 for Canada, Japan and Korea) the opposite 
causality has even been found – growth-driven exports rather than export-driven growth.  
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2.2.2. Exports of what? 
The products that a country exports also have important implications for the country’s 
economic growth potential and its place in the world economic order.  
The neo-classical trade theory – in particular Heckscher-Ohlin theorem (Heckscher and Ohlin, 
1924) – predicted that a capital-abundant country will be able to produce capital-intensive 
goods most efficiently, and will therefore export the capital-intensive good, while the labour-
abundant country will export the labour-intensive good. Based on this approach, for a long 
time the conventional view of the world was that a country’s fundamentals – endowments of 
physical and human capital, labour and overall institutional quality – will determine the 
relative costs and the patterns of specialisation of a country (Hausmann et al. 2006).31 Rich 
countries are usually considered to be more endowed with capital, while poor countries with 
labour. Consequently countries like the USA and Germany will be better positioned to 
produce and export cars or machinery, while Brazil or China would be better at exporting 
clothing or food.  
The Heckscher-Ohlin orthodoxy was challenged in the 1980s by an observation that the bulk 
of international trade was conducted between countries with similar factor proportions and 
that significant overlap existed within industries, implying that a considerable portion of trade 
was not being driven by factor endowments.32 E.g. in 1996, 65 percent of merchandise trade 
of the EU-15 was conducted within the union. Europe’s imports from Japan exceeded its 
imports from all of Africa and were more than twice as high as its imports from all of the 
Middle East (WTO, 1997, Table A10). Moreover, trade between EU and Japan, both on the 
imports and on the exports side, was dominated by capital-intensive products, such as cars, 
electronics and other machinery and equipment. In order to explain this extensive intra-
industry trade, Helpman and Krugman (1985) proposed a so-called increasing returns to scale 
theory (IRS), later referred to as new trade theory, which abandoned the assumption of non-
differentiated (identical) goods and identical technologies across countries, the main premise 
of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, and highlighted the importance of sectors with product 
differentiation – such as different brands in various product categories – which in order to be 
developed require economies of scale. Moreover, the share of intra-industry trade will be 
larger between countries that are similar both in composition of factor endowments and in 
                                                          
31 Although conceptually it fitted the trade patterns between developed and developing economies rather well, 
empirical evidence was inconclusive. See Helpman (1999) for review.  
32 This observation is attributed to Grubel and Lloyd (1975), who analysed the levels of intra-industry trade 
worldwide and composed an index of intra-industry trade (now referred to as Grubel-Lloyd index).  
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size. The IRS theory, however, still left room for factor proportions. Krugman (1981) and 
Helpman (1981) presented a vision of world trade patterns which integrated the new trade 
theory with the traditional factor endowments theory. Trade among rich countries, the North-
North trade, is intra-industry type and is based on the gains from specialisation and on 
economies of scale. The North-South trade, on the other hand, is predominantly inter-industry 
– where the North exports technology-intensive goods and imports lower value-added 
resource- and labour-intensive products from the South – and is based on differences in factor 
endowments.33 This hybrid paradigm has become a new vision of the determinants of world 
trade patterns.  
However, a developing country may manage to shift its comparative advantage and reorient 
its trade with the industrialised partners towards commodity patterns observed in the North-
North trade, i.e. towards more technology-intensive products, thus increasing its economic 
growth potential due to higher value-added content of exports. This idea, although based on 
the Ricardian concept of comparative advantage, has been embedded into the endogenous 
growth theory and referred to as a ‘dynamic comparative advantage’ theory (theoretically 
formalised by Redding, 1999, but mentioned earlier by various authors, e.g. Krugman, 1987, 
and Grossman and Helpman, 1991).  
Trade structure is also important for it is believed to have an impact on economic growth. The 
neoclassical trade literature tends to stress the importance of factor-content of exported 
products for growth prospects, drawing a broad distinction between resource-intensive or 
primary products and capital-intensive or manufacturing exports.  
Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) provided an influential body of research that found a 
detrimental impact of natural resource abundance on economic growth, which has since then 
been confirmed in many studies. In a study of least developed countries (LDCs), Fosu (1990) 
also found that the primary export sector exhibits little or no effect on GDP growth in LDCs, 
while there was a differential positive impact of the manufacturing export sector on growth. 
Similar results were reported by Auty (1998) and Dowrick and Golley (2004). As opposed to 
primary exports, exports of manufacturing goods have been found to have a positive impact 
on economic growth and on total factor productivity.34 
                                                          
33 The North-South Divide is a socio-economic and political division that exists between the wealthy developed 
countries, known collectively as "the North", and the poorer developing countries, or "the South." http://www.s-
cool.co.uk/gcse/geography/development/contrasts-in-development.html , retrieved on 10th of July 2010  
34 Fosu (1990) for least developed countries, Ghatak et al. (1997) for Malaysia, Herzer et al (2006) for Chile.  
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The channels through which the concentration of export structure in resource-intensive 
products may harm economic growth include: an alleged lower human and physical capital 
accumulation and productivity growth of resource-intensive sectors; the so-called ‘Dutch 
disease’, when over-reliance on the tradable sector leads to exchange rate appreciation, which 
harms the non-tradable sector; high concentration in resource-intensive exports may lead to 
higher export price volatility and hence greater macroeconomic volatility.  
While Sachs and Warner’s approach has become a mainstream approach to ‘resource curse’ 
issues, there is alternative literature that disagrees with this approach. Thus, Lederman and 
Maloney (2003) found a strong positive effect of natural resource-intensive exports on 
growth, controlling for export concentration (which indeed was found to have a negative 
impact), physical and human capital accumulation and intra-industry trade. The implication of 
this finding is that should a resource-rich country manage to maintain a diversified export 
structure and maintain high levels of physical and human capital accumulation, natural 
resource abundance will have a positive effect on the economic growth. Norway, Australia or 
Canada can serve as examples of such cases. However, in view of the author, either by chance 
or by some path-dependency, the majority of resource-rich countries, in particular non-
OECD, tend to have export structure highly concentrated in the abundant resource 
commodity. Therefore it seems that not allowing for export concentration would confirm the 
conventional wisdom that over-reliance on (i.e. high concentration in) natural resources may 
have a negative impact on the economic growth. This distinction is important in the Ukrainian 
context, where metals, often of low degree of processing, constitute around 40 percent of total 
exports.  
Endogenous growth literature brought a new dimension to the analysis of the effects of 
product composition on economic growth. By stressing the importance of innovation, 
knowledge accumulation and new technologies (and the spillovers and positive externalities 
that these factors may cause through trade), it suggests that product diversification (or variety) 
and specialisation in technology-intensive products may also have a positive impact on 
economic growth. Amable (2000), Laursen (2000), Peneder (2002) and Crespo-Cuaresma and 
Worz (2005) all find evidence of positive impact of specialising in technology-intensive 
sectors on economic growth, in particular through productivity-enhancing effects. Product 
variety has also been found to matter for growth. Funke and Ruhwedel (2001, 2005) find that 
higher export variety is associated with higher growth in both OECD and East European 
transition economies, including Ukraine. Klinger and Lederman (2006), although not 
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establishing the direction of causality, also showed that export diversification was a part of the 
growth process.35 
Building on the idea that technology matters for growth, and its effects can be dispersed 
across countries through trade, a number of scholars have developed more detailed measures 
of technology- or (in one instance) productivity-intensiveness of exports. Thus, Lall (2000) 
and Hatzichronoglou (1997) focus on factor content and technology-intensiveness, while 
Michaely (1984) and Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007) look at the implied productivity 
content of exports. The latter study demonstrated that the proposed measure of productivity 
level associated with a country’s export specialisation pattern is a consistent and robust 
predictor of subsequent growth. Interestingly, Ukraine performs relatively well on this 
dimension, i.e. its export structure is more sophisticated than its level of per capita income 
would predict, or, in other words, over-performs the level that would be in line with the 
aggregate level of productivity (see Annex 1 for a mapping of Ukraine compared to other 
countries).  
2.2.3. South-North or South-South? 
2.2.3.1. Trade theory  
As was already discussed above, both neoclassical and new trade theories propose a specific 
explanation of why trade flows are as they are between the developed (North) and developing 
(South) economies.36 To briefly recap, the former argues that global trade is dominated by the 
North-South exchange of goods, whereby North exports capital intensive products to the 
South, and in return buys labour-intensive goods. The new trade theory, on the other hand, 
seeks to explain why the North trades more with the North, and exchanges similar, mainly 
capital- and technology-intensive products. In this context, the South appears marginalised, as 
it has little capacity to achieve the necessary economies of scale to develop technology- and 
research and development (R&D) intensive export industries, which would allow them to 
increase the trade volumes with the North.  
Endogenous growth theory, first applied to international trade context by Grossman and 
Helpman (1991), is mainly based on the presumption that technological innovation is 
undertaken in the North, and the South mainly serves as an imitator. The ‘dynamic 
                                                          
35 Since this study is not directly investigating the link between exports and growth, the precise mechanisms for 
the latter effects are not discussed here. See e.g. Mayer (1996) for the discussion of the implications of the new 
trade and endogenous growth theories for diversification of exports.  
36 Note that here North/South is an economic concept, and does not have a geographical meaning.  
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comparative advantage’ theory, however, suggests that the South can shift its specialisation 
towards technology-intensive products by allowing temporary government intervention. 
Hence the theory implicitly suggests that trade with the North will be more growth-inducing. 
As far as transition economies are concerned, a number of authors found a significant positive 
association between growth in exports to non-FSU countries and growth in GDP 
(Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1996, for example).  
Classifying Ukraine on a North-South scale is not straightforward. Although in terms of GDP 
per capita Ukraine and the rest of Former Soviet Union fall under the North, and are not 
usually referred to as ‘developing economies’, but rather transition or emerging economies, in 
terms of their export structure – highly concentrated in primary and resource-intensive 
products – they rather have to be classified as the South. Hence, at least for analytical 
purposes, trade between Ukraine and CIS has to be categorised as a South-South relationship. 
On the other hand, at the start of transition, Ukraine and the rest of former Soviet Union, as 
well as CEECs, emerged as relatively industrialised economies with abundant and educated 
labour force. Both regions had limited trade with the EU, and whenever present, it was of 
North-South type in terms of commodity composition. CEECs, however, have relatively 
quickly reoriented their trade structure with the European Union towards North-North 
patterns, where vertical intra-industry trade has played a crucial role. At the same time 
Ukraine’s trade with the EU and other OECD remained of North-South type. Therefore, while 
there is no reason for Ukraine to fall under South in terms of its economic fundamentals, in 
terms of its export structure with the advanced economies, it does come across as North-South 
relationship.  
Both North-South and South-South vectors are of similar importance to Ukraine, accounting 
for about a third of total exports each, with the share of CIS following a U-shaped trend – first 
falling from over 80 percent to below 30 percent between 1991 and 2004, and recovering 
again to 36 percent after 2004 (see in more detail in CHAPTER 3). Moreover, while the 
commodity composition in trade with the North (EU) is dominated by products of low degree 
of processing, trade with the South (CIS), as will be discussed in detail in CHAPTER 3, is 
more reminiscent of North-North patterns, having a high degree of intra-industry trade37 and a 
higher content of capital- and technology-intensive products. Clearly, in view of the 
discussion above and of the experience of CEECs in trade with the EU, a reorientation 
towards North-North commodity structure in trade with the EU would be most beneficial. 
                                                          
37 54 percent, as opposed to 36 percent with the rest of the world (World Bank, 2005: 29).  
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However if the existing trend persists, at least in the medium term there is a dilemma – what 
is more beneficial for Ukraine – higher trade with the South in more sophisticated goods, or 
higher trade with the EU, but with a stagnant low-value added export structure? Although a 
range of factors are at play, from historical to institutional, it is interesting to see what 
economic theory has to say about this issue.  
Most of the literature that seeks to explain the levels of trade between a number of given 
countries is based on the gravity model (a simple model based on Newton’s law of gravity, 
first widely applied in geography, and then applied to international trade by Tinbergen, 1962), 
which has become a workhorse model of the trade literature. Although it can be derived 
theoretically, it is essentially atheoretical, and explains the volumes of trade between given 
countries based mainly on distance and economic mass (as well as a number of control 
variables, such as common border, common language and membership in trade blocs). 
Although it has provided a spectacular fit, the results are hard to relate to either of the strands 
of trade theory discussed above.38  
Endogenous growth theory suggests that technology-intensive exports are more conducive to 
economic growth than resource-intensive exports, through their effects on knowledge, 
innovation and human capital accumulation. At the same time, the theory is based on the 
assumption that most of the R&D and technological innovation is produced in the North, 
hence suggesting that trade with the North should be more beneficial for growth. Although 
most of the work is focused on the transfer of knowledge through imports, one other 
important channel is vertical intra-industry trade, whereby the South imports semi-finished 
products from the North for further processing or assembly, and exports back finished goods. 
This is the path that was followed by CEECs during the 1990s, which, whether directly or 
indirectly, has been associated with higher growth (e.g. Hunya, 2002; Campos and Kinoshita, 
2002). At the same time, North-South type of trade, dominated by inter-industry trade based 
on the classical notion of comparative advantage determined by factor proportions, exhibits 
decreasing returns to scale and may lead to regional trade diversion and protectionist 
pressures (Kaminski and Rocha, 2002).  
At the same time, Schiff, Wang and Ollareaga (2002), measuring bilateral openness to trade, 
find that both North-South and South-South trade openness has a positive impact on 
productivity, though the former is larger. Interestingly, it is primarily R&D-intensive 
                                                          
38 See a more detailed discussion of the literature on gravity models in CHAPTER 5. MACRO-LEVEL 
DETERMINANTS OF UKRAINIAN EXPORTS IN 1996-2004: STEEL MATTERS.  
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industries that are found to benefit from North-South trade, while low R&D-intensive 
industries benefit more from South-South trade. They explain this finding by a dynamic 
comparative advantage, whereby the South has a comparative advantage in low R&D-
intensive industries, which, if shared, may benefit its trading partners.  
In contrast, Orlova (2005), in a cross-country study of developed and transition economies, 
finds that while trading partners’ economic growth has a strong positive effect on domestic 
growth, the partners’ relative income level (GDP per capita), however, is negatively 
correlated with growth, suggesting that trading with a less developed but fast-growing country 
can be more beneficial for growth. 
A completely new strand of literature emerged when new theories of the firm and 
international trade were developed in early 2000s (starting with a seminal paper of Melitz, 
2003). Usually referred to as being based on models of heterogeneous firms, these studies 
shift the focus to firms as subjects of trade, rather than countries or industries, and consider 
which characteristics make firms more or less likely to export. While mainly focused on 
internationalisation per se, some firm-level studies (e.g. Blalock and Gertler, 2004) predict 
that exporting to the countries with higher level of technological development will bring about 
higher productivity gains, especially when capital intensive products are exported (through 
learning-by-doing, access to new innovative technologies, better managerial practices and 
other effects), while exporting to less advanced markets is not expected to have such positive 
externalities. Shevtsova (2010), studying the firm-level export dynamics in Ukraine, finds that 
exporting to both the EU and CIS is associated with post-entry productivity gains, and these 
gains are higher in trade with the EU and for capital-intensive products.39 Damijan et al. 
(2004), using the example of Slovenia, also find that firms exporting to more advanced 
markets have higher level of productivity prior to entry. Assuming that higher productivity of 
individual enterprises is associated with higher levels of aggregate growth, this finding also 
suggests that exporting to the ‘North’ will be associated with higher growth, although 
causality may run both ways.  
Hence, while theory predicts that trade with the North should be more growth-enhancing, 
empirical evidence is sometimes contradicting. This should be borne in mind when drawing 
conclusions from the apparently limited success of Ukrainian products on the European 
markets.  
                                                          
39 The evidence of capital-intensive exports to the EU being more productivity-enhancing than capital-intensive 
exports to the CIS is, however, inconclusive. 
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2.2.3.2. Regional trade integration / bilateral trade liberalisation 
A potential of regional integration changes completely the angle of the above assessment of 
benefits that may stem from greater trade with either the EU or the CIS. So far the discussion 
has been focused on greater volumes of trade and exports in particular. Regional trade 
integration with a more advanced market, depending on whether it is deep or shallow (also 
called negative and positive), may involve a broader range of positive effects. Shallow 
integration involves mainly elimination of tariffs and quotas, often with the exclusion of 
sensitive industries (like agriculture) and services. Deep integration, labelled so by Lawrence 
(1996), in addition to the free movement of goods, may include free movement of services 
and capital, and harmonisation of legal and institutional norms.  
When undertaken with a trade bloc of advanced economies, the benefits of such integration 
may also include a range of politically desirable effects: locked-in reforms, intra- or extra-
regional security, increased bargaining power in multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations, 
as well as project cooperation (e.g. in transport, energy, environment, etc.) (World Bank, 
2000). The same effects are likely to be less pronounced when a regional trade agreement is 
formed between less developed economies, while the first effect – promotion of reforms – is 
even less likely in cooperation between countries with mixed institutional and/or democratic 
record. From this point of view, Ukraine can clearly benefit from the incentives that an FTA 
with the EU can provide for institutional reforms.  
Moreover, establishment or enlargement of regional trade agreements can be trade creating or 
trade diverting, according to the famous Vinerian customs union theory (Viner, 1950). Trade 
diversion occurs when an enlarged bloc engages more in intra-bloc trade and/or raises 
external trade barriers and some more efficient third-country suppliers lose their market share. 
Trade creation, on the contrary, occurs when new members of a trade bloc lower their external 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, creating better market access to third-country suppliers. 
However, the formation of a customs union can create additional trade with non-members if it 
boosts the economic activity levels of the members enough to generate additional trade with 
non-members, sufficient to outweigh the trade-diverting effect. In the case of EU-Ukraine 
relations, enlargement of the EU customs union entailed abolition of free trade agreements 
between Baltic countries and Ukraine, and adoption of product standards and technical 
requirements in sensitive areas like agriculture by all new EU members, making it more 
difficult for Ukrainian producers to export to the Baltic countries and other new EU members. 
These and other factors created risks of trade diversion in trade between the new EU members 
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and Ukraine, creating strong incentives for a neighbouring third country like Ukraine to join 
the free trade area (or indeed a customs union) with the enlarged EU as well. Therefore the 
possibility of a deep integration with the European Union, even if distant, seems to promise 
greater benefits to Ukraine than integration with the CIS. 
Frankel (1997) also notes that South-South integration – trade blocs consisting of poorer 
countries with a level of development, or capital-labour ratio below world average – may, 
under certain conditions, lead to the divergence of welfare among bloc members, with the 
benefits captured by the most developed member of the bloc. This is particularly likely to 
happen when external tariffs of this bloc are high, which is not the case in the CIS.  
When accompanied by a prospect of full integration or membership, as was the case with the 
Eastern enlargement of the EU, regional integration may result in higher FDI flows, industrial 
upgrading, participation in integrated production processes and value chains, as well as 
institutional and legal reforms that further improve the business and investment climate in a 
less developed economy. Eventually, EU accession process has also been argued to result in 
income convergence (e.g. Barbone and Zalduendo, 1997; Matkowski and Prochniak, 2004).  
Ukraine has been calling for a prospect of EU membership since 1998, although itself making 
little progress in reforming its economy to approximate to the EU standards. EU, being in a 
state of enlargement fatigue, has consistently stated that membership is not on offer. As a 
result of long insistence on the part of Ukraine on its European vocation, EU recognised these 
aspirations by offering Ukraine the prospect of deep integration through a deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA). Apart from the liberalisation of trade in 
goods, it foresees liberalisation of trade in services and capital, and harmonisation of product-
related, legal and institutional standards (such as competition rules, intellectual property 
rights, government procurement, customs, etc.).40  
This process may produce large gains in the future; however the early progress – from 
launching of the European Neighbourhood Programme in 2004 to 2008, when negotiations on 
DCFTA were officially launched – has been rather slow.  
Although future benefits from deeper integration with the EU are important, as long as 
negotiations on the EU-Ukraine DCFTA are ongoing, the assessment of these benefits has to 
follow an ex ante approach, using either policy analysis or computable general equilibrium 
                                                          
40 According to the terms of reference for the new enhanced agreement between the EU and Ukraine (ECORYS 
and CASE, 2007).  
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modelling (which computes economic costs and benefits resulting from given policy 
changes). This thesis, however, aims to explore the performance of Ukrainian exports in an ex 
post fashion, as this may provide important insight based on actual events that already took 
place as opposed to future opportunities (keeping in mind the assumption of potential large 
gains from EU-Ukraine integration). Therefore, abstracting from the future effects for the 
purpose of this study, the next sub-section sets out the empirical framework for the ex post 
analysis undertaken in this thesis, placing it in the context of the above theoretical discussion.  
2.3. Empirical framework  
From the context we know that European integration has been a major factor in Ukraine’s 
political discourse and has a potential to significantly shape Ukraine’s future – economically, 
institutionally, politically and socially. Integration within the CIS, on the other hand, already 
has a track record. As discussed in the INTRODUCTION, the project of CIS integration, 
although de facto quite advanced, de jure remained unfinished: Russia never ratified the main 
plurilateral Agreement on the Establishment of the Free Trade Area, signed by all CIS 
countries (except Turkmenistan) in 1994, which therefore remains ineffective; Ukraine has 
not ratified a CIS Charter, thus remaining a participant, but legally not a full member. These 
are just some examples of ‘stumbling blocs’ in CIS integration. The main reason for this 
uneven progress has been the desire of the former Soviet republics to preserve their newly 
gained sovereignty. As far as trade liberalisation is concerned, bilateral free trade agreements 
between CIS countries also include a wide range of exemptions and contingent measures that 
distort the free trade and do not comply with WTO standards. The repeated attempts at 
creating sub-regional groupings (Eurasian Economic Union, which was supposed to become a 
customs union, Single Economic Space) have also failed so far.  
Therefore, these geopolitical as well as pragmatic pull and push factors speak in favour of 
moving progressively towards integration with the European Union. This process is, however, 
at its early stages and, arguably, has not yet affected the micro- and macro-economic 
fundamentals of Ukraine. Due to its prominence in the political discourse and the 
intensification of this discourse since 2005, it is, however, a point of departure of this thesis.  
While, as mentioned in the Introduction, it is important to acknowledge the multiplicity of 
factors that can explain the observed patterns of trade of a given country, the author chose to 
focus on economic forces – macro-level, explored with the help of the gravity model, micro- 
or firm-level, and business lobbying. The latter effectively serves as an extension of the firm-
 level analysis, which acknowledges the specifics
financial-industrial groups control most of the metallurgy production, 
for 40 percent of Ukrainian export revenues and about a quarter of GDP 
the quantitative firm-level a
Figure 1 below demonstrates 
of this analysis. Ukrainian exports, with a focus on main trade partners 
are the dependent variable, while macro
explanatory variables chosen in this study
methods, while for the latter a qualitative approach is more appropriate. 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework 
Source: Author’s research 
Although a lot of the theoretical background discussed above was about the eventual impact 
of exports on economic growth, the thesis as such does not explore this relationship. It was, 
however, important to set the scene for the rest of the empirical analy
understand the fundamental reasons for why geographic and commodity distribution of 
exports, and the combination of those, 
assumptions, discussed in the theoretical background,
both in the theoretical and empirical discussions of the chapters that follow. 
 of the Ukrainian economy 
which, in turn, accounts 
nalysis by a qualitative political economy analysis. 
schematically the ‘model’ adopted in the 
-, micro- and political economy of lobbying are the 
. The two former are studied using quantitative 
of the thesis 
should matter. The fundamental 
 will feature either directly or indirectly
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2.3.1. Dependent variable: Exports to the EU versus exports to the CIS 
The study starts with describing the dependent variable – the actual export performance of 
Ukraine on the main markets of interest, the EU and the CIS. CHAPTER 3 contains a detailed 
analysis of the changes in volumes, as well as geographic and commodity structure of exports 
in light of the changing political economy conditions in Ukraine since independence, which 
affected the overall health of the economy and hence export performance as well. 
Building on the theoretical discussion in the first part of this chapter, the thesis proceeds to 
analysing the factor content and revealed comparative advantage in trade with the EU and 
Russia. The balance between resource- and labour-intensive products on the one hand, and 
technology-intensive products on the other will reveal to what extent Ukraine can be 
characterised as the South in international trade terms (if its exports are resource- and labour-
intensive) and whether there are signs of ‘dynamic comparative advantage’. The latter, 
respectively, would indicate a sign of positive industrial upgrading that could bring about 
higher growth prospects and/or reorientation closer to the North-North relationship in trade 
with the EU. Factor-content analysis is undertaken according to Lall’s classification (Lall, 
2000), while in order to estimate Ukraine’s comparative advantage the traditional Balassa 
index of revealed comparative advantage is used (Balassa, 1965).  
The general picture that emerges from this analysis is that trade with the North (the EU) 
indeed exhibits a Heckscher-Ohlin commodity structure, with little intra-industry trade, an 
exchange of resource- and labour-intensive products in return for capital- and technology-
intensive imports from the EU, and little upgrading of the commodity structure. There are, 
however, some signs of an increase in exports of medium-technology products to the EU. 
Trade with the CIS, on the contrary, after an initial decline, has been recovering dynamically 
since early 2000s, while commodity composition underwent some positive change towards 
higher share of technology-intensive goods.  
At the first glance, these findings are at odds with the picture that was observed at the 
beginning of this research – in 2005. From early 1990s until 2003-2005 Ukraine seemed to be 
undergoing a steady reorientation of its exports towards the EU, a trend which reversed since 
then and is casting doubt on the shifting centre of gravity in Ukrainian trade. This fact calls 
for a more careful examination of the underlying factors that have been driving this export 
performance.  
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2.3.2. Macro-level determinants 
The argumentation of the endogenous growth theory suggests that higher trade with the EU is 
apriori desirable for Ukraine due to potential productivity and efficiency gains it may 
provide. The existing policy (e.g. CEPS, 2006) and political science discourse (e.g. Wolczuk, 
2006, 2008) also highlights the institutional, political and economic development benefits that 
the EU integration can bring to Ukraine. Using this majority view as a motivation, CHAPTER 
5 explores whether Ukraine under- or over-trades with the EU as opposed to the traditional 
market of CIS, employing the traditional empirical tool of international economics – the 
gravity model. Gravity model investigates whether a country A over- or under-trades with (in 
this study – exports to) a country B compared to the ‘natural level of trade’, which would be 
expected based on basic economic and geographic fundamentals – GDP, GDP per capita, 
distance, common border, access to the sea and common language. In an ideal, frictionless 
world without tariff and non-tariff barriers and with non-differentiated consumer preferences, 
after controlling for these fundamental factors, the effect of trade blocs should be neutral. In 
the real world, however, all of the above does not hold – tariffs may be abolished inside trade 
blocs or between countries that signed an FTA, and remain in place for third countries; non-
tariff barriers are overcome more easily by some countries, and less easily by others; despite 
equal distances, infrastructure may make it easier for a country A to export to country B, and 
more difficult for country C; last but not least, products and consumer preferences differ 
across importing countries.  
Therefore, the main scope of the macro-level analysis is to see whether Ukraine over- or 
under-exports to the main trade blocs or groupings in its near proximity – CIS, CEFTA 
(which included most of the EU candidate countries until their accession to the EU in 2004) 
and EU-15. A difference is made here between old and new EU members first of all because 
CEECs did not join the EU until 2004, and secondly to explore separately a potential of 
Vinerian trade diverting effects of the EU Association Agreements signed by the EU with 
candidate countries in early 1990s, which liberalised EU-CEE trade early on and could entail 
some trade diverting effect for the third countries. EU-15 also has a potential trade diverting 
effect due to higher intra-bloc trade and potentially lower trade with third countries. Similarly, 
free trade agreements signed with CIS countries are hypothesised to produce a trade creating 
effect for Ukraine.41  
                                                          
41 While they could be trade diverting for non-CIS members, this is not a subject of this study. 
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Another interesting hypothesis that gravity model allows to test is whether Ukraine will 
export more or less to countries of similar level of development (measured by income per 
capita). The former would indicate a Heckscher-Ohlin type of trade, where countries with 
dissimilar capital/labour ratios would engage in more trade, while the latter would comply 
with the Linder hypothesis (Linder, 1961), which, contrary to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, 
expects countries with similar levels of development to trade more.  
To eliminate the bias created by high concentration of exports in metals and articles of metal 
(about 40 percent of total exports), a similar analysis is conducted with exports of metals 
removed.  
2.3.3. Micro- (firm-) level determinants  
Firm-level analysis of internationalisation – entry of firms to international markets – has 
developed in trade literature relatively recently, due to the availability of new data and 
theoretical advances. It provided a whole new range of possibilities. First of all, it shifted the 
focus from countries and industries as subjects of trade to firms, entities that actually conduct 
trade. Secondly, it provided a much better avenue for testing the hypotheses of new trade and 
endogenous growth theories.42 The predictions of the latter – that knowledge accumulation 
and innovation, facilitated through trade, will be more productivity-enhancing and therefore 
will encourage higher growth – in its essence refer to the performance of firms, not countries. 
Lack of data, however, did not allow testing these predictions on firm data until early 2000s. 
Thirdly, firm-level data allows conducting a comparative analysis within the limits of a single 
country, which is not possible with country-level data. Moreover, firm-level data allows 
breaking down the analysis further by industries, which is done in this thesis. 
This thesis therefore attempts to build on the findings of the macro-level gravity model by 
adding a micro-level dimension.  
The firm-level data on Ukraine is still very scarce, as are firm-level studies. To the best of our 
knowledge, the only authors to have studied the firm-level export performance in Ukraine are 
Filatotchev et al. (1999, 2001) and Shevtsova (2010). The latter study does not, however, look 
at the determinants of exports, but rather at the exports-productivity link. Neither of the 
                                                          
42 The models of heterogeneous firms, on which firm-level internationalisation literature is based, are mostly 
derived from models of new trade theory, but they do not explicitly aim to test either new trade or endogenous 
growth theory. They use, however, the same set of variables, such as size (as a proxy for economies of scale) and 
foreign links, which feature in new trade theory, or diversification, skill intensity, innovation and productivity, 
all being the central factors in the endogenous growth theory.  
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studies looks at the destination-specific determinants of exports, i.e. what makes firms more 
or less likely to export to the EU as opposed to the CIS. Therefore this thesis will be one of 
the pioneering studies in firm-level determinants of exports in Ukraine.  
Drawing on the existing empirical literature on firm-level determinants of export 
performance, the following research questions are explored:  
§ Is there a systematic difference between firms exporting to the EU and those serving 
the domestic market? 
§ Are economies of scale associated with higher or lower probability of exporting to the 
EU? 
§ Is higher product diversification associated with higher or lower probability of 
exporting to the EU? 
§ Are firms serving the EU market more innovative, judging from process innovation? 
§ Are firms with foreign links more likely to enter the EU market?  
We also explore the determinants of non-destination specific internationalisation, by asking 
similar questions – whether size, foreign links and product innovation make firms more likely 
to export – and, additionally, whether age of the firm, international quality certification, skill- 
and capital-intensity of an enterprise increase the likelihood of internationalisation.  
Essentially, this part of the study attempts to see whether, as trade theory predicts, exporters 
have foreign links in the form of FDI or joint venture, are bigger, more dynamic and more 
innovative than non-exporters, and whether the same is true for exporters to the EU relative to 
exporters to the CIS. The findings of this thesis, however, confirm only part of these 
expectations.  
Acknowledging the specifics of the Ukrainian business environment, where enterprises 
controlled by financial-industrial groups represent important outliers in the above analysis, it 
is interesting to explore their role in trade policy-making using qualitative research methods, 
as described next. 
2.3.4. Role of business elites in the EU-Ukraine trade policy-making 
This part of the study develops a conceptual political economy framework to explain the 
observed degree of mobilisation of large Ukrainian business groups towards EU-Ukraine 
trade policy-making. It departs from the proposition of Alt et al. (1996) that the level of trade 
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liberalisation in a country will be determined by an interaction of economic considerations, 
special interests within a society and political institutions. In this study this approach is 
modified by making the degree of business mobilisation a dependent variable, being a 
function of (i) economic costs and benefits as perceived by business elites (where information 
asymmetry plays an important role), (ii) nature of prevalent political institutions that form 
trade policy-making, and (iii) collective action costs.  
We find that the predictions of classical and new trade theories logically fit the behaviour of 
business groups in Ukraine with regard to trade. The former, being at the roots of endogenous 
tariff theory (Mayer, 1984; Grossman and Helpman, 1994) essentially predicts that due to 
immobility of factors of production economic agents cannot adjust to unfavourable changes of 
trade policy and those who stand to lose will mobilise a lobby against respective trade policy 
changes. In this case the resulting policy equilibrium is likely to be protectionist.  
The new trade theory (applied to the political economy of trade policy lobbying by Milner, 
1988 and Milner and Yoffie, 1989) shifts the attention to larger firms, whose economies of 
scale make them competitive not only domestically, but also internationally. As a result of 
their international competitiveness and negotiating power such firms can pursue a ‘strategic 
policy’, i.e. can become ‘policy makers’ rather than ‘policy takers’ on the international arena. 
Moreover, by acting strategically such actors can overcome information asymmetry (concrete 
legislative proposals not yet being ‘put on the table’). While normally applied to MNCs, a 
similar behaviour is observed in Ukraine on the example of financial-industrial groups (FIGs) 
and their attitudes to the EU-Ukraine trade policy making.  
Political institutions and the ‘Olsonian’ collective action costs represent another crucial factor 
in identifying the degree of business mobilisation with regard to trade. The study will discuss 
how both of these favour direct lobbying channels in Ukraine by largest business interests and 
inhibit mobilisation of medium and large enterprises.  
Thus, by the end of this research the author expects to have explored the determinants of 
Ukrainian exports from three very different perspectives. This will hopefully provide new 
insight into the traditional question of trade reorientation of a transition economy, with wider 
application to other economies.  
The next chapter explores the dependent variable of this research – the trends in geographic 
and commodity reorientation of Ukrainian exports. 
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CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF UKRAINIAN TRADE 
LIBERALISATION AND EVOLUTION OF TRADE PATTERNS  
3.1. Introduction  
The break-up of the Soviet Union resulted in a massive economic and social shock for the 
economies of the newly formed independent states and their citizens. Old industrial links were 
disrupted, the aggregate demand in the former Soviet Union collapsed, payments became 
unreliable – the need for reorienting towards the rest of the world was urgent and obvious. 
Ukraine was slow in responding to the realities of transition in the early years of 
independence, trying to develop its own ‘third way’ in terms of reforms, which resulted in a 
protracted decline in output, accompanied by a widening current account deficit. 
Nevertheless, the initial geographic re-distribution of exports took place rather quickly.43 
Until 2005 it seemed that Ukraine was on a steady path of trade reorientation and deeper 
integration with the rest of the world, with the European Union emerging as the largest export 
partner, consistently accounting for over 30 percent of total exports. In 2005, however, the 
trend reversed, and the share of the EU started to fall and that of CIS to restore its positions. 
While the EU is still the second most important market for Ukraine after CIS, the 
reorientation is no longer following a clear-cut route, and it is important to understand what 
was driving these two different trends, and whether the recent reversal has longer-term 
implications.  
The commodity composition of Ukrainian exports has undergone even less reorientation. 
Being a heavily industrialised economy in the Soviet times, during the years of independence 
Ukraine lost some of its positions and became more dependent on resource-intensive exports, 
primarily steel, oil refinery products and some low value-added agricultural commodities. 
Hence, Ukrainian trade with the rest of the world became even more of a ‘North-South’ type, 
whereby Ukraine export resource- and labour-intensive goods, and imports capital- and 
technology-intensive goods. To see whether there are any positive developments away from 
this pattern the chapter will look at a detailed commodity composition of exports by regions, 
while the next chapter will look at a more detailed picture to see whether Ukraine is 
developing any narrow niches in higher value-added products by using a factor content and 
revealed comparative advantage analysis.  
                                                          
43 The share of CIS fell from over 80 percent in 1990 (then still USSR) to 50 percent in 1996 and 24 percent in 
2002 (Michalopoulos and Tarr, 1994; UN Comtrade Online Database). 
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This chapter starts with the political economy of trade liberalisation in the early years of 
independence, looks at the evolving geographic composition of exports, and proceeds with the 
analysis of geographic and commodity composition of Ukrainian trade, focusing mainly on 
trade with the main Ukrainian economic partners and neighbours, CIS and the European 
Union  
3.2. Trade liberalisation and the evolving geographic composition of 
exports 
3.2.1. The dissolution of the USSR and adjusting to a market economy  
Almost entirely dependent on intra-USSR trade, with over 80 percent of total trade in 1990 
(Michalopolous and Tarr, 1994), in the early years of transition the newly independent states 
had to urgently restructure their economies and establish new foreign economic relations, as 
trade with the former Soviet Union (FSU) partners was suddenly disrupted. There were 
numerous reasons for this disruption.  
First of all, aggregate demand and output collapsed in all of the FSU economies. Between 
1991 and 1996 the cumulative average GDP growth in CIS economies was minus 63 percent 
(see Annex 2 for the breakdown of FSU economies’ GDP growth rates in 1991-2008). Hence, 
the traditional export markets lost more than a half of their previous purchasing power, 
reducing sharply the demand for imports. On the supply side, Ukraine’s output was also 
contracting sharply. Since export performance and output are endogenous, as exports are a 
reflection of the structure of the economy, the falling output, in turn, was reinforcing the 
contraction of exports.  
Although some output decline was expected at the start of transition, the actual decline in 
FSU economies exceeded all expectations, giving rise to a severe criticism of the 
‘Washington consensus’ reform package. There is extensive economics of transition literature 
trying to explain ‘what went wrong’ with the reforms and the reasons for such a drastic output 
decline in FSU economies.44 The detailed review of these reasons is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, but some of them are directly relevant to Ukraine’s foreign trade performance.  
The standard reform package for the economies in transition45, largely designed by the 
economists of IMF and the World Bank – hence the ‘Washington Consensus’ – involved three 
pillars of reforms: macroeconomic stabilisation, external liberalisation and restructuring. 
                                                          
44 E.g. Kornai (1997), Gross and Steinherr (1995), Lavigne (1999), Blanchard (1997). 
45 Originally designed for the Latin American economies.  
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These reform programmes were not dictated by the IMF and World Bank, and governments 
could in principle decline them. In practice, countries often accepted the reform package, but 
then did not implement them. Whether or not one wanted to follow the exact prescriptions of 
the IMF for each of these pillars, each of the former centrally planned economies (even 
Belarus, which followed a least liberal route of economic reforms), had to undergo some form 
of macro-economic stabilisation, some form of external liberalisation (in the absence of 
Gosplan and state orders from Moscow), and some form of restructuring once private 
ownership was allowed. Ukraine lagged behind in all of these reforms. In the early years of 
transition, when foundations for future growth had to be laid, Leonid Kravchuk’s government 
tried to exploit the opportunities offered by the old system and postpone many of the painful 
reforms. Although corruption did play a role, the premise was often benign – to protect the 
existing industries and to preserve jobs.  This resulted in both the most prolonged recession 
among the CIS economies, and the loss of external competitiveness throughout the 1990s, 
which some authors even call “the lost decade” (Babanin et al., 2002).  
In terms of the macroeconomic stabilisation, the biggest problem for all the CIS economies 
was the persistence of the Soviet ruble zone across CIS. With fifteen, and after the exit of 
Baltic countries, twelve central banks issuing ruble credit in competition with one another, 
three- and in 1993 four-digit hyperinflation was hard to curb (Aslund, 2009: 73).46 The 
Ukrainian government wanted to exploit the ruble zone for access to cheap credit and raw 
materials, and postponed the introduction of a national currency. The coupon (Karbovanets) 
circulated simultaneously with the ruble (the former as cash, the latter as a means for bank 
transfers) from 1991 to 1993, and although by then counted in millions, still was not 
abolished until 1996, leaving the Ukrainian monetary system in a mess. And although hryvnia 
was printed in 1992 and the Soviet ruble zone was abolished in 1993, new currency was not 
introduced until August 1996, on the grounds of the need to bring down hyperinflation first. 
While most FSU economies introduced new convertible currencies in 1993-1994, Ukraine 
was the latest in the region to conduct currency reform in 1996. Varying degrees of 
hyperinflation in FSU economies, in turn, distorted the international payments system and 
gave rise to extensive barter schemes, leaving the majority of small and medium enterprises 
with no efficient means to conduct foreign trade transactions (Michalopolous and Tarr, 1994).  
                                                          
46 Using earliest available data, in 1993 annual consumer price index in Ukraine was 4,735%, the highest of all 
CIS economies. CPI of comparable scale was registered only in Belarus in 1994, at 2,221% and in Kazakhstan in 
1993 at 1,877%. (World Bank WDI, April 2010 edition).  
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If currency bottlenecks were not enough, external liberalisation reforms were imposing 
further barriers to the evolution of market-based foreign trade. A ‘gradualist’ approach was 
adopted to shield the economy away from the pains of opening up to global markets. Until 
mid-1990s trade was still heavily regulated, with numerous licences, quotas and permits 
required to both export and import (Aslund, 2008). The bilateral trade agreements, established 
in 1992, aimed at preserving inter-state trade, also retained some mechanisms applied during 
the central planning. A system of “state orders” to enterprises was still in place, accompanied 
by guaranteed or restricted prices. State trading organisations were also maintained across the 
CIS. Price controls discouraged enterprises from meeting the state orders and instead forced 
them to come up with alternative routes to export. These administrative controls were meant 
to preserve the previously existing links in closely integrated industries, but in fact not only 
did they not achieve their goal47, they also to some degree facilitated the breakdown of such 
value chains, as suppliers were often unwilling to deliver inputs at restricted prices 
(Michalopolous and Tarr, 1994: 7). Moreover, they inhibited the establishment of new foreign 
trade links and distorted a more efficient reallocation of resources and restructuring by state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) or privatised enterprises. Intra-CIS trade was also facing payment 
difficulties, with delays of two or three months. Trade with third countries was distorted by 
export restrictions, to keep the minimal available output inside the country. 
Structural reforms have had the most long-lasting impact. Privatisation was delayed (de facto 
started only in 1994), and when initiated, favoured insider-ownership. Although nominally the 
employees were the holders of former SOEs’ shares, in practice incumbent directors gained 
control of those enterprises. With close links to the government, they ensured the preservation 
of soft budget constraints, through cheap credit, discretionary import and export licenses and 
subsidies. These measures were often taken for good reasons – to preserve the jobs – however 
workers were becoming even less productive than in the Soviet times, as lack of threat to lose 
the job was compounded by salaries below subsistence levels. Lack of structural reforms and 
institutional weaknesses in the areas of banking, credit, insurance and other supporting 
financial infrastructure were further limiting foreign trade (Hare, 2000).  
The output contraction was partially caused by the so-called “disorganisation” process – the 
disruption of previously highly integrated and administratively controlled production chains 
                                                          
47 Besides, industries that were competitive enough and/or highly dependent on other CIS suppliers, e.g. 
Ukraine’s production of aircraft engines for the Russian helicopters and airplanes, could survive without these 
administrative controls.  
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(Blanchard, 1997, Blanchard and Kremer, 1997), resulting in lower production and 
investment levels.48 
It should be stressed, however, that not everything should be blamed on policies. The reason 
for such a sharp output decline was the fact that FSU economies were much more closely 
integrated with each other than the CEE countries, and therefore the consequences of 
disintegration were graver. The break-up of the Soviet Union disrupted the production links in 
vertically integrated industries, such as heavy machinery, electronics, equipment and 
consumer goods. The supporting science and research centres were also no longer funded by 
Russia and their activities came to a halt. High inter-republican specialisation, which was also 
made possible primarily by subsidisation from Moscow, was also disrupted, and the newly 
formed states had to adjust to the conditions of market economy and start developing their 
own, more natural, competitive advantages and patterns of trade.  
As a result, between 1990 and 1993 intra-CIS trade contracted sharply – intra-CIS exports fell 
by more than 60 percent, while imports shrank even more, by 63 percent (Michalopolous and 
Tarr, 1994). Part of the decline reflects the overvaluation of the official exchange rate of ruble 
in 1990 and the preceding years. Besides, trade statistics between 1990 and 1996 was rather 
poor due to hyperinflation and changing standards. Illegal trade was also accounting for a 
certain unobserved share of cross-border flows. However the scale of the decline was too big 
to be explained by exchange rate differences or statistics only. 
For Ukraine, all the 1990s were marked by trade and output contraction, reinforcing each 
other. As Figure 12 below shows, both exports and imports plummeted in 1991 and 1992. The 
data, including for 1990, is measured at official US dollar exchange rates, potentially 
overstating the volume of trade in 1990. The precise value was never established, however 
Michalopolous and Tarr (1996) provide alternative measures at implicit exchange rates. In 
that case the starting export value for 1990 would be lower by some 6 percent, at US$73.7bn, 
while 1993 exports would be about twice as high as in the figure (i.e. US$23.9bn rather than 
US$12bn). The estimated decline in exports would still amount to almost 70% between 1990 
                                                          
48 Under planned economy, large state-owned enterprises benefited from a fixed price and guaranteed inputs 
from nominated suppliers. Once Soviet Union was dismantled and markets liberalised, both suppliers and buyers 
could choose the best partner, which should in principle make the production process more efficient. This, 
however, is dependent on timely reallocation (a move from state to private ownership) and restructuring 
(improvement of performance through more efficient allocation of labour and capital). In Ukraine both of these 
processes were delayed. The delayed privatisation, resulting in insider ownership, in fact leaving ownership in 
the hands of incumbent directors, was not conducive to restructuring. Therefore, in case of suppressed 
restructuring capabilities, disorganisation of previous industrial links had a disproportionately negative effect on 
output.  
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and 1993. The fall and the subsequent sluggish growth of exports up to 2000 were 
accompanied by a cumulative contraction of GDP by 83 percent between 1991 and 1999.  
In fact, reservations need to be made about data quality not only in pre-independence years, 
but in all years since independence. As the example on p. 73 with machine-building exports 
will show, the mirror statistics of exports by Ukraine and imports by its partner countries 
often diverge significantly. Various tax evasion practices employed by businesses are the 
main reason, however they are not unique to Ukraine – such practices and data problems are 
common for most countries, although more so for countries with a high share of the shadow 
economy.  
Figure 2. Evolution of Ukrainian trade and GDP growth, 1990-2008 
 
Source: Trade data for 1990-1993 Michalopolous and Tarr (1996), trade data and GDP 
growth for 1994-2008 World Bank WDI, April 2010 edition.  
 Table 1 shows the evolution of export and import trends and the geographic composition of 
trade, while Figure 3 illustrates the geographic distribution of exports graphically. The 
following three periods can be distinguished during the 1990s: 
(1) 1990-1993 – a sharp trade contraction in the early years after the collapse of the USSR, 
associated with a sharply shrinking share of CIS in both exports and imports. The share of 
CIS in total exports fell by 43 percent between 1990 and 1993 (from 81 to 46 percent), while 
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that of the EU-15 increased by 14 percent, although still remaining limited at 6.4 percent, and 
that of the rest of the world more than doubled – increasing from 13 percent to 47 percent. 
Imports from CIS also declined, although to a lesser degree – by 18 percent, those from the 
EU-15 increased from 5 percent to 8 percent, and imports from the rest of the world went up 
to almost a third of total, compared to 16 percent in 1990.  
Figure 3. Geographic distribution of Ukrainian imports and exports, % of total  
 
Source: UN Comtrade Database, retrieved on 18 May 2010 
As described above, there were three main reasons for a sharper fall of exports to the CIS than 
that to the rest of the world in this period – a sharp demand contraction in the former Soviet 
Union economies (associated with output contraction both in Ukraine and in the rest of CIS), 
the disorganisation of industrial linkages and severe payment distortions. A virtual lack of 
market reforms and a failure to deregulate trade and prices, in particular for intra-CIS trade, 
were exerting further pressure on Ukraine’s business and hence export performance.  
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The role of CIS in imports declined to a lesser extent due to the high energy dependency of 
Ukraine on CIS, and on Russia and Turkmenistan in particular. The dissolution of the USSR 
also seriously affected the steel market, both within the region and internationally. Production 
of steel in the former Soviet Union fell from its peak of 163 million tonnes in 1988 to 77 
million in 1994, whereas consumption fell much sharper – from 125 million tonnes in 1988 to 
just over 25 million tonnes in 1994.49 Therefore large extra capacity was created, boosting 
exports of steel from CIS to the rest of the world. 
Figure 4 shows that exports of steel from CIS skyrocketed between 1991 and 1994, increasing 
from just over 6 to 40 million tonnes – a more than 6 times increase. Ukrainian production of 
iron and steel fell from just under 100 million tonnes in 1990 to 40 million tonnes in 1995, 
while consumption in 1995 was only 31 percent of that observed in 1990 (Ustenko, 2004). 
Since within CIS Ukraine is the second major exporter of steel after Russia (the rest of CIS 
account for no more than 10 percent of production and exports)50, a lot of the increase in CIS 
exports came from Ukraine. Despite this, the lower level of global steel prices and even lower 
prices charged by heavily subsidised Ukrainian producers (bringing about numerous anti-
dumping cases by the EU, US and Russia) meant that total Ukrainian exports were still in 
decline.  
Figure 4. Steel trade of Newly Independent States 1985-2005, million tonnes 
 
Source: OECD (2004), p.11 
                                                          
49 http://www.worldsteel.org/?action=stats&type=steel&period=latest , retrieved on 2 June 2010.  
50 WorldSteel Association (2009) Steel Statistical Yearbook 2008. 
http://www.worldsteel.org/pictures/publicationfiles/SSY2008[1].pdf  , retrieved on 2 June 2010.  
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(2) 1994-1996 – saw a positive trend with exports recovering by 20 percent and imports 
growing faster at 26 percent; exports to Russia regained some of its positions, at 39 percent, 
compared to 35 percent in 1993; however the reorientation to the EU was steadily taking 
place – the share of the EU-15 in total exports almost doubled in three years, increasing from 
6.4 percent to 11.8 percent.  
Domestically, this period was characterised by a meaningful break-through in the reform 
process, as the newly elected president – Leonid Kuchma – was using the momentum to 
implement the long overdue reforms. Trade and prices were substantially liberalised; 
exchange rate was finally unified and currency exchange liberalised.51 Privatisation of most 
small and medium enterprises was also completed during this period, although privatisation of 
large enterprises was still lagging behind. Corporate and personal income taxes were 
simplified and rates lowered (Aslund, 2009: 74). In terms of external conditions, steel prices 
increased by 18 percent in 1994, however the growth moderated in 1995 and went into 
negative in 1996; therefore steel prices were not responsible for the positive export 
performance. Arguably, the reform package can be credited for the improved export 
performance.  
(3) In 1996-1999 the recovery of foreign trade reversed again, with both imports and exports 
returning to the levels below those observed in 1993. Reorientation of trade, however, 
continued. The share of CIS and Russia declined significantly – to 28 percent and 21 percent 
respectively, while that of the EU-15 doubled, reaching 21.2 percent. A combination of 
factors explains the fall of exports. Firstly, global steel prices were in decline, as seen from 
Figure 5 above. Secondly, in 1998 Ukraine was hit by knock-on effects of the Russian 
financial crisis and by the debt crisis of its own. Demand in Russia contracted, producing a 
chain effect on output and demand in other CIS economies – major destination markets for 
Ukrainian produce. Thirdly, an important policy stance reversal took place. By 1996 business 
elites strengthened their influence on policy-making and formed a political centre, advocating 
policies similar to those of the Communist Party, but for pragmatic rather than ideological 
reasons – higher taxes, which would affect smaller businesses as large businesses often 
enjoyed discretionary taxation privileges, subsidies and higher regulation, which gave them 
                                                          
51 Previously, a separate exchange rate existed for the energy trade, which subsidised imports of natural gas from 
Russia, effectively boosting imports and increasing Ukraine’s indebtedness, whereas revenues from subsidisation 
went to individual gas traders controlling this trade. (Aslund 2009, p.74)  
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more control over situation, and would also stifle competition as smaller businesses would 
have less capacity to overcome the barriers of regulation – forming what Aslund calls a 
“flourishing ... rent-seeking economy combined with repressed productive economy” (Aslund 
2009: 121). These numerous pressures, both domestic and external, could not have gone 
unnoticed for Ukraine’s economy and might explain a lot of the negative performance of 
exports in this period. 
Figure 5. Relationship between the evolution of Ukrainian exports, GDP growth and 
global steel prices  
 
Source: GDP – World Bank World Development Indicators, Exports – UN Comtrade 
Database, Steel Price Index – www.crugroup.com , retrieved June 2010.  
3.2.2. 2000s - Delayed reforms and recovery of exports and growth 
As seen from Figure 2, 2000 marks the beginning of a steady recovery of Ukrainian exports 
and GDP. Although steel prices were on the rise throughout 2000s, they were not the main 
driver of recovery in 2000-2001. In 2000 there was an 11 percent increase in global steel 
prices, but in 2001 they fell by almost 17 percent, however exports continued to grow. Figure 
6 shows that between 2000 and 2002 exports of steel and articles of steel (HS 2-digit numbers 
72 and 73 respectively) were in fact flat, while non-steel exports were on the rise. 2000 was a 
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peak of business cycle in the western world, before the dot-com bubble burst in March 200052, 
however, despite by then a substantial exposure to the EU-27, both Ukrainian exports and 
GDP continued to register robust growth throughout the crisis period. Currency devaluation 
during 1998 debt crisis was another important factor. Although initially it triggered negative 
balance sheet effects on corporate sector’s foreign exchange-denominated debt, in the 
aftermath of the crisis this boosted the country’s external competitiveness.53 A new phase in 
domestic reforms, therefore, seems to have played a bigger role in Ukraine’s robust export 
performance.  
Figure 6. Evolution of steel and non-steel exports, 1996-2008, US$ billion 
 
Source: UN Comtrade Online Database 
By the end of 1999 the danger of default convinced business elites of the need of reform, and 
a centre-right majority was formed  to allow Kuchma appoint Viktor Yushchenko a prime 
minister. Yushchenko enacted a 100 day programme, which represented an overhaul of the 
economic order. Important missing laws were passed54 and operation of small businesses 
deregulated. Barter was abolished and energy trade cleaned up. Budget deficit was reduced 
from 5.4 to 1.1 percent of GDP by cutting down subsidies, removing loopholes in taxation 
and eliminating about 270 decrees granting social transfers to the well-connected enterprises. 
                                                          
52 The effects of equity or financial crises on real economy in partner countries are usually delayed due to 
contracts being concluded in advance for several months or quarters.  
53 See a more detailed discussion of exchange rate effects in CHAPTER 5.  
54 A tax code, a land code, a housing code, a law on banking, and a new criminal code and law on public 
procurement. 
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Agricultural reform formally disbanded state and collective farms. The next wave of large-
scale privatisation was undertaken, and private sector started to adjust and restructure 
(Aslund, 2009: 141).  
As of 2002 global steel prices have been experiencing a boom, largely due to the steadily 
growing demand in China (see Figure 5). Interestingly, however, between 2001 and 2004 the 
share of steel in total Ukrainian exports was below its all-time average, as seen from Figure 7 
below. This was due to an increase in exports of natural gas and petroleum products.55 Due to 
the orientation of gas and petroleum products to the Western markets the share of CIS in total 
Ukrainian exports was at its lowest in these years. A lot of trade in natural gas, however, was 
discontinued in 2005, as it was allegedly based on non-transparent schemes of several gas 
traders. The case was made that Ukraine, as a net importer of gas, could not sustainably 
export such large volumes of gas. This suggests that what may have seemed as a structural 
reorientation of exports towards the EU, in fact was a temporary trend in commodity 
composition, which soon reversed.  
Figure 7. Share of steel and non-steel exports in total Ukraine’s exports, 1996-2008, %  
 
Source: UN Comtrade Online Database 
A 26 percent growth of exports in 2000 was accompanied by a 6 percent recovery – the first 
positive growth record since the start of transition. Although endogeneity between exports 
and economic growth is always an issue, there is evidence suggesting that Ukrainian recovery 
                                                          
55 A more detailed discussion of commodity composition follows below.  
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was consistently export driven. World Bank (2004) notes that Ukraine’s accelerated growth in 
1999-2003 was largely export driven and about 40 percent of GDP growth can be attributed to 
the increase in net exports (World Bank, 2004: 14). Likewise, Dritsakis and Gialetaki (2005) 
and Dawson and Hubbard (2004) show that exports have a significant and positive effect on 
GDP growth in Ukraine and in other Central and East European economies.   
3.2.3. Orange Revolution and its aftermath  
December 2004 Orange Revolution brought to power a new pro-liberal government with 
Viktor Yushchenko as a president and Yulia Timoshenko as prime minister. Soon, however, 
these leaders became fierce rivals and an era of political instability ensued. Apart from 
contributing to political instability, Yulia Timoshenko enacted a number of economic 
measures, which sent strong negative signals to the markets. Threats to re-privatise up to 
3,000 enterprises and opening of criminal cases against 2,000 people; regulation of gas, oil 
and meat prices, even with attempts to introduce planning of production, combined with 
increased tax burden needed to meet populist policies could not have left business 
environment unaffected. Reforms in the customs and tax administration, however, were a step 
in the positive direction. Lowering of import tariffs across a number of sectors was a long-
awaited measure in the process of WTO accession. Nevertheless, economic growth fell from 
12 percent in 2004 to minus 1.6 percent in August 2005 year-on-year (Aslund, 2009: 209). 
On the backdrop of a political instability and inconsistent economic policy, coupled with a 
deceleration of growth of global steel prices (see Figure 5), in 2005 exports from Ukraine 
plunged. Overall exports grew only by 5 percent. Moreover, at this point exports to the EU-27 
started to fall continuously. As Table 1 shows, in 2005 the share of EU-27 in total exports fell 
by 11 percent and by further 9 percent between 2005 and 2008. At the same time the falling 
trend in trade with the CIS has reversed and between 2004 and 2008 its share recovered from 
26 to 35.6 percent of total world exports of Ukraine. This change represents a key moment in 
the path of Ukrainian integration into the world economy, and is essentially a cornerstone fact 
in this research. 2005 marked a structural change in both geographic and commodity 
composition of Ukrainian exports. In order to understand the reasons for this shift one needs 
to look closer at the commodity composition of exports.  
However, before looking at the commodity composition, it is important to highlight that 
although this thesis is mainly concerned with the East vs. West dimension, in fact a not less 
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important export reorientation took place towards the rest of the world (ROW), as seen from 
Figure 8. Between 1996 and 2008 (the period when reliable statistics became available) the 
share of the CIS declined by 16 p.p., while that of the EU-15 and EU-12 increased only by 2 
p.p. and 1 p.p. respectively. In contrast, the share of the ROW increased by 13 p.p. If 
compared to the starting point in transition, 1990, the change in the role of the CIS is even 
more dramatic, down by 46 p.p. (from 81 percent to 36 percent), while the change in the role 
of the EU-15 was somewhat more substantial, by 8.8 p.p. (from 5.6 percent to 14.4 percent).56 
While in absolute terms exports to the EU-27 increased by a factor of five between 1996 and 
2008, exports to the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) experienced an almost 12 times 
increase (compared to the change in world exports of 4.6 times). A similar change occurred 
with ‘other Europe’, by 11.9 times. At the same time, in 2008 the share of ‘other Europe’ 
remained low, at 3 percent, while the top ROW countries, apart from the USA, were Turkey, 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Iran (together accounting for 16.3 percent of total 
Ukrainian exports) – i.e. mainly MENA countries, as well as India and South Korea (both 
accounting for 2.4 percent). I.e. if the focus of the analysis were purely a reorientation of 
exports, one could arguably speak about the reorientation of Ukrainian exports from the FSU 
to the Middle East rather than the EU. However, since the motivation of this analysis is 
broader and is based on deeper political and economic integration processes between Ukraine 
on the one hand and CIS / EU on the other, these two regions remain the main focus of the 
thesis.  
  
                                                          
56 No data is available for the share of EU-12 in 1990, which made part of the ROW in 1990, therefore no 
change is reported for the ROW between 1990 and 2008. 
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Figure 8. Geographic distribution of Ukrainian exports by regions, % of total exports  
 
Source: UN Comtrade Online Database, retrieved on 18 May 2010 
3.3. Commodity composition of trade 
3.3.1. General commodity composition 
After the collapse of the USSR Ukraine emerged as a resource-abundant economy, which fact 
had both positive and negative implications. Positive because in conditions of collapsing 
competitiveness of the industrial production, with no major reconstruction required, the 
country maintained competitiveness in at least some sectors and avoided huge current account 
deficits; negative because it weakened the incentives for major reorientation of production 
towards more value-added products. Primary and resource-intensive products, namely 
metallurgy, mineral products and agriculture, have consistently accounted for over half of 
Ukraine’s exports. As Figure 9 below shows, the share of these sectors has in fact increased 
since 1996, reaching almost two thirds of total exports, primarily due to increasing global 
steel prices. Dependence on global steel prices is remarkable – the correlation between global 
steel prices and total Ukrainian exports for the period 1996-2008 is 0.8 (see Annex 4). This 
leaves the economy increasingly more vulnerable to external price shocks.  
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Figure 9. Resource-intensive versus other sectors in Ukrainian exports, 1996-2008, % of 
total 
 
Source: UN Comtrade Online Database, retrieved on 18th of May 2010.  
Figure 10 below further breaks down the above picture. The point for commodity 
reorientation can hardly be made – no major qualitative change took place between 1996 and 
2008 – and exports are highly and consistently concentrated in resource-intensive and primary 
products. Metals demonstrated the most robust growth, pushing downwards the share of other 
products, but other resource-intensive products – namely agriculture and mineral products – 
also strengthened their positions, while the share of more processed products – chemicals, 
machinery and electrical products and textiles – shrank noticeably. It is important to note, 
however, that increase in the share of metals in total exports is mainly driven by price effects. 
Export prices for steel more than doubled between 2001 and 2006 in US dollar terms, while in 
volume terms exports of iron and steel grew modestly by 2% on average between 2003 and 
2006 (OECD, 2007, p. 107). 
Looking at a more detailed picture, Table 2 shows that metals (mostly iron and steel) 
consistently comprise around 30-40 percent of merchandise exports, with a strong upward 
trend since 1996. Mineral products, mostly represented by petroleum refinery products and 
until 2005 natural gas, are the next most important category of exports, accounting for 12 
percent of total exports on average during 1996-2008. Mineral products experienced an 
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above-average growth of 15.1 percent p.a. between 1996 and 2008, mainly due to the growing 
oil and petroleum prices. Chemicals, machinery and electric products, and agriculture account 
for about a tenth of total exports each. The most important chemical products are inorganic 
chemicals (ammonia, aluminium oxide and others) and fertilizers. 
Figure 10. Commodity composition of exports, % of total, based on current prices, 1996 
and 2005 
 
Source: UN Comtrade Database, retrieved on 10th of May 2010. 
Although Ukraine is a major exporter of fertilizers and inorganic chemicals, accounting for 
2.8 percent and 1.4 percent of world exports respectively, it has recently been losing its 
positions in these markets. With fertilizers Ukraine moved from 7th place in the world in 2004 
to the 9th in 2008, while with inorganic chemicals – from 16th to 19th, respectively (Intracen 
Trade Competitiveness Database, 2010). 
Machinery and Electric products are composed of two product groups: HS 84 “Nuclear 
reactors, boilers, machinery”, where top export products are turbo-jets, turbo-propellers and 
other gas turbines; air and other pumps, and machinery parts; and HS 85 “Electrical and 
electronic equipment”, where top performers have been: electric transformers, insulated wire 
and cable, electric motors and generators, and more recently television cameras and radio 
transmission apparatus. Machinery and electrical products, although having lost 1 p.p. of their 
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share, given the growing pressure from metallurgy and mineral products, have on the whole 
performed rather well. 
 
Table 2. Commodity composition of Ukrainian exports, 1996-2008, US$m and % 
  1996 2000 2004 2008 % change 
2008/1996 
1996-2008 
CAGR57  
Metals 4,763 6,468 13,048 27,594 479 15.77 
Agriculture  1,647 974 2,328 8,306 404 14.43 
Mineral products & 
stone/glass 
1,417 1,517 4,622 7,648 440 15.08 
Machinery & Electrical 1,407 1,358 3,032 6,341 351 13.37 
Chemicals & Allied 
industries 
2,077 1,788 3,221 6,043 191 9.31 
Transportation 635 438 2,033 4,321 580 17.33 
Food products 1,403  403  1,141  2,518  80 4.99 
Wood & wood products 194 418 909 1,675 764 19.68 
Textiles & footwear& leath 574 724 1,212 1,522 165 8.47 
Other 285 484 1,121 985 246 10.89 
Total 14,400 14,573  32,666  66,952  365 13.66 
Metals 33% 44% 40% 41% 25%  
Agriculture  11% 7% 7% 12% 8%  
Mineral products & 
stone/glass 
10% 10% 14% 11% 16%  
Machinery & Electrical 10% 9% 9% 9% -3%  
Chemicals & Allied 
industries 
14% 12% 10% 9% -37%  
Transportation 4% 3% 6% 6% 46%  
Food products 10% 3% 3% 4% -61%  
Wood & wood products 1% 3% 3% 3% 86%  
Textiles & footwear& 
leather 
4% 5% 4% 2% -43%  
Other 2% 3% 3% 1% -26%  
Source: UN Comtrade Online Database.  
 
While metals have clearly been the star performer and the dominant export group, having 
their share grow by 15.8 percent between 1996 and 2008, (which is above the average per 
annum growth of 13.7 percent), some other sectors – transportation and wood-related 
products – have experienced an even more dynamic growth, by 17.3 percent and 19.7 percent 
                                                          
57 Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) reflects average growth per annum.  
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respectively. Exports of transportation products are mainly represented by automobile58 and 
railway vehicles (mainly selling to Russia and some other CIS economies), while those of 
wood-related products – by wallpaper and other paper products.59 Transportation and wood 
products were also the most dynamically growing sectors as a share of total Ukrainian 
exports, their share growing by 46 percent and 86 percent respectively.  
Looking at the relative competitiveness of Ukrainian products in global markets in 2008, 
Figure 11 shows that railway vehicles and equipment have the highest world market share, 
with over 7 percent, followed by iron and steel (4.5 percent share), cereals (3.6 percent, 
mainly represented by wheat and barley), fertilizers (2.8 percent) and oil seeds (2.2 percent, 
mainly sunflower seeds). Among these, fertilizers are the most dynamic industry in global 
trade, and Ukrainian exporters face a significant pressure in maintaining the existing world 
market share. 
Figure 12, showing the dynamic picture, shows that indeed the share of fertilizers in world 
trade has declined by almost 10 percent since 2001. On the other hand, Vehicles are an 
important emerging category of exports, enjoying an almost 40 percent growth in the world 
market share since 2001 (although the total world market share still remains very low, at 0.10 
percent). Oil seed, Cereals, Paper and paperboard, Animal and vegetable fats and oils, 
Electrical and electronic equipment, as well as salt, sulphur, earth and stone have all benefited 
from a 10 percent to 50 percent growth in the world market share. Transportation and certain 
machinery and electrical products therefore seem to represent an important emerging cluster 
of a dynamic competitive advantage for Ukraine.  
  
                                                          
58 Automobile industry has been on the rise since 2003-2004, supported by joint ventures and foreign 
investment. Top export products for the period 2001-2008 have been cars (Zaporizhye Automobile Plant ZAZ, 
assembling Daewoo, Chevrolet and Opel cars in partnership with General Motors, pick-up trucks by “Bogdan 
Corporation”), diesel powered trucks, mainly produced by Kremenchug Automobile Plant KrAZ, traktors 
(mainly Kharkiv Traktor Plant) and buses (mainly small buses produced by “Bogdan Corporation”, in 
partnership with Japanese Isuzu ). 
59 Ukraine is a fifth top exporter of railway equipment in the world, accounting for 7.2% of world exports of HS 
category 86 “Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment”. (UN Comtrade Database, retrieved on 
9th of July 2010). Main export lines are train locomotives, engines and wagons.  
  
Figure 11. Competitiveness of Ukrainian export products
Figure 12. Dynamic competitiveness of Ukrainian export products
Source: Intracen Trade Competitiveness Map, 2010
http://www.intracen.org/appli1/TradeCom/TP_EP_CI.aspx?RP=804&YR=2008
10 July 2010 
 
                                                          
60 Note to both figures: Relative size, increase in world market share against growth of world market exports of 
respective products. The area of the circles corresponds to the relative size of exports of respective
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3.3.2. Commodity composition by destination markets  
Turning to commodity composition by destination markets, Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate 
the composition of Ukrainian trade with the EU and Russia in 2008. The asymmetry is easily 
observed. Trade with Russia is reminiscent of intra-industry trade, with similar goods being 
exchanged between the two countries. Moreover, Ukraine is running a positive balance in 
most product categories, including the highest positive balance in technology-intensive 
industries of machinery and equipment, with a negative balance only in mineral products (due 
to high oil and gas dependency on Russia) and chemicals. Trade with the EU, on the contrary, 
is more representative of a North-South pattern of trade, whereby Western economies export 
high-value added products to an emerging economy and import raw materials and products 
with a low degree of processing. Ukraine has a positive balance with the EU only in iron and 
steel, energy and low value-added agricultural products. In all other lines there is a huge 
negative balance, especially in technology-intensive goods – machinery and transport 
equipment – reflecting the fact that EU is a major source of technological upgrading in 
Ukraine. Indeed, as Annex 3 shows, intra-industry trade (IIT) with the CIS has been about 
twice as high as with the rest of the world in 2000 – 60 percent versus 28.7 percent, the 
former being quite high by international standards and approaching the level of OECD 
countries. Moreover, no significant change has been observed since 1996. In trade with CIS 
the level of IIT increased by 2 p.p., while with the rest of the world only by 1 p.p. Among all 
CIS members, Ukraine has the highest level of intra-CIS IIT (Freinkman et al., 2004).  
Figure 13. Commodity composition of Ukrainian trade with the EU, 2008 
 
Source: European Commission (2010)  
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Figure 14. Commodity composition of Ukrainian trade with Russia, 2008 
 
Source: Tsvetkov (2009) 
A useful insight can be gained from making a similar comparison with the two new EU 
members – Bulgaria and Czech Republic (see Figure 15 below). In 1988 these two countries 
had very similar trade relations with the EU – both countries were net importers of machinery 
and equipment, and net exporters of fuels and energy. In 2002 the picture was very different. 
Bulgaria remained a net importer (with big trade deficit) of machinery and transport 
equipment, whereas Czech Republic’s trade has become more of an intra-industry type, with 
high inward and outward trade flows in technological goods. Therefore, a positive evolution 
of the commodity composition in trade with the EU, and hence closer economic integration, is 
not the only logical consequence of political integration and is not a self-reinforcing process – 
even having a free trade agreement with the EU and deeper cooperation in many other areas 
may not be sufficient to promptly boost competitiveness of some of the EU members. The 
chapter will look at a more detailed picture of Ukrainian exports to the EU below, to reveal 
any emerging signs of improving competitiveness.  
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Figure 15. Evolution of trade balances between EU and Bulgaria and Czech Republic 
(ex-Czechoslovakia) 
a) Trade balances of the EU in trade with Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, 1988 
 
Source: Smith (2000), Chapter 4. 
b) Merchandise trade of Bulgaria with the EU, 2002 
 
Source: http://trade-info.cec.eu.int, retrieved on 8 December 2003 
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c) Merchandise trade of the Czech Republic with the EU, 2002 
 
Source: http://trade-info.cec.eu.int, retrieved on 8 December 2003 
3.3.2.1. Top markets and products 
Table 3 below further describes the commodity and geographic distribution by top destination 
markets and top export products. In 2005 there was an observable geographic reorientation of 
exports – four of the top 5 importers were EU customs union members, which was not the 
case in 1999, Belarus and China both not featuring among the top five. Russia remains 
Ukraine’s by far most important export partner throughout the years, although its share was 
shrinking sharply between 1996 and 2004 – falling from 39 to 18 percent. Since 2005, 
however, as was discussed above, reorientation has somewhat reversed – the share of Russia 
and other CIS economies has grown substantially, Russia recovering to 24 percent, and 
Belarus re-emerging as one of the top five trade partners again in 2008, with a share of 3 
percent of Ukraine’s total exports. Germany is no longer in top five, and only three of the top 
five are members of the EU customs union, although their share is still rather high, at 15 
percent, compared to only 6 percent in 1996. In terms of geographic distribution of exports 
trade structure has become less concentrated, with top 5 partners now accounting for 41 
percent, compared to 54 percent in 1996. However an alternative calculation shows that 
product structure, on the contrary, became more concentrated. If in 1996 the top ten products 
(at 2-digit level according to HS 1996 classification) accounted for 64 percent of total exports, 
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in 2008 this share was 74 percent, which was mainly due to a 10 p.p. increase in the share of 
metals.61  
In terms of top commodities, little restructuring seems to have occurred, apart from trade with 
Russia. Now all top four commodities exported to Russia, after iron and steel, are high- to 
medium-technology intensive products. In trade with Belarus electronic equipment emerged 
as one of the top five. With the rest of the countries no visible qualitative change in the 
commodity structure has occurred. Turkey became a member of the EU Customs Union in 
1996, which might explain the disappearance of live animals from top five products, but other 
than that export structure has undergone little change.  
Table 3. Top five export partners and top five export lines 
 1996  2000  2005  2008 
1. Russia 39% 1. Russia 24% 1. Russia 22% 1. Russia 24% 
73 Articles of iron and 
steel 
72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 
72 Iron and steel 84 Nucl. reactors, 
boilers, machinery 
84 Nucl. reactors, 
boilers, machinery 
86 Railway 
locomotives and 
equipment 
84 Nucl. reactors, 
boilers, machinery 
73 Articles of iron and 
steel 
73 Articles of iron and 
steel 
84 Nuclear reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery 
17 Sugars  28 Inorganic chemicals 86 Railway 
locomotives 
73 Articles of iron 
and steel 
85 Electrical and 
electronic 
equipmnt 
02 Meat and edible 
meat offal 
04 Dairy products, 
eggs, honey 
85 Electrical / 
electronic 
equipment 
     
2. China 5% 2. Turkey 6% 2. Turkey 6% 2. Turkey 7% 
72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 
31  Fertilisers 31  Fertilisers 27 Mineral fuels, oils 31 Fertilizers 
84 Nucl. reactors, 
boilers, machinery 
28 Inorganic chemicals 31  Fertilisers 27 Mineral fuels, oils 
85 Electrical and 
electronic 
equipmnt 
44 Wood and articles 
of wood 
28 Inorganic 
chemicals,  
15 Animal, vegetable 
fats and oils 
73 Articles of iron and 
steel 
27 Mineral fuels, oils 44 Wood and articles 
of wood 
28 Inorganic 
chemicals 
     
3. Belarus 5% 3. USA 5% 3. Italy 6% 3. Italy 4% 
72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 
10 Cereals 76 Aluminium  27 Mineral fuels, oils 41 Raw hides and 
skins 
84 Nucl. reactors, 
boilers, machinery 
88 Aircraft, spacecraft 
and parts 
41 Raw hides and skins 27 Mineral fuels and 
oils 
73 Articles of iron and 62 Articles of apparel 73 Articles of iron and 10 Cereals 
                                                          
61 Author’s calculations based on data retrieved from UN Comtrade Online Database.  
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steel steel 
40 Rubber and articles 
thereof 
31 Fertilisers 44 Wood and articles 
of wood 
15 Animal vegetable 
fats 
     
4. Turkey 3% 4. Germany 5% 4. Germany 4% 4. Poland 3% 
72 Iron and steel 01 Live animals 62 Articles of apparel 72 Iron and steel 
28 Inorganic 
chemicals, precious 
metal comp. 
62 Articles of apparel 27 Mineral fuels, oils 26 Ores, slag and ash 
15 Animal vegetable 
oils and fats 
74 Copper and articles 72 Iron and steel 44 Wood and articles 
of wood 
01 Live animals 72 Iron and steel 73 Articles of iron and 
steel 
27 Mineral fuels and 
oils 
12 Oil seed, oleagic 
fruits, grain nes 
35 Albuminoids, modif 
starches, glues 
84 Nucl. reactors, 
boilers, machinery 
12 Oil seed, oleagic 
fruits etc 
     
5. Germany 3% 5. Italy 4% 5. Poland 3% 5. Belarus 3% 
62 Articles of apparel 72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 72 Iron and steel 
74 Copper and articles 
thereof 
27 Mineral fuels, oils 27 Mineral fuels, oils 84 Nuclear reactors, 
boilers, 
machinery 
72 Iron and steel 31  Fertilisers 26 Ores, slag and ash 72 Articles of iron 
and steel 
35 Albuminoids, modif 
starches, glues 
76 Aluminium and 
articles thereof 
29 Organic chemicals 23 Residues, wastes 
of food industry 
84 Nucl. Reactors, 
boilers, machinery 
41 Raw hides and skins 44 Wood and articles 
of wood 
85 Electrical and 
electronic 
equipment 
Source: UN Comtrade Database, HS 1996 classification.  
3.3.2.2. Commodity diversification by destination markets 
In addition, a simple test was conducted of the extent of diversification of exports and imports 
with different trade partners by taking top ten countries in terms of the number of HS 1996 
tariff lines (disaggregated at 6-digit level) they bought from or sold to Ukraine in 1996, 2000 
and 2005, as shown in Table 4 and Table 5 below.  
Table 4. Diversification of exports, top 10 destination countries  
 1996  2000  2005 2005/1996 % ch. 2005/1996 
Russia 2858 Russia 2295 Russia 2423 -435 -15.2 
Belarus 1757 Areas, nes 1892 Moldova 2071 +743 +55.9 
Moldova 1328 Moldova 1188 Belarus 1606 -151 -8.6 
Areas, nes 1169 Belarus 1102 Germany 1238 +469 +60.9 
Lithuania 837 Germany 981 Poland 1230 +533 +69.3 
Germany 769 Poland 728 Kazakhstan 1170 +672 +134.9 
Poland 697 Lithuania 632 Lithuania 977 +140 +16.7 
Latvia 572 USA 573 Azerbaijan 909 +623 +217.8 
Uzbekistan 537 Latvia 557 Georgia 899 +619 +221.1 
Bulgaria 512 Hungary 501 USA 883 +494 +126.9 
World 3624 World 3473 World 3724 +100 +2.8 
  66
Note: diversification by 6-digit tariff lines in HS 1996 classification.  
Source: UN Comtrade Online Database, accessed in February 2007.  
Table 5. Diversification of imports, top 10 countries of origin  
 1996  2000  2005 
2005/1996 % change 
2005/1996 
Russia 3154 Areas, nes 3189 Germany 3537 +383 +19.8 
Germany 2953 Germany 2964 Russia 2824 -330 -10.4 
Areas, nes 2504 Russia 2696 Italy 2814 +885 +45.9 
Poland 2088 USA 2058 China 2755 +2043 +286.9 
Italy 1929 Italy 1983 Poland 2486 +398 +19.1 
USA 1824 Poland 1736 France 2411 +898 +59.3 
Czech Rep. 1667 France 1686 Netherl. 2162 +761 +54.3 
France 1513 Netherlands 1493 Turkey 1912 +896 +88.2 
Slovakia 1473 UK 1488 Czech Rep 1863 +196 +11.8 
Netherlands 1401 Czech Rep. 1357 Belgium 1708 +851 +99.2 
World 4511 World 4487 World 4678 +167 +3.7 
Note: diversification by 6-digit tariff lines in HS 1996 classification.  
Source: UN Comtrade Online database, accessed in February 2007 
The striking feature of export data is that most of the top ten countries listed in Table 4 are 
either CIS or former Comecon members (Poland, Latvia, Hungary), with the exception of 
Germany and USA. While exports to Russia are still the most diversified, the number of 
products Ukraine sold to Russia in 2005 was 15.2 percent less than it was in 1996. The same 
negative trend is observed with Belarus. Imports from Russia have also become more 
concentrated, with the number of tariff lines shrinking by 10.4 percent. In general, changes in 
overall nomenclature of products in the period 1996-2005 for both exports and imports are not 
that high - +2.8 and +3.7 percent respectively, but one can see that with many countries 
Ukraine has experienced more than doubling of export (with Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and USA) and import lines (particularly with China and Belgium, whose role in terms of 
diversification structure was very low in 1996). Changes in export structure, however, first of 
all reflect not an East-West reorientation, but rather East-within-East: it is mainly with CIS 
economies that Ukraine manages to significantly broaden the range of exported products. As 
far as imports are concerned, the dominating role of non-CIS economies driving the 
diversification trend, first of all Germany, Italy, China, France, Turkey, the Netherlands, 
reflects the fact that CIS economies cannot fully satisfy either the consumers’ tastes, or the 
demand for new technologies and capital investment products. Export diversification has been 
shown to be positively associated with economic growth in transition economies, including 
Ukraine (Funke and Ruhwedel, 2005), therefore it is an important trend that Ukraine is 
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undergoing an increase in product variety, in particular with West European economies 
(Germany, USA), which are more demanding markets.  
3.3.2.3. Sectoral dimension 
Moving to a sector-by-sector analysis, from Figure 15 below (see Annex 5 for a numerical 
breakdown) one can immediately notice a clear U-shaped trend of exports to CIS in most 
sectors.  
Figure 16. Geographic distribution of exports by commodity categories, 1996-2008, % of 
exports of respective commodities62 
a)       b) 
 
c)        d) 
 
 
 
                                                          
62 The categories include the following two-digit level HS product lines: a) 01-15; b) 16-24; c) 84 and 85; d) 28-
40; e) 72-83; f) 25-27, 68-71; g) 50-67; h) 86-89; i) 44-49. 
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e)       f) 
 
g)         h) 
 
i) 
 
 
Source: UN Comtrade Online Database. Retrieved in December 2009.  
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It is important to emphasise that the share of CIS had been falling in many sectors until 2002-
2003, but since 2003-2004, almost simultaneously, CIS started to regain its positions across 
all industries except agriculture. By 2008 CIS became by far the prevailing market for most 
Ukrainian exports – food products, machinery and electrical products, wood and paper and 
more recently transportation. Most remarkable is a sharp increase in the share of CIS in many 
product groups in 2005 at the cost of EU-15 and/or EU-12 and the rest of the world (Other). 
This is particularly noticeable in food exports, chemicals, machinery and electrical products 
and transportation. Moreover, since 2005 this trend has not reversed. This year thus marked 
an important structural change in Ukrainian trade reorientation.  
Another striking fact is a high and growing role of ‘Other’ countries in agriculture, chemicals 
and minerals, and a dominating role in metals. This is parallel to the trends observed in Figure 
3 on p. 45, where ROW (rest of the world) has taken over both CIS and the EU as destination 
market for Ukrainian exports in 2008. As discussed above, in the past decade the most 
important ROW export markets for Ukraine have been Turkey, a traditionally important trade 
partner, but increasingly more so Middle Eastern countries (Egypt, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia 
and United Arab Emirates). The growing global demand for food and agricultural products 
has been particularly pronounced in the Middle East, which explains the high exports of 
agricultural products (wheat, barley, sunflower oil) and fertilisers (which are an input for 
domestic agricultural production) to this region. Iron and steel are also an important 
commodity for the USA and some Asian markets. Interestingly, the role of China, which had 
been an important market for Ukraine (over 5 percent of total Ukrainian exports in 1996), has 
been declining since 2003 and was down to 0.82 percent by 2008. The main reason for this 
was a virtual disappearance of steel imports from Ukraine.63  
3.3.2.4. What happened in 2005? 
Returning to the issue of CIS vs. EU exports, one cannot help but wonder about the causes of 
the structural change that occurred in 2005. In terms of the political environment, 2005 was a 
year following the December 2004 Orange revolution with a new pro-Western government 
coming to power, a year of ‘Euro-euphoria’ in Ukraine. In recognition of Ukraine’s 
democratic elections and the election of the liberal government, EU-Ukraine Action Plan 
signed in February 2005 was meant to upgrade European Union’s relations with Ukraine and 
                                                          
63 It is remarkable that China has been increasing imports of iron and steel from most countries, apart from 
Ukraine and Russia, which have been in decline as a source market for this product group.  
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deepen its integration into the EU’s internal market and institutions (although stopping short 
of membership). Despite this positive environment, the ensuing political instability and 
populist economic policies of the Government of the then prime minister Yulia Timoshenko 
brought about a totally domestically caused economic crisis, whereby Ukrainian GDP growth 
fell from 12.1 percent in 2004 to 2.7 percent by the end of 2005. Attempts to administratively 
control prices, threats to re-privatise thousands of enterprises and abolition of free economic 
zones (even if economically justified) significantly worsened the business and investment 
climate in Ukraine, causing many enterprises to suspend or cut down production altogether. 
On the other hand, 2005 was the first full year of EU membership for the ten new member 
states. They adopted external EU import tariffs and non-tariff requirements, which could 
potentially cause trade diversion.  
Commodity distribution by regions in Annex 6 shows that in fact in absolute value terms 
there was no visible change in exports to the CIS in 2005. Exports to CIS had indeed been 
growing more dynamically since 2003 (average annual growth between 2003 and 2008 was 
31.6 percent, versus 17 percent for the period 1999-2003), but 2005 saw no particular 
speeding up of this trend. In contrast, certain exports to the EU-15 and EU-12 experienced a 
decline not only in relative but also in absolute terms in 2005. In case of the EU-15, exports of 
machinery and electrical products went down by 53 percent, chemicals by 27 percent and 
metals by 1 percent. In case of the EU-12, the biggest drop was also observed in machinery 
and electrical products, by 35 percent, food exports declined by 29 percent, mineral exports 
by 15 percent, and agricultural exports by 14 percent.  
In principle, EU accession in 2004 could have resulted in higher tariff barriers for Ukrainian 
products in the new member states. Table 6, however, shows that upon accession tariff 
protection levels increased only for agriculture and food products, the most sensitive sectors 
in the EU internal market, which explains the decline of agricultural and food exports in trade 
with the EU-12. Tariff rates on machinery and electrical products, chemicals and minerals, on 
the contrary, on average went down in CEECs upon accession. Besides, a parallel decline of 
machinery and electrical exports to both EU-15 and EU-12 in 2005 rules out enlargement as a 
reason for the decline of these exports in trade with the EU-12. In terms of individual EU-12 
countries, some decline in trade with Baltic countries was expected, as accession entailed 
abolition of the free trade agreement between these countries and Ukraine. This did take 
place, especially in trade with Lithuania and Estonia, however significant decline was also 
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observed in trade with Hungary and Romania. Exports to Poland had experienced the most 
dynamic growth compared to other EU-12 countries, however in 2005 they were ‘flat’, before 
resuming significant growth again since 2006 onwards. The latter fact, and the decline in 
exports to Romania, which did not join until 2007, suggests that the decline of exports in 2005 
was not caused by enlargement-induced trade diversion.  
Table 6. Comparison of protection rates on imports in CEECs and EU-15 
Agricultural products CEECs EU-15a  Industrial products CEECs EU-15 a 
Wheat -3.9b 49  Textiles 11.6 6.3 
Other grains -5.8b 13.7  Clothing and Leather 13.0 7.3 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 11.1 4.2  Furniture and Lumber 7.4 1.3 
Oilseeds -6.0b 0.0  Petroleum products 7.9 0.5 
Beet and cane sugar 0.0 45.5  Chemicals 8.1 2.7 
Other crops 11.3 2.1  Iron and Steel 7.0 1.9 
Bovine animals 2.1 63.8  Non-ferrous metals 3.8 0.8 
Other animal products 3.4 3.5  Motor vehicles 14.4 6.7 
Raw milk 33.3 93.6  Other manufacturers 8.7 1.9 
Bovine meat 2.6 63.8  Electrical machinery 8.4 3.4 
Other meat 4.4 4.9     
Dairy  29.0 93.1     
Processed sugar 14.1 50.5     
Other processed food 10.2 6.5     
Extraction  1.4 0.1     
Tobacco and beverages 43.7 14.7     
a Post-Uruguay round average MFN tariffs that should be fully in effect by 2005.  
b Negative tariff protection can take place in case of import subsidies. 
Source: Francois and Rombout (2001: 10)  
A product-by-product analysis reveals no coherent picture that could point to specific product 
market developments – different EU-15 and EU-12 countries registered declines in imports of 
different products from Ukraine. Apart from agricultural and food exports, which most likely 
declined due to the EU-12 joining the EU customs union, the only other commonalities are a 
significant fall in exports of mineral products to several EU-12 countries, in particular coke 
(Romania, Hungary), and a wide-ranging fall of machinery, equipment and electronic and 
electrical products (HS 84 and 85) in trade with many EU countries.  
In 2005 Ukrainian coke market was experiencing structural difficulties – deficit of coking 
coal, lower domestic demand causing coke producers to reduce production, sharply increased 
prices for railway transportation, plus lower world prices for coke driven down by China – all 
these put the coke producers under increasing pressure, which reacted by cutting down output. 
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As a result, total exports of coke from Ukraine, including to the EU-15 and EU-12, fell almost 
by two thirds, from US$642m in 2004 to US$219m in 2005.  
As far as machinery and electric products are concerned, in 2005 year-on-year this product 
group halved in trade with the EU-15 and fell by over a third in trade with the EU-12. There is 
little symmetry between the products that experienced a decline in trade with the EU-15 and 
EU-12. Table 7 below shows a snapshot of changes in exports of selected machinery and 
electric exports from Ukraine to the EU-15 and EU-12. As can be seen, many of the product 
lines in trade with the EU-15 experienced more than a ten-fold decline. Machinery and 
electric exports to the EU-12 are much more concentrated, and much sharper decline is 
observed for the top two exported products. There is also little overlap between products 
exported to the EU-15 and those exported to the EU-12. Hence, specific structural market 
changes cannot be blamed for the decline, neither can EU enlargement.  
Table 7. Selected machinery and electric exports from Ukraine to the EU-15 and EU-12, 
2004 and 2005, US$ thousand  
Exports to the EU-15 2004 2005 
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery etc 311,017 131,261 
8471 Automatic data processing machines, optical readers etc 69,603 2,205 
8421 Centrifuges 34,053 731 
8466 Machinery parts & accessories 28,603 2,245 
8417 Industrial, laboratory furnaces, ovens 23,375 423 
8410 Hydraulic turbines, water wheels 16,058 127 
85 Electrical, electronic equipment 254,041 171,745 
8514 Industrial, laboratory electric furnaces and ovens 81,728 1,466 
8543 Electrical machinery & apparatus, having individual function 34,504 286 
8518 Microphones, loudspeakers, etc 25,445 19,282 
Exports to the EU-12   
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers and machinery 169,938 150,361 
8473 Parts and accessories of computer and office machinery 17,343 1,404 
85 Electric and electronic equipment 261,893 131,135 
8537 Board and panels equipped with two or more switches, fuses 130,077 1,972 
Source: Intracen Trade Competitiveness Map, retrieved on 10th of July 2010  
While the precise reasons for this decline are hard to find out, there can be two hypothetical 
reasons. On the demand side, the hypothesis can stem from the fact that many of the products 
listed below are parts or components of machinery and/or equipment. If they are part of value 
or supply chain management, given the specifics of this industry, which relies heavily on 
timely and predictable deliveries, political instability could damage the reliability of Ukraine 
as a supplier, resulting in lower number of orders from Ukraine. Political instability could also 
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affect the supply side of this process. Anecdotal evidence exists that many enterprises, which 
were under threat of re-privatization following the announcement of Yulia Timoshenko’s 
Government, suspended production operations during 2005, which could lead to this decline 
in exports. This is, however, less likely, as exports of machinery and electric products to CIS 
did not experience any decline in 2005 or afterwards, as Annex 5 shows. Alternatively, there 
could be a combination of both factors at work, if higher adaptability of CIS partners to 
political instability and unpredictable business climate in culturally familiar markets partially 
compensated for the decline of exports to the EU.  
At the same time, the analysis in OECD (2007) suggests that the reason for the asymmetry in 
GDP and exports between 2004 and 2005 could be simply due to data measurement problems 
and the distorted statistics. Over- or under-reporting of cross-border transactions is a common 
problem in countries with large shadow economy, which in Ukraine is estimated at as much 
as 15-25 percent of GDP (OECD, 2007: 24).  According to World Bank (2005) exports to the 
CIS have traditionally been under-reported by some 5-10 percent (between 1996 and 2002), 
while those to the EU-10 over-reported, in 2000-2002 by as much as 22-33 percent. The 
picture with the EU-15 has been inconsistent, although more often than not over-reported. As 
far as machine-building industry is concerned, as Table 8 shows, in 2004 and 2005 significant 
under-reporting is observed in trade with both CIS and the EU-15. The discrepancy between 
data for the EU-15 in 2005 – 37.9 percent fall as reported by Ukraine, and 28 percent increase 
as reported by the EU-15 – is particularly startling.  
Table 8. Exports of Ukrainian machine-building, percentage change, US$ 
Reporting country: Ukraine  
Exports to: 2003 2004 2005 
World 33.9 52.2 –11.7 
CIS 19.4 54.4 18.1 
EU-15 47.8 26.3 –37.9 
Reporting countries: trading partners 
Imports from Ukraine of:  
World 34.3 39.4 22.2 
CIS 23.3 58.1 22.1 
EU-15 44.3 30.7 28.0 
Source: OECD (2007: 24) based on data from UN Comtrade Database.  
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Exports in 2004 and in previous years could have been inflated due to tax-evasion 
mechanisms employed in many sectors. Many of these mechanisms were brought to a halt 
due to the abolition of tax privileges for special economic zones in 2005 as well as tightening 
of customs administration.  
As far as chemicals are concerned, reorientation towards CIS took place mainly due to an 
increase of exports of inorganic chemicals (in particular aluminium oxide and hydroxide) to 
Russia. In trade with the EU there was a decline in 2005 compared to 200464, however taking 
into account the fact that export levels observed in 2004 were rather an above average 
increase, decline in 2005 represented a return to the trend from previous years rather than a 
structural change. The same can be said about exports of chemicals to the EU-12 – certain 
products registered a sharp temporary increase in 2004 (and sometimes in 2003) and fell back 
to negligible levels as of 2005.65 This temporary increase in 2004 could mean a beginning of a 
longer trend which was circumvented by enlargement or the domestic Ukrainian crisis, or 
could mean pre-emptive increase of exports in the run-up to enlargement aimed at by-passing 
tariff or non-tariff barriers that would come into force as of accession of the EU-10 countries 
in May 2004.66  
Changes described above – in mineral, machinery and electric, and chemical products –
explain most of the structural change in geographical distribution of Ukrainian exports that 
occurred in 2005. It is hard to say that one particular reason caused the reversal of 
reorientation towards the EU that had been taking place until 2004. In fact, it was a 
combination of lower demand from the EU, higher demand in the CIS, and lower domestic 
supply capacity.  
                                                          
64 Exports of ammonia were down from US$57.2m to US$41m, but then were up again in 2007 and 2008; 
perfumes and toilet waters fell from US$165.1m in 2004 to US$90,000 in 2005; articles of plastic went down 
from US$19m to US$607,000. Increase in exports of ammonia in 2004, followed by a reduction in 2005 could 
be related to the new anti-dumping investigation into imports from Ukraine and Russia, which claimed that in 
2003-2004 new forms of ammonium nitrate entered the EU under the different tariff heading. 
(www.allbusiness.com/legal/international-trade-law-nontariff/9549530-1.html ) 
65 Exports of titanium oxides (HS 2823) increased from almost zero to US$23.5m in 2003 and US$28.3m in 
2004, but then fell to 44,000 in 2005 and did not recover thereafter. Lubricant preparations (HS 3403) also 
registered a sharp increase from almost zero to US$19.9m in 2004 and fell to almost zero thereafter. Only 
albuminoids and casein and casein derivatives experienced a continuous decline on previous years, by 34% and 
30% respectively.  
66 At the end of 2005 Ukraine entered a gas row with Russia, which resulted in increased gas prices, significantly 
undermining competitiveness of producers of chemicals, however this would affect the 2006 performance, not 
2005. 
  75
However what has been happening since 2006, as seen from Annex 5, is a clear growing 
demand for Ukrainian products in CIS countries (particularly in Russia, but also growing 
demand in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Moldova) across most product groups, in particular 
higher value-added transportation, machinery and electric products. Exports to the EU-15 and 
EU-12, meanwhile, were growing at a slower pace and the structure became even more 
dominated by metals, minerals and agriculture. Therefore the more recent U-turn towards the 
CIS is a sign of growing competitiveness of Ukrainian products on those markets and a sign 
of an upgrading industrial structure as a result of cooperation with these countries.  
3.4. Conclusion 
The collapse of the USSR has been associated with a sharp reorientation of trade flows away 
from the FSU to the rest of the world for most FSU republics. A sharp reorientation of 
Ukrainian exports towards the EU in early 1990s was primarily caused by three main reasons 
– the contraction of demand in the CIS, the disruption of old production links and payment 
distortions. Severe output contraction in Ukraine and slow reform process resulted in a sharp 
decline of overall trade volumes, and in 1993 exports constituted only 15 percent of the level 
registered in 1990, by 2008 recovering to only 85 percent.  
Further fluctuations in geographic distribution of exports have had a lot to do with aggregate 
demand trends on the destination markets, global steel and oil prices and exchange rate 
movements. Thus, the 1998 financial crisis resulted in significant devaluation of hryvnia and 
improvement in terms of trade with non-CIS countries, while no such improvement was 
observed relative to Russia and other CIS countries (where devaluation was even stronger). 
The crisis therefore improved Ukraine’s competitiveness on the EU-15 and EU-12 markets 
and was associated with the growth of exports to these markets in 1999-2003 (both peaking at 
38 percent in 2002-2003) and a simultaneous dip in exports to the CIS.  
A dramatic continuous increase of global steel prices since 2003 contributed to both growth of 
Ukrainian exports and a dynamic economic growth.  
Trends in aggregate demand, however, seem to have influenced the geographic distribution of 
Ukrainian exports most. Thus, a dynamic recovery of the share of CIS in total Ukrainian 
exports seems to have been driven by a robust economic recovery that reached double digits 
in most CIS economies since 2001 and a simultaneous increase in their demand for steel. At 
the same time, high economic growth in the MENA countries, often driven by growing oil 
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prices, also created higher demand for Ukrainian products, in particular steel, grains (mainly 
wheat and barley), fertilisers and other chemicals. A dynamic growth in China, accompanied 
by the growing domestic production of steel, on the contrary, crowded out Ukrainian exports.  
While this chapter looked at the general picture, CHAPTER 4 contains a more specific 
analysis of the factor content of Ukrainian exports to the two ‘balancing’ regions of the EU 
and CIS, and a relative comparative advantage analysis that takes into account Ukraine’s 
position on these markets relative to other world suppliers. CHAPTER 5, in turn, will contain 
a more formal test of the effect of aggregate demand mentioned above, as well as the effect of 
trade blocs, on the Ukrainian exports.  
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CHAPTER 4. FACTOR CONTENT AND THE REVEALED COMPARATIVE 
ADVANTAGE OF UKRAINIAN EXPORTS 
4.1. Introduction 
One of the theoretical departing points of this thesis is the idea of a dynamic comparative 
advantage, which, if evolving towards more technology-intensive specialisation or 
specialisation in products of higher degree of processing, has positive implications for the 
competitiveness and growth of the economy in question. This applies to both developed and 
developing economies. The reason for this is higher rates of growth of high-technology 
products, their higher income elasticity of demand and higher value added. Therefore, 
although from the above analysis the aggregate composition of the Ukrainian trade with the 
EU does not reveal any particularly positive trends, a more formal analysis of factor-content 
of exports may help to see whether there are any signs of improvement at a more 
disaggregated level (at the 3-digit level according to SITC Rev. 3 classification). Using the 
same factor content classification the author then explores in which products Ukraine enjoys a 
revealed comparative advantage on the EU and Russian markets. While the former is a 
Ukraine-centred analysis, the latter is a more relative analysis, which weighs Ukraine’s role 
on the target markets against that of suppliers from the rest of the world.  
4.2. Factor content of exports to the EU-27 and Russia 
We apply the factor-content classification proposed by Lall (2000), which breaks down 
commodities depending on their level of processing and technological activities involved in 
their production into the following categories: 
§ Primary products (PP), with little processing; 
§ Resource-based products (RB), which tend to be either simple or labour-intensive, and 
the distinction is made between agro-based (RB1) and others (RB2); 
§ Low-technology (LT) products include products, which use technologies embodied 
primarily in capital equipment, that tend to be undifferentiated, and where labour costs 
comprise a major share of total costs. The distinction is made between textiles and 
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footwear (LT1) and others (LT2), which include many iron and steel products, which 
are so important in Ukrainian production.  
§ Medium-technology products (MT) are classified by Lall as products comprising the 
bulk of skill- and scale-intensive technologies in capital goods and intermediate 
products, and form an important part of industrial activity in mature economies. They 
have complex technologies, moderately high R&D and are usually linkage-intensive 
and harder to relocate. While high-technology products, described below, require a 
more mature, reliable but still highly flexible economic environment, for recovering 
transition economies increasing competitiveness in medium-technology products 
looks like a second-best option. A distinction is made between MT1, automotive 
products, MT2 – process industries (mainly chemicals and base metals), and MT3 – 
engineering products.  
§ High-technology products (HT) are R&D intensive products that require complex 
technology infrastructures, supplier networks and interaction between firms and 
research establishments. Electronic HT products have become a subject for integrated 
production systems, with labour-intensive production stages being relocated to 
countries with lower labour costs, but economic environment still remains a crucial 
criterion for such relocation.  
What follows next is the analysis of the structure of Ukrainian exports, with a view of 
revealing whether there are any signs of industrial upgrading that can lead to greater 
international competitiveness. Export flows to Russia are compared with export flows to the 
EU-27 by their factor content in the period from 1999 to 2008, as this is the earliest available 
period for trade with the EU-27 as a whole. While the previous section was based on 
Harmonised System commodity classification, factor content methodology is based on the 
SITC Rev.3 classification. The 3-digit level data was taken from UN Comtrade Online 
Database and each tariff line was classified according to one of the above categories. Table 9 
below compares an aggregate factor-content composition of exports to the EU-27 and Russia, 
while Table 10 gives a more detailed picture.  
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Table 9. Factor content of exports to the EU-27 and Russia 
a) Factor-content of exports to the EU-27, percent of total  
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2008 % change 
Primary products 18.6 24.2 18.2 13.6 21.4 +15% 
Resource-based 35.3 35.8 36.8 31.7 24.4 -31% 
Low-tech 22.8 21.7 19.9 19.3 16.4 -28% 
Medium-tech 19.2 14.8 20.8 28.4 32.6 +70% 
High-tech 3.5 3.1 3.5 3.0 4.3 +23% 
Other 0.6 0.4 0.9 4.0 0.9 +50% 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
b) Exports to Russia, percent of total 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2008 % change 
Primary products 12.2 9.0 9.6 6.1 5.5 -55% 
Resource-based manuf. 30.0 28.6 27.6 29.3 24.1 -20% 
Low-tech 16.2 18.4 17.2 21.9 20.4 +26% 
Medium-tech 35.5 38.2 40.0 38.0 43.6 +23% 
High-tech 5.2 5.7 5.6 4.7 6.2 +19% 
Other 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -89% 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade Online Database data  
Primary products constitute a lower share of exports to Russia than to the EU – 5.5 percent 
versus to 21.4 percent in 2008 respectively. After an initial decline in 2005, PP exports to the 
EU rebounded in 2008. This gain can be explained by the growth in world grain prices and 
exports of wheat, as well as by increased exports of petroleum gases and oils, coal and 
aluminium.  
Resource-based products are equally important in trade with both regions and account for 
about a quarter of all export flows, although in the case of the EU their share has fallen from 
about 35 percent registered in 1999, which to a large degree was due to the imposition of 
restrictions on export of ferrous and non-ferrous waste and scrap.  
RB1, agro-based products, are more significant in trade with Russia than with the EU – 19 
percent vs. 8 percent of total exports respectively. In trade with Russia there has been some 
reorientation within this category: whereas in 1999 a major share belonged to products of 
lower level of processing – sugars, wheat flour and cereal preparations, vegetable and fats and 
oils, rubber tyres and paperboard, in 2005 sugars have declined almost ten-fold, while in food 
products a bigger role in 2005 was played by products of higher level of processing – cheeses, 
fruit and vegetable preparations, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, etc. However the 
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bans that Russia imposed on imports of Ukrainian cheese, meat and other products in 2005 
and 2006 reduced the share of the products again. In trade with the EU this group is mainly 
characterised by increased competitiveness of vegetable fats and oils, which have increased 
ten-fold (from US$2mln to US$20mln), chocolate and fruit preparations (over 10 times 
increase), and wood manufactures, the latter category coming from Western Ukraine and 
mainly driven by foreign direct investment or outward processing schemes. In the future 
wood manufacturing industry presents opportunities for shifting up the value chain towards 
furniture and other higher-value added products.  
Non-agro-based (RB2) products in trade with the EU are mainly represented by coke, refined 
petroleum exports, as well as other hydrocarbons, iron ores and electric current. The lion’s 
share has traditionally been accounted for by petroleum and petroleum related products, 
produced from the crude oil sourced from Russia. 
Relative share of low-technology exports, which include LT1 – textiles and footwear, and 
LT2 – mainly steel and chemicals, has declined in trade with the EU-27, whereas that to 
Russia is on the rise. This is explained by slower than average growth in exports of textiles to 
the EU (which play almost no role in trade with Russia), an increase in anti-dumping 
investigations against Ukrainian steel and chemical producers on the one hand, and on the 
other hand higher growth of exports of several iron and steel lines to Russia.  
The fact that medium-technology manufactures have been the most dynamic group in trade 
with the EU (their share increasing by 70 percent between 1999 and 2008) and the dominant 
group in trade with Russia, as seen from Table 9, reflects a marginal, but an important 
improvement in Ukraine’s role in the global economy, and reflects, as Lall argues, a shift 
towards products representing a bulk of production in industrial countries. Although this 
group, as well as all others, is heavily biased towards iron and steel products and more 
complex chemicals, its growth also reflects upgrading of the level of processing of steel. This 
is happening partially as a way to overcome EU quotas67 on iron and steel of low level of 
processing, and partially due to an increased demand for higher quality Ukrainian steel for 
automotive industry on the world markets, encouraging producers to reorient away from 
production of cheap carbon steel predominant in previous years (Doing Business in Ukraine, 
2005).  
                                                          
67 In place until 2008, when Ukraine joined the WTO. Quantitative quotas cannot be applied to WTO members.  
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In value terms, as shown in Table 10,  in trade with the EU the bulk of growth was accounted 
for by MT2 (process) and MT3 (engineering) product groups, which grew on average by 116 
and 115 percent per annum between 1999 and 2008. Process manufacturing exports are 
roughly of equal importance in trade with both regions, accounting for around a quarter of 
total exports to Russia and the EU in 2008. In trade with the EU it is mainly comprised of pig 
iron (over US$1.6bn in 2005), tubes and pipes, various chemicals and fertilisers, and trailers 
and semi-trailers. Despite some foreign direct investment and ‘infant industry protection’ 
strategy of the Ukrainian government, the share of automotive products, MT1, is almost 
negligible in exports to both the EU and Russia (0.2 percent and, for most of 2000s, 2 percent, 
respectively). More recently, however, between 2005 and 2008, this group grew more than 
six-fold in trade with Russia, its share increasing from 2 to 5 percent.68 This finding is 
corroborated in Figure 12 on p.59, which shows that automotive products have been the most 
dynamically growing product group in Ukrainian trade.  
In terms of growth rates, group MT3 (engineering manufactures), follows MT2 as the 
second most dynamic group in trade with the EU (Table 10, 115 percent compound annual 
growth rate). The best performers are electric distribution equipment (almost a 30-fold 
increase), ship structures (7-fold), internal combustion engines (five-fold), domestic electronic 
and non-electronic equipment (almost 4-fold). However, these growth rates are from a very 
low base and Table 11 contrasts the (un)competitiveness of Ukrainian engineering products 
on the EU market with the importance of this group in trade with Russia (5.3 percent vs. 14.6 
percent respectively), although it seems to be losing positions (compared to 2002-2003) even 
on the Russian market.  
Ukraine does not yet have a pronounced specialisation in high-technology exports, either with 
Russia, or with the EU. Although the share of HT1 (electric and electronic products) in trade 
with Russia is higher than that with the EU (5.8 percent vs. 3.5 percent respectively), the 
growth rates have been more dynamic in trade with the EU (130 percent p.a. vs. 99 percent). 
The bulk of exports to the EU consist of telecommunication equipment parts (70 percent of 
total exports in group HT1). In trade with Russia HT exports are mainly represented by parts 
of electric power machinery (40 percent of total HT1 exports in 2008), electric machinery and 
apparatus (34 percent) and transmission shafts (19 percent).  
                                                          
68 Due to the dynamic growth of automobile exports to Russia, as described in more detail in footnote 58.  
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Table 10. Factor-content of exports to the EU-25 and to Russia, 1999 and 2008, thous. 
US$ 
  Exports to EU-25 Exports to Russia 
  1999 2008 CAGR % 1999 2008 CAGR % 
Primary products 593,114 4,157,848 78% 308,399 889,193  32% 
RB1: Agro-based 180,528 1,558,905 96% 485,659 2,068,848  47% 
RB2: Other resource-based 943,859 3,188,021 38% 274,110 1,825,786  74% 
LT1: Textile and footwear 436,887 827,731 21% 40,351 164,084  45% 
LT2. Other low-tech 290,832 2,357,704 90% 368,565 3,128,137  94% 
MT1: Automotive 10,027 46,519 52% 45,622 789,836  192% 
MT2: Process 500,198 5,243,448 116% 429,973 3,896,313  101% 
MT3: engineering 100,039 1,036,950 115% 421,630 2,359,434  62% 
HT1: Electronic and 
electrical 57,423 671,786 130% 104,834 933,277  99% 
HT2: Other high-tech 52,998 166,079 35% 27,623 74,370  30% 
Other 20,260 170,229 93% 21,590 11,997  6% 
Total  3,186,165 19,425,220 68% 2,528,356 16,141,274  71% 
Source: author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade Online Database 
The above has been a Ukraine-centred analysis, looking at trends in Ukrainian exports only. It 
has shown some positive trends in the commodity structure of exports to the EU, which have 
not been revealed in the more general analysis in CHAPTER 3.  
While important, this analysis does not take into account the dynamics on the world markets 
in general and does not allow assessment of how Ukraine keeps up with these trends and 
maintains its positions on the EU and Russian markets. The next section attempts to answer 
this question.  
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4.3. Revealed comparative advantage 
The term comparative advantage has been introduced by a British economist David Ricardo, 
who argued that countries (as well as economic agents, people, firms) are most efficient when 
they do the things that they are best at doing. By exporting goods and services that they can 
produce most efficiently and at a lower cost, and using export revenues to import goods that 
are more costly to produce domestically, the economies would thus maximise national 
production and consumption.69 As was discussed in CHAPTER 2, specialisation in 
technology-intensive exports may be more conducive to economic growth through efficiency 
and productivity gains. Specialisation in exports of primary products, on the contrary, was 
found to have an adverse effect on economic growth in the medium- to long-term. However, 
even with initial specialisation in low value-added products a country may shift its 
comparative advantage towards more value-adding products by means of industrial 
development, technological upgrading, inward FDI, etc., thus demonstrating a dynamic 
comparative advantage, as proposed by Redding (1999).  
We now proceed to analysing the revealed comparative advantage of Ukraine, first at 2-digit 
SITC (Rev. 3) level, comparing Ukraine’s RCA in trade with the EU with that it has with 
Russia, to see how Ukraine’s quality of trade differs between the traditional and the newer 
markets.  Then, pulling out good performers in medium- and high-technology clusters from 
the factor content analysis, a more detailed analysis is conducted of the Ukrainian RCA with 
the EU and Russia in these groups at the 3-digit level. The reasoning for this is to find out 
whether there is a case for potential improvement of Ukraine’s trade structure with developed 
economies, and thus for the dynamic comparative advantage.  
The traditional Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage (Balassa, 1965), although 
being said to be biased due to omission of imports (Greenaway and Milner, 1993), suits the 
line of inquiry in this study, as it is mainly focusing on upgrading of the competitiveness by 
means of exports. The index takes the form70:  
RCA = (Xij/Xit) / (Xwj/Xwt), 
                                                          
69 World Bank Beyond Economic Growth Student Book, Glossary 
http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/beyond/global/glossary.html , retrieved on 23rd of July 2010.  
70 One of the formulations. Another equivalent is: RCAij = (Xij/Xwj) / (Xit/Xwt). 
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where the share of a product i in country j’s total exports is compared to the share of the same 
product in comparators’ total exports. The formula can be used to compare Ukraine’s export 
structure with the international structure of exports, as well as with the global structure of 
exports to the EU and Russian markets. This analysis can be done on any level of tariff-line 
aggregation, and a country is considered to have a comparative advantage in a certain product 
if the RCA index is higher than 1. Unlike Ukraine-centred analysis undertaken in the previous 
sections, RCA analysis will show how Ukraine’s relative position is evolving compared to 
world’s exports to Russia and EU-27.  
Table 12 and Table 13 show Ukraine’s RCA in trade with Russia and EU-27 in 2000, 2005 
and 2008. As the totals show, Ukraine is competitive in an approximately equal number of 
tariff lines on both markets, although it is slightly higher in trade with the EU. The bad news 
is the declining number of products that exhibit comparative advantage with both regions – 
down from 18 to 14 in trade with Russia, and from 19 to 16 in trade with the EU. Another 
striking difference is more intensive RCA indices in trade with the EU than those in trade 
with Russia. This can partially be explained by higher complementarity of Ukraine’s and 
Russia’s trade. As noted in IER (2006), high index of complementarity of trade between 
Ukraine and CIS countries (in the range of 70-90 percent) implies that Ukraine’s export 
structure is very similar to CIS countries’ import structure. While this is interpreted as being 
good for the trade potential, complementarity is effectively inversely related to the RCA 
index, as the latter will be higher when a comparator country’s import structure is more 
dissimilar to Ukraine’s export structure.71 Besides, Russia is specialising in production of 
many product lines similar to those exported by Ukraine (e.g. food preparations or iron and 
steel), reducing Russia’s demand for imports of those products.  
In terms of product composition, on the Russian market Ukraine’s comparative advantage is 
most pronounced in iron and steel, fertilizers, dairy products and eggs, but also some 
technology intensive products – power-generating machines, metalworking and electric 
machinery, as well as transport equipment. Some structural shift is notable. As of 2008 
Ukraine has lost comparative advantage in many technology-intensive products (shown 
                                                          
71 E.g. since EU’s imports are more concentrated in intra-industry trade with developed economies in 
technology-intensive products, the share of primary or resource-based imports from Ukraine, such as cereals or 
fertilizers, will be relatively higher. In contrast, if Russia’s world imports contain many product lines that are 
important in Ukraine’s exports, e.g. it might be importing wheat or food preparations from other CIS countries, 
the share of Ukraine is likely to be relatively lower, reducing Ukraine’s RCA on the Russian market 
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towards the bottom of the table) and gained it in resource-intensive products (towards the top 
of the table). As such, this dynamics cannot be interpreted as a sign of positive structural 
change. The only positive development in terms of technology-intensive products seems to be 
the emergence of a relatively strong RCA in transport equipment. This gain was, however, 
was offset by a falling RCA in power-generating machines, and a disappearing RCA in 
electric and metalworking machinery.  
Table 12. Ukraine’s RCA in trade with Russia at a 2-digit level, 2000, 2005, 2008 
Commodity SITC  2000 2005 2008 
Meat, meat preparations 01 1.53     
Dairy products, bird eggs 02 2.21 3.84 2.99 
Cereals, cereal preprtns. 04  1.12 2.69 
Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices 07  1.08 1.62 
Beverages 11  1.91 1.57 
Crude fertilizer, mineral 27 2.43 3.00 5.72 
Metalliferous ore, scrap 28 1.26 2.04 1.74 
Coal, coke, briquettes 32  1.14  
Petroleum, petrol. product 33   3.38 
Electric current 35  2.66  
Fixed veg. fats and oils 42 1.70 1.53 3.16 
Inorganic chemicals 52  1.19 1.17 
Dyes, colouring materials 53 1.29   
Leather, leather goods 61 1.12   
Rubber manufactures, nes 62 2.63 0.97  
Paper, paperboard, etc. 64 1.35 1.36 1.77 
Non-metal. mineral manfct 66 1.24   
Iron and steel 67 4.83 4.77 4.90 
Non-ferrous metals 68 1.80  1.64 
Power generatng. machines 71 2.89 1.69 1.31 
Metalworking machinery 73 1.65   
Elec mch appar, parts, nes 77 1.00   
Othr. transport equipment 79  3.27 6.88 
Furniture, bedding, etc. 82 1.10   
Footwear 85 1.11   
TOTAL PRODUCT LINES WITH RCA  18 16 14 
Note: Only groups where Ukraine has a comparative advantage are represented here.  
Source: author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade data in SITC V.3 classification. 
Trade with the EU is characterised by a lack of RCA in foodstuffs and almost absent in 
manufactures, apart from metals manufactures (which was only observed in 2005) and 
clothing and footwear, both of which were no longer competitive in 2008. Strong and growing 
comparative advantage is observed in cereals, oil seeds, fixed vegetable fats and oils and iron 
and steel. Still strong, but either stable or falling, RCA has been observed in cork and wood, 
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fertilizers, metalliferous ores and scrap, electric current and leather / leather goods. In 14 out 
of 19 product groups the scale of RCA has been falling. In contrast, although the strength of 
RCA in trade with Russia is lower across the board, in 10 out of 18 cases it has grown, which, 
coupled with a falling number of product groups that exhibit RCA, indicates an increasing 
specialisation in trade with Russia.  
Table 13. Ukraine’s RCA in trade with the EU-27 at 2-digit level, 2000, 2005, 2008 
Commodity SITC 2000 2005 2008 
Dairy products, bird eggs 02 7.33 
Cereals, cereal preprtns. 04 2.44 14.49 13.30 
Animal feed stuff 08 1.09 1.17 
Hides, skins, fur skins, raw 21 8.31 6.12 
Oil seed, oleaginous fruit 22 5.87 1.40 12.39 
Cork and wood 24 4.04 5.35 5.05 
Crude fertilizer, mineral 27 5.56 7.39 4.79 
Metalliferous ore, scrap 28 9.17 5.17 3.42 
Coal, coke, briquettes 32 3.70 2.70 2.41 
Electric current 35 12.76 4.76 4.64 
Fixed veg. fats and oils 42 1.75 6.01 6.73 
Animal, veg. fats, oils, nes 43 1.46 
Organic chemicals 51 1.15 
Inorganic chemicals 52 4.02 1.17 
Dyes, colouring materials 53 1.40 
Fertilizer, except grp272 56 13.88 4.51 3.60 
Chemical materials nes 59 2.42 2.04 1.14 
Leather, leather goods 61 6.36 4.23 3.63 
Cork, wood manufactures 63 1.20 2.51 2.75 
Iron and steel 67 12.69 15.52 10.51 
Non-ferrous metals 68 1.77 
Metals manufactures, nes 69 1.02 
Clothing and accessories 84 1.76 1.17 
Footwear 85 1.13 
TOTAL PRODUCT LINES WITH RCA 19 19 16 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade Online Database data.  
In order to distinguish between various products in terms of their factor content, as discussed 
above, a revealed comparative advantage at a more disaggregated, 3-digit level, is analysed 
next.  
Figure 17 reveals the redistribution in RCA in trade with Russia away from medium-
technology towards resource-based exports. The number of low-technology products with 
comparative advantage also fell in 2005 and 2008. The number of high-technology products 
with RCA is higher than in trade with the EU, but also fell from 6 to 4 between 2000 and 
2008. The total number of exports with RCA in trade with Russia fell significantly between 
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2000 and 2005, from 73 to 58, but recovered to 63 in 2008 on account of resource-based, 
medium- and low-technology exports.   
Figure 17. RCA by factor content in trade with Russia, 2000, 2005, 2008 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade Online Database.  
Figure 18. RCA by factor content in trade with EU-27, 2000, 2005, 2008  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade Online Database. 
The structure of Ukraine’s comparative advantage on the EU market is similar to that of 
Russia – dominated by resource-based exports, and an even higher number of primary 
products. While in 2000 the number of Ukrainian products with RCA was higher on the 
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Russian market, by 2005 the situation reversed and there were 11 more products with RCA on 
the EU market than on that of Russia. In 2008 this gap narrowed down to 5 products, but was 
still in favour of the EU. However, the average intensity of the comparative advantage across 
all products (with RCA>1) has somewhat declined in trade with the EU – from 6.8 in 2000 to 
4.4 in 2008, and increased slightly in trade with Russia – from 2.6 to 3.5, though still 
remaining lower than on the EU market. The fact, however, that these averages are based on a 
smaller number of competitive product lines makes them less relevant estimates. Still, these 
contradicting trends make it hard to make a straightforward judgment as to the dynamics of 
the overall comparative advantage of Ukraine on the Eastern and Western markets. Besides, it 
is important to bear in mind that unlike in the preceding analysis, RCA analysis takes into 
account the dynamics on a destination market and its imports from the rest of the world, 
thereby showing the relative rather than absolute performance of Ukrainian products on those 
markets.  
In exports of primary products to the EU Ukraine has an exceptionally high comparative 
advantage in barley (in 2000 almost half of all barley imported by the EU came from Ukraine, 
though declining to 38 percent in 2008, resulting in the RCA of 100 and 42 respectively, the 
former being the highest RCA in the whole sample), unmilled wheat and maize (RCA of 28.6 
and 12.8 respectively in 2008), oil seeds (12.8 in 2008), fuel wood (12) and other crude 
minerals. In trade with Russia the highest RCA in primary products was observed in stone, 
sand and gravel (8.5 in 2008), unmilled maize (6.6) and milk and cream (4 in 2005, down to 
2.5 in 2008). Liquefied propane and butane emerged with a strong RCA in 2008 (8.5), but it 
had not been competitive in 2000/2005. 
In group RB1 – agricultural resource-based products – a notable difference is that on the 
Russian market Ukraine has a comparative advantage in food preparations (cheeses, cereal 
flours and preparations, chocolate and cocoa preparations), which are absent in trade with the 
EU, which is understandable given the high level of protection of the European market for 
these products, the problems with compliance to quality standards of the EU, and not least the 
difference in tastes. In trade with the EU the most pronounced RCA in this group was in fixed 
vegetable fats and oils and wood.  
Although the total number of products with RCA in resource-based products remained more 
or less constant throughout the period under observation, it is masking large losses on the EU 
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market in RCA intensity in group RB2 (from 9.3 in 2000 to 2.3 in 2008), which includes 
energy, base metals, inorganic chemicals and other minerals. Ukraine has been loosing 
positions across the majority of products that were competitive in 2000 – in iron ore, ferrous 
and non-ferrous waste and scrap, coke, residual petroleum products, electric current and 
inorganic chemicals. While exports of scrap metal have been curbed by Ukraine and its 
producers unilaterally, to meet the domestic demand, other product lines seem to have lost 
comparative advantage due to higher imports of those products from the rest of the world. The 
same group has undergone relatively few changes on the Russian market, apart from growing 
RCA in coke/semi-coke and miscellaneous non-ferrous base metals. Average RCA in this 
group increased slightly, reaching the same level in 2008 as that observed in the EU (2.3).  
In low-technology exports to the EU Ukraine has been loosing competitiveness in textile 
products72 and in certain metallurgy products – iron and steel bars and shapes (RCA halved 
from 18.3 to 9.8), railway track iron and steel (down from 42 to 7.9), wire of iron and steel 
(from 17 to 6.8). In Russia, on the contrary, similar products have slightly gained in 
competitiveness.  
To see whether there are any signs of dynamic comparative advantage in higher-value added 
products, the medium- and high-technology products are looked at in more detail in Table 14.  
The number of medium-technology products with comparative advantage on the EU market is 
low but growing (from 10 in 2000 to 13 in 2008). In trade with Russia, in contrast, although 
this group accounted for over a third of all products with RCA in 2000 (25 out of 73), Ukraine 
has lost many of its positions by 2008, the number of competitive positions evening out with 
those observed on the EU market at 13. Hence, even if there are some positive trends on the 
Western markets, there is clearly a more important loss of competitiveness on the Russian 
market.  
  
                                                          
72 Women’s/girls clothing except knit – RCA down from 4.2 in 2000 to 1.22 in 2008, fur skins – from 5.1 to 2.6, 
and a disappearing RCA in knit women clothing, footwear, and special yearn and textile fabrics in 2008.  
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Table 14. Revealed comparative advantage in medium- and high-technology exports to 
Russia and the EU-27, 2000, 2005, 2008 
Russian Federation EU-27 
2000 2005 2008 2000 2005 2008 
MEDIUM-TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS 
783 mt1 ROAD MOTOR VEHICLES NES  2.0     
782 mt1 GOODS,SPCL TRANSPORT VEH  1.2       
784 mt1 PARTS,TRACTORS,MOTOR VEH  1.4       
Total MT1: Automotive manufactures 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Average MT1 1.3 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 
      
265 mt2 VEGETABLE TEXTILE FIBRES  3.3 2.5 6.3   
512 mt2 ALCOHOL,PHENOL,ETC.DERIV  1.7       
513 mt2 CARBOXYLIC ACIDS,DERIVTS  1.3 2.2 3.3 3.0 
533 mt2 PIGMENTS, PAINTS, ETC.  1.4   1.9 2.4 
562 mt2 FERTILIZER,EXCEPT GRP272  13.9 4.5 3.6 
572 mt2 POLYMERS OF STYRENE  2.1       
579 mt2 PLASTIC WASTE, SCRAP ETC  1.6 2.2 6.4   4.7 1.1 
671 mt2 PIG IRON,SPIEGELEISN,ETC  6.4 5.8 6.2 7.8 12.7 8.6 
672 mt2 INGOTS ETC.IRON OR STEEL  6.7 5.0 7.8 45.8 43.5 38.8 
679 mt2 TUBES,PIPES,ETC.IRON,STL  4.3 4.6 5.0 6.2 11.8 5.4 
786 mt2 TRAILERS,SEMI-TRAILR,ETC  1.7 2.4 1.5 
791 mt2 RAILWAY VEHICLES.EQUIPNT  3.6 8.1 11.7 4.0 8.2 12.0 
598 mt2 MISC.CHEMICAL PRODTS.NES    1.4 1.1 
Total MT2: Process manufactures 9 5 6 8 11 10 
Average MT2 3.2 5.1 7.4 10.5 9.2 7.7 
      
711 mt3 STEAM GENER.BOILERS,ETC.  1.2       
713 mt3 INTRNL COMBUS PSTN ENGIN  1.9       
714 mt3 ENGINES,MOTORS NON-ELECT  4.8 4.8 7.3       
722 mt3 TRACTORS  3.1 2.9 1.7       
735 mt3 PARTS,NES,FOR MACH-TOOLS  1.0 1.1       
737 mt3 METALWORKING MACH. NES  2.3 1.5 1.0 2.5 2.6 3.5 
742 mt3 PUMPS FOR LIQUIDS,PARTS  1.3 1.0       
746 mt3 BALL OR ROLLER BEARINGS  2.5 1.7 1.5   1.5 1.3 
749 mt3 NON-ELECT MACH.PARTS,ETC  1.0       
772 mt3 ELEC.SWITCH.RELAY.CIRCUT  1.0       
773 mt3 ELECTR DISTRIBT.EQPT NES  1.1 1.2   4.1 4.9 
775 mt3 DOM.ELEC,NON-ELEC.EQUIPT  1.4       
812 mt3 PLUMBNG,SANITRY,EQPT.ETC  1.1 1.3       
813 mt3 LIGHTNG FIXTURES ETC.NES  1.1       
891 mt3 ARMS AND AMMUNITION  7.1       
Total MT3: Engineering manufactures 14 6 7 1 3 3 
Average MT3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.2 
Total MT 25 11 13 10 14 13 
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Russian Federation EU-27 
2000 2005 2008 2000 2005 2008 
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS 
716 ht1 ROTATING ELECTRIC PLANT  2.2       
718 ht1 OTH.POWR.GENRTNG.MACH.  1.5 1.8 1.5       
748 ht1 TRANSMISSIONS SHAFTS ETC  1.3 1.5 1.8     1.0 
771 ht1 ELECT POWER MACHNY.PARTS  2.5 2.3 4.4       
778 ht1 ELECTRIC.MACH.APPART.NES  1.2       
Total HT1: Electronics and electrical 5 3 3 0 0 1 
525 ht2 RADIO-ACTIVE MATERIALS  1.6     2.5 
712 ht2 STEAM TURBINES  6.1 7.7 4.9 1.7     
Total HT2: Other high-technology 1 2 1 1 0 1 
Average HT 2.5 3.0 3.1 1.7 0.0 2.5 
Total HT 6 5 4 1 0 2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on UN Comtrade Online Database. 
This finding is in contrast with the trends described earlier in sections 3.2 and 3.3, showing a 
U-turn in the overall share of CIS in Ukrainian exports, and an increase both in relative and 
absolute terms of technology-intensive exports to the CIS, in particular in 2005, the year when 
many medium-technology products lost their RCA. Recalling that the denominator of the 
RCA index is measuring the supply of a particular product to the comparator market (EU or 
Russia) by all countries of the world, the loss of competitiveness on the Russian market by 
Ukraine can be explained by Russia importing even larger volumes of certain products 
supplied by Ukraine from the rest of the world. This, in turn, relates back to the economic 
recovery in Russia, which started in 1999 and gained momentum throughout the first decade 
of 2000s, generating high aggregate demand which seemingly had to be met by expanding the 
range of suppliers, thus diminishing the role played by Ukraine.  
It is notable from Table 14 that in trade with the EU the RCA in medium-technology products 
is mainly represented by the group MT2 “Process manufactures”, while in trade with Russia – 
by group MT3 “Engineering manufactures”. The latter contains products of higher added 
value; hence once again Ukraine fails to show competitiveness in this category on the EU 
market. One positive trend on the EU market is a growing RCA in railway vehicles and 
equipment (from 4 in 2000 to 12 in 2008), and the emergence of two new product groups with 
RCA in MT3 category – ball or roller bearings and electrical distribution equipment. 
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In high-technology exports Ukraine has even less RCA, on both markets. The situation is 
slightly better with the Russian market, where in 2000 Ukraine had 6 competitive product 
groups, but by 2008 this number was down to 4, a trend similar to the medium-technology 
exports.  
4.4. Conclusion 
This section revealed trends that are different from those described in CHAPTER 3. 
CHAPTER 3 showed that the role of the EU as a destination market for Ukrainian products, 
in particular for more technology-intensive products, has been diminishing recently giving 
way to the CIS. The factor content analysis, in contrast, showed that the share of medium-
technology products in total exports to the EU has been growing; in fact it was the most 
dynamically growing group, while the share of resource-based and low-technology products 
declined. At the same time medium-technology exports to Russia were growing less 
dynamically, but still constituted a higher share than that in trade with the EU (44 percent vs. 
33 percent).  
As far as competitiveness is concerned, in 2000 Ukraine had more product lines competitive 
on the Russian market than those on the EU market. However, by 2005 Ukraine lost 
competitiveness in a fifth of products on the Russian market, and although it regained some of 
the positions by 2008, the number of products with an RCA was anyway higher in trade with 
the EU. Moreover, wherever present, Ukraine’s comparative advantage is more intense in 
trade with the EU than that in trade with Russia. This can be explained partially by high 
complementarity of trade with Russia and CIS countries in general73 and by the similarity of 
production structures in Russia and Ukraine, which diminishes the demand for Ukrainian 
substitutes. 
Although in 2000 Ukraine enjoyed a comparative advantage across many technology-
intensive products in trade with Russia, by 2008 some of it has been lost (in particular in 
power-generating machines and in electric and metalworking machinery). In contrast, in trade 
with the EU74 apart from steel almost no manufactures enjoyed a revealed comparative 
advantage.  
                                                          
73 Whereby CIS countries’ import structure is similar to Ukraine’s export structure, thus making it more difficult 
for Ukraine to ‘stand out’ relative to competing suppliers. 
74 Measured on a two-digit level in SITC commodity classification. 
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Breaking down the RCA analysis further, to a 3-digit level, to focus on the medium- and high-
technology exports, the data shows that in trade with the EU there was a positive trend – the 
number of medium-technology products with RCA has increased, in line with the factor 
content analysis. In trade with Russia, on the contrary, the seeming increase in the importance 
of MT exports from the factor content analysis was not pronounced in the RCA analysis. The 
latter showed that between 2000 and 2008 Ukraine lost competitiveness in 12 out of initial 25 
medium-technology products. This implies that even though Russia was importing more 
medium-technology products from Ukraine in absolute terms, it was at the same time 
importing even higher volumes of similar products from other countries, causing Ukraine to 
lose its positions and some of the RCA.  
The lower number of product lines with the RCA on the Russian market, lower intensity of 
competitiveness indices and a simultaneous loss of RCA in many products come as a stark 
contrast with the analysis in CHAPTER 3, which showed a persistent increase in the role of 
CIS for both overall exports and technology-intensive exports in particular. The likely reason 
for this is a size of the Russian market. A rate of growth comparable to that of Ukraine 
translates into a much higher increase in the absolute demand (in particular for technology-
intensive products that are needed for further industrial upgrading), which Ukraine finds hard 
to keep up with. This negative trend in relative competitiveness on the Russian market serves 
as a warning for Ukraine for the medium- to long-term. It does not, however, change the fact 
that CIS and Russia in particular have become more important export partners for Ukraine in 
the past several years. The ongoing catching up in growth in these countries is likely to 
continue driving higher demand for imports from Ukraine and from the rest of the world. At 
the same time Ukrainian exporters need to be aware of the dynamics on the global markets 
and of a fiercer competition they are facing on the traditional markets of CIS and Russia.  
As far as trade with the EU is concerned, while the analysis in CHAPTER 3 showed a 
negative evolution in the share of the EU in certain sectors, the factor content and the RCA 
analysis on a more detailed product level revealed some positive trends. The number of 
product groups with the RCA has increased in medium-technology products (both process and 
engineering), although the average intensiveness of RCA indices has fallen in the former 
group.  
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Bridging the findings from CHAPTERS 3 and 4, it appears that while Ukraine is clearly 
struggling to compete on the EU market, it would be a mistake to say that it is losing its 
positions there. On the Russian market, on the other hand, while in absolute terms there is a 
strong positive trend, the medium- to long-term perspective is posing risks to Ukraine in view 
of the dynamically developing demand and competition on the Russian market.  
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CHAPTER 5. MACRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF UKRAINIAN EXPORTS 
IN 1996-2004: STEEL MATTERS 
5.1. Introduction 
Analysis in CHAPTERS 3 and 4 showed that until recently Ukraine had been experiencing a 
considerable reorientation towards the European Union. As of 2005, however, CIS has seen a 
U-turn in Ukraine’s export portfolio and recovered its position as a leading destination market 
for Ukrainian products.  
On the backdrop of this variable dynamics in geographic distribution of exports, the study is 
focusing on regional trade blocs as determinants of Ukraine’s export performance. Applying a 
traditional tool for analysing regional trade effects, the gravity model, this chapter is trying to 
explore the role of traditional macro-level factors that have been used in the trade literature. 
The main focus of this analysis is the effect of the various regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
that Ukraine’s trade partners are members of, on Ukraine’s exports, paying particular 
attention to the trade blocs in closest proximity – the old EU – 15 member states that formed 
European Union prior to 2004, Central European Free Trade Area, which until 2004 included 
10 new EU members (or candidates prior to 2004) as external trade blocs, and the network of 
free trade agreements within the CIS, as an internal trade bloc. Another important determinant 
is the evolution of aggregate demand in the partner countries. As suggested in Chapter, it may 
have determined both the absolute changes of Ukrainian exports and the changes in the 
revealed comparative advantage, in particular on the Russian market. Controlling for 
aggregate demand and for natural geographic characteristics (proximity, common border, size 
and access to the sea), this analysis is trying to capture to what extent belonging to an 
(internal) trade bloc increases exports from Ukraine, and to what extent being excluded from 
an external trade bloc, or being left out from an enlarging trade bloc, may result in trade 
diversion for this country.  
This exercise appears to be more accurate in a single-country setting employed here, as it 
allows decomposing regional effects in a way that would be difficult to explore in a multi-
country gravity model, not least due to better data quality. This is done in order to clarify the 
conflicting findings in the literature about over- or under-performance of Ukrainian trade with 
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Western or Eastern trade blocs and to point out aspects in external trade policy of Ukraine, 
which require early attention of policy makers.  
Given the specifics of the commodity composition of Ukrainian exports, where steel accounts 
for about 40 percent of total exports, analysis herein distinguishes between aggregate and 
non-steel exports to reveal any bias that the high share of one commodity could generate in 
aggregate results. Besides, steel is a sensitive commodity to trade, and often faces high tariff 
and non-tariff restrictions in the destination countries, thereby potentially causing a downward 
pressure on the effects of certain regional trade agreements on Ukrainian exports.  
Section 5.2 provides the background information on trade, economic growth and exchange 
rate dynamics in Ukraine and their possible interaction. Section 5.3 presents the theoretical 
approach and the model, followed by data description in section 5.4. Section 5.5 includes the 
discussion of the results, which are further summed up in the Conclusion section. 
5.2. Background information 
Geographic distribution of exports 
As discussed extensively in previous chapters, the trends in geographic reorientation of 
Ukrainian exports since the start of transition have not been consistent. The initial shock 
created by the collapse of the USSR was associated with a sharp decline of trade among FSU 
republics and an increase in the role of the rest of the world and, for Ukraine, the EU in 
particular (see Figure 3 on p.45). The role of the EU has been on the rise and by 1999 the EU-
15, along with the twelve EU candidate countries, was the top destination region for 
Ukrainian exports. In 2005, however, the trend reversed and CIS regained its position as a 
dominant market for Ukrainian products. Since then the share of the EU has not recovered, 
while that of the CIS has been continuously rising. Among the rest of the world some of the 
most important trade partners are China, Turkey and the United States (see section 3.2.3 on p. 
52 for a more detailed discussion). While the primary focus of this chapter is to explore the 
role of regional trade agreements in determining Ukraine’s exports, the effect of China and 
Turkey as significant partners is also controlled for.  
Commodity composition and high resource-dependence  
The commodity composition of Ukrainian exports is dominated by resource-intensive 
products, in particular iron and steel. As Figure 7 on p. 51 shows, the share of base metals and 
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articles thereof consistently comprises 35-40 percent of total world exports. The commodity 
structure of exports is not analysed in this chapter, as this is done in detail in Chapter 3, but 
given the domination of the steel industry, it is important to distinguish between total and 
non-steel exports in this analysis, in order to avoid generalising the results where they may be 
distorted by one commodity. The study therefore compares the effects of external and internal 
regional trade agreements for total and for non-steel exports. 
1998 financial crisis, exchange rate and external sector 
In 1998 both Russia and Ukraine were hit by financial crises, which had an impact on the 
subsequent evolution of their external sectors, and economies in general.  
The negative investor sentiment in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis resulted in 
massive capital outflows from Russia and Ukraine, which had been pursuing unsustainable 
government debt levels (mainly in high-return short-term treasury bills). In order to 
restructure and repay where possible this debt Ukrainian government had to borrow heavily 
from the National Bank (NBU). At the same time the NBU was selling foreign exchange on 
the market to support hryvnia. This was unfeasible for the foreign exchange reserves and in 
September 1998 the NBU stopped its interventions and allowed hryvnia to float. Russian 
rouble, however, depreciated even further (see Figure 19 below – while depreciating against 
the US dollar and the euro, hryvnia appreciated relative to the Russian rouble). This relative 
appreciation of the Ukrainian currency against the Russian rouble, combined with the 
negative economic growth and the fall in aggregate demand for imports in Russia, triggered a 
partial redirection of Ukrainian exports towards countries offering better terms of trade. Thus, 
exports to the EU-27 and to Asia and the Middle East continued to grow. 
Although being a strong shock for the economy, in the medium-term the depreciation of the 
hryvnia improved Ukraine’s external competitiveness and spurred exports. Given the need to 
diversify exports, which were highly concentrated on the CIS market and Russia in particular, 
the shock was also beneficial for the geographic export structure. At the same time, since 
2002 the National Bank of Ukraine has been following a policy of de facto fixed exchange 
rate, which, as theories promoting stable exchange rates would predict, may have had a 
positive effect on the growth of exports. 
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Figure 19. Real effective exchange rates of Ukrainian hryvnia (CPI-based), 1996=100 
 
Note: downward trend means appreciation of the REER, and increasing – depreciation. 
Source: World Bank (2004) 
Exports and GDP 
Since one of the main explanatory variables in gravity-type models is GDP, the growth rate of 
real exports is compared below to the growth of real GDP (in constant 2000 US dollars). 
Some correlation between exports and GDP can be observed, and although in recent years 
growth has been mainly due to the increased consumption and investment, growth in 2002-
2006 was also boosted by the terms of trade improvement, due to higher global steel prices 
and improved competitiveness due to real exchange rate depreciation (OECD, 2007). 75  
  
                                                          
75 However, as will be explained below, in our model we do not explore the causality between exports and 
Ukrainian economic growth and vice versa, primarily because in one-country setting the variance is mostly 
explained by the demand-side growth, i.e. growth of partner countries’ GDP. 
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Figure 20. Growth rates of real exports and GDP, % change year-on-year 
 
Source: WB World Development Indicators for GDP data, IMF DOTS for exports  
The period under analysis 
The analysis in this chapter was undertaken in 2005/2006, when the latest available cross-
country data was up to 2004. The fact that the data-set was manually created by the author 
makes it too time-consuming to update the analysis to include later years during the course of 
writing up this thesis. This will be done, however, should publication of this study be 
considered.  
Global steel market developments as a factor in Ukrainian export performance 
Before passing on to the discussion of the model and the results it is worth outlining briefly 
the developments on the global steel market, as the distinction between steel and non-steel 
exports is an important part of this analysis.  
Figure 21 roughly outlines the main events from 1996 to 2004. The kick-off point to much of 
the recent steel prices dynamics was the 1997 Asian financial crisis – it decreased the demand 
for steel in the affected countries76 and consequently the world steel prices. Ukrainian exports 
of steel in value terms were respectively declining between 1997 and 1999.  
                                                          
76 Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea were the countries where initial securities defaults started, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Laos, Philippines followed. China, Taiwan and Singapore were relatively unaffected.  
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Besides, in 1998-1999 Ukraine had to cope with a financial crisis of its own. The reaction of 
the markets to the price drop was to divert a lot of steel exports to the US and Europe. US 
reacted promptly by opening safeguard investigations in 2001 on 33 products and imposed 
high additional duties on 14 products in 2002, which was against WTO rules and was subject 
to criticism by the international community (Bendini, 2007). Therefore Ukrainian steel 
exports declined again slightly in 2001 (not significantly, due to relatively low share of the 
US). Besides, in 2001 the EU, fearing being flooded with products that could no longer be 
exported to the US, also took safeguard measures, which did not, however, concern Ukraine, 
as with Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan the special regimes apply, with quotas being 
negotiated annually (European Commission, 2002). 
Since 2001-2002 the world steel market, and particularly price movements became defined by 
the Chinese economy – while its steel consumption had been growing by 2.6 percent per year 
in the period 1995-2002, since 2002 it has been growing by some 25 percent per year. To 
compare, in the rest of the world since 2001 the average annual growth of steel consumption 
has been 2.1 percent per year. 
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Figure 22 shows the acceleration of China’s steel imports since 2002 (OECD, 2004). Partially 
because of this, when in 2003 the European Union cut down Ukraine’s quotas on certain steel 
products by 30 percent to 184,500 tonnes per annum, it did not affect Ukraine’s aggregate 
steel exports. The steel exports to China doubled in 2003, but other markets, in particular 
South East Asia and Middle East, were dynamically gaining importance for Ukraine as well 
(See Annex 7).  
Figure 22. Chinese Steel Trade 
 
Source: OECD (2004) 
Below follows the description of the theoretical foundation of the analysis, which aims to 
disentangle the effects on exports of regional trade groupings of immediate concern to 
Ukraine – the CIS, with its network of bilateral free trade agreements, and the EU, as a big 
neighbouring bloc granting duty-free access to the insiders, and potentially causing a trade 
diversion effect to the outsiders.  
5.3. Theoretical approach and the model 
The main focus of this analysis is the role of regional trade groupings in determining the 
evolution of Ukrainian exports, focusing on the EU as the most important external trade bloc, 
and on CIS with its network of bilateral free trade agreements as an internal trade bloc. With 
internal trade blocs the expectation is to find a positive association with Ukraine’s exports, 
while with the external bloc, without strong expectations, the effect of an increasing EU 
internal market on Ukraine as a non-member is explored. On the one hand, there should be a 
positive association due to restoration of more natural levels of trade after the collapse of the 
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Soviet system, given the geographic proximity and economic mass of the EU. On the other 
hand, as the Vinerian customs theory (Viner, 1950) posits, when the enlargement of a customs 
union takes place, trade may either be created, if accessing countries are more efficient than 
non-members, or diverted from non-members, even if the latter had been more efficient 
producers prior to the creation of a customs union.  
In applied trade literature the effect of trade blocs on trade flows has traditionally been 
investigated by means of gravity models. Gravity models are used in various social sciences 
to predict and describe certain behaviour that mimics gravitational interaction as per 
Newton’s law of gravity.77 In relation to trade it was first applied by Tinbergen (1962).   
Gravity model has been one of the most proliferate approaches to modelling trade flows, both 
due to its simplicity and empirical success. It gained its name from Newton’s gravity law that 
states that the gravity between two bodies is proportional to their masses and inversely related 
to the distance between them. Therefore, in its basic form the model in relation to trade looks 
like: 
, 
where Fij is a trade flow between countries i and j (varies in different studies, either the total 
average trade turnover, or imports and/or exports separately), M are the economic sizes of 
countries i and j (usually measured by GDP or GNP), and D is the distance between them 
(usually measured from capital to capital) and G is a gravitational constant (as specified in 
Head (2003)).  
In log-linear form the gravity equation takes the form: 
, 
where all variables are as defined above, are the parameters of interest, and  is the 
normally and independently distributed error term. Hence a trade flow will be positively and 
proportionately related to the countries’ GDP and negatively related to the distance between 
them. There are various opinions on whether the GDPs should be specified as a sum or as a 
product. Product of GDPs allows for a multiplicative effect of size, whereby two 
(economically) medium countries will trade more than a small and a large country. Helpman 
                                                          
77 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gravity_model)  
θ
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(1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) were the fundamental works that provided the 
theoretical rationale for the idea that bilateral trade depends on the product of GDPs.  The 
same approach is taken here.  
The distance represents not only the hampering effect of the geographical distance, but serves 
as an estimate of a range of trade costs: transportation and customs clearance costs, 
perishability of goods and hence impossibility of selling certain goods at high distances, 
transaction costs of searching for trading opportunities in distant territories, “cultural costs”, 
also known as “psychic distance” following Johanson and Vahnle (1992), and, as noted by 
Krugman, communication costs (Head, 2003). Hence, the distance variable in this 
specification of the model could incorporate a wide range of factors, which would tell us a lot 
in general and nothing in particular. Therefore more specific variables are usually added to the 
analysis to disaggregate this effect, the most popular ones – common language, common 
border and landlockness as fixed country effects. Thus, common language, common border 
and landlockness controlled for, the distance variable would retain: the effects of actual 
distance and transport costs associated with it; tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed by a 
country’s trading partners; and the remaining transaction costs. More variables were also 
added to the effect of size: land size and income per capita.  
In the case of our analysis common language would coincide with the CIS as a trade bloc 
dummy, as all former Soviet Union countries are bilingual with Russian either the main or a 
second language. Therefore only the CIS dummy is left in this regression analysis, 
incorporating common language effects, as well as cultural, historical and social effects. 
The GDP per capita is added to gauge for the effect of development, rather than mere 
economic size. The effect of this variable is however ambiguous. The standard gravity model 
predicts that countries with higher levels of income (measured by GDP per capita) will have a 
higher demand for imports and will thus tend to trade more. In the formal theoretical trade 
literature, however, it has been treated differently. 
Using GDP per capita as a proxy capital-labour ratio, the neoclassical (Heckscher-Ohlin) 
trade theory suggests that countries with dissimilar per capita incomes are likely to have 
different resource endowments, will offer different goods for trade, and will therefore be 
likely to trade more with each other. This implies a positive sign on the product of GDP per 
capita in the gravity model. At the same time, Linder (1961), being among the first ones to 
suggest that demand also plays a role in international trade patterns, proposed a hypothesis 
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that countries with similar levels of GDP per capita will have similar demand structures and 
will develop similar industries, and will therefore trade more with each other, particularly in 
similar products (e.g. Pagoulatos and Sorensen, 1975). This would imply a negative sign on 
the product of GDP per capita. Helpman and Krugman (1985) also used income per capita as 
a proxy measure of capital-labour ratio, and found that countries with similar levels of per 
capita GDP will trade more. In a related discussion, Deardoff (1998) argued that capital-rich 
countries will trade more with other capital-rich countries than with capital-poor countries and 
vice versa (see a more detailed discussion in Frankel, 1997: 60-61). This issue will be raised 
again during the discussion of the results.  
As regional trade agreements were proliferating in the late 1980s and 1990s, the gravity 
model became a very popular tool for exploring the effects that trade groupings had on either 
members or those left-out, as well as for predicting trade potentials. The main questions 
usually posed in such studies are: (1) Are regional blocs natural in a way that neighbours tend 
to trade more and therefore form RTAs? (2) After controlling for the ‘neighbour’ effect, are 
RTAs increasing trade further? (3) Is there a potential for an increase in trade after an RTA is 
formed? (4) Does an RTA result in trade diversion away from non-members, thereby making 
it logical for them to join the RTA as well?  (See Greenaway and Milner, 2002, for review). 
This study attempts to answer the first two questions with regard to Ukraine, and to draw 
conclusions as to the fourth question. Although the language often used in making inferences 
from the estimated point coefficients on regional trade agreement dummies includes “trade 
creation / trade diversion effects”, these inferences are also rather empirical, as none of the 
theoretical justifications of the gravity model has so far focused on the Vinerian customs 
theory as such. So these reservations are made in this analysis as well. 
The model 
The study employs an extended version of the outlined above gravity model, including some 
of the mentioned additional variables.  
Xijt aggr or Xijt non-steel = α + β1LPGDPijt + β2LPGDPCAPijt + β3LDISTi + β4BORDERij + 
β5LPLANDij + β6LANDLOCKj + β7CISij + β8EU_15jt + β9CEFTAjt + β10CHINA + 
β11TURKEY + εijt 
where all continuous variables are in natural logarithms, i – in this case is Ukraine, j – a 
partner country, t – year from 1996 to 2004,  - independently and normally distributed with 
zero variance error term, and 
ijtε
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Xijt – exports from Ukraine, i, to its partner j at time t, first aggregate, then non-steel;  
LPGDPijt – log of pair-wise product of GDPs in year t; 
LPGDPCAPijt – log of pair-wise product of GDP per capita in year t; 
LDISTij – log of distance between partners’ capitals; 
LPLANDij – log of pair-wise product of land areas; 
BORDER ij - a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the two countries share a common 
land border, 0 otherwise; 
LANDLOCKj – whether Ukraine’s partner has access to the sea; 
CISij – 1 for a country j that is a member of the CIS and has a free trade agreement with 
Ukraine, 0 otherwise; 
EU-15jt –1 for a country j that is a member of the ‘old EU’ at time t, 0 otherwise;  
CEFTAjt – 1 if a partner country is a member of CEFTA at time t, 0 otherwise; 
CHINA – a dummy variable for China; 
TURKEY – a dummy variable for Turkey. 
Thus, the model is a single-equation gravity model, analysing bilateral trade flows from 
Ukraine to most of its partners (170) in years 1996-200478. Although gravity models are 
usually performed in a multi-equation setting, where data is for trade flows for all countries in 
the sample to most of their trading partners, in order to consequently extrapolate trade 
potentials for certain countries, a single-equation approach is valid as well and has been 
applied for analysing trade of a single country of interest (Lissovolik and Lissovolik, 2006 for 
Russia; Buckwalter, 1998 for Hungary). Also, since the coefficients of interest (on RTAs) 
exhibit little or no time variance, panel data with fixed effects model does not suit this model, 
as it would drop the time-invariant regional trade dummies. Therefore a simple econometric 
specification is adopted – yearly cross-sectional OLS regressions. Despite its simplicity, it 
allows to see the dynamics of the explored effects over time.  
Exports, rather than aggregate trade flows, have been chosen as a dependent variable, because 
the primary aim of this study is to explore the determinants of Ukraine’s export performance. 
                                                          
78 In total 22 countries were excluded, exports to which were very low. These were mainly poor African 
countries and island states.  
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Besides, such specification has been argued to be a proper one in the literature (e.g. Matyas, 
1997). 
A word of caution needs to be made – the big role of the exchange rate fluctuations in 1998-
2000 might be expected to decrease the goodness of fit of the model. 
Recalling what was said above, the following research questions are posed in this analysis:  
§ Do neighbours tend to trade more with each other, accounting for other geographic 
characteristics, and therefore form RTAs?  
§ After accounting for the neighbour effect and other geographic factors, do RTAs 
further increase trade?  
§ Does an RTA result in trade diversion away from non-members, thereby making it 
logical for them to join the RTA as well? and  
§ Do different commodities (in Ukraine’s case - resource-intensive goods, particularly 
steel) behave differently with regard to the above questions?  
In order to answer these questions the following hypotheses for  coefficients of the 
equation are tested. Ukrainian exports are: 
H1: Positively and proportionately related to the bilateral interaction of the GDPs and 
GDPs per capita, i.e. the coefficient on the product of GDPs should be around 1; 
H2: Negatively and proportionately related to distance, with the coefficient around 1; 
H3: Higher with the country that Ukraine shares a common border with; 
H4: Negatively related to the bilateral product of geographical areas – bigger countries 
tend to be more self-sufficient and thus less dependent on imports; 
H5: Lower to the landlocked countries; 
The above are traditional gravity model hypotheses. The main focus of the analysis is, 
however, on the regional trade arrangement of immediate concern for Ukraine: (1) bilateral 
free trade agreements within the CIS, (2) The EU-15 bloc, (3) CEFTA and (4) controlling for 
China and Turkey as significant individual trade partners. Although Turkey is a member of 
the EU Customs Union, for demonstration purposes a specification separating the effects of 
the EU Customs Union and that of Turkey is reported here. The hypotheses tested in this 
respect are: 
nβ
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H6: The CIS dummy is expected to have a positive effect on Ukrainian exports; 
H7: With respect to the EU CU the model is testing the hypothesis of potential trade 
diversion caused to Ukraine as a non-member, due to increased self-sufficiency of the EU-
centred bloc, i.e. a negative effect; 
H8: With regard to CEFTA no specific hypotheses are made, as greater integration with the 
EU could have a negative effect, while former common past within the Comecon79 could 
imply a positive association; 
5.4. The data 
Data on exports was taken from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), GDP data – 
from the World Bank World Development Indicators database. In line with Bergstrand 
(1985), the model accounts for the effect of growing prices, and the GDP deflator (also taken 
from WB WDI database) was applied to reach real GDP, and was also used to deflate nominal 
exports from DOTS.  
Distance was derived from the US Department of Agriculture web-site. Land area was taken 
from the CIA World Factbook.  
As far as regional trade bloc dummies are concerned, a few words are in order. Formally, CIS 
is not a regional trade bloc, as there is no multilateral free trade area among the members. 
Although the process of creating a free trade area within the CIS was initiated in 1994 with 
the conclusion of the Agreement on the Free Trade Area, it was never finalised – Russia’s 
failure to ratify it was critical. But since all CIS members have bilateral free trade agreements 
among themselves, though some of them non-ratified, for the purpose of this analysis CIS is 
treated as a regional trade bloc. As shown by Cyrus (2002), informal trade groupings (such as 
Western Europe, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) tend to exhibit even stronger effects 
than formal trade blocs. On similar premises, after running the specification with EU customs 
union as an explanatory variable, which yields this variable insignificant throughout the years, 
the exercise is re-run with the EU-15 instead, primarily to distinguish the effect of Turkey, 
which has become Ukraine’s major export partner recently. In this alternative specification 
EU-15 variable turns out significant in most years under the analysis. The breakdown of 
regional dummies is given in Annex 9. 
                                                          
79 Council for Mutual Economic Assistance that USSR had with the Central and East European countries.  
  110 
5.5. Discussion of the results 
Cross-sectional OLS regressions with robust standard errors, to adjust for heteroskedasticity, 
were performed in STATA 9.1.  
The analysis first looks at the effect that the economic mass and the level of output, as well as 
natural geographic country characteristics, have had on Ukraine’s aggregate and non-steel 
exports (Table 15 and Table 16 respectively), and then, having controlled for the latter effects, 
introduces regional trade agreement effects, again distinguishing between steel and non-steel 
exports (Table 17 and Table 18). In order to reach non-steel exports groups 72 “Iron and 
Steel” and 73 “Articles of iron or steel” in HS-1992 classification were deducted from total 
exports.  
Basic gravity variables: income and fixed-country effects 
Table 15 (with aggregate exports as a dependent variable) and Table 16 (non-steel exports) 
show the effect of GDP, GDP per capita and of fixed country-specific characteristics – 
distance, common border with Ukraine, access to the sea and geographic size. In both 
specifications the H1 and H2 are confirmed – exports are positively related to partner’s GDP 
and negatively related to the distance between them. Ukraine seems to exhibit a 
proportionally stronger relationship between exports and GDP in the later years of the 
analysis, approaching and even surpassing a one-to-one change, which may imply a growing 
absorption capacity in the importing countries.80 Some authors (Davis and Weinstein, 1998) 
treat such a disproportionately large response of trade to income as evidence of economies of 
scale. Magnitude aside, the finding is important in a broader context – geography (fixed 
effects) and demand in partner countries explains from 51 to 67 percent of the variation in 
value of real exports from Ukraine between 1996 and 2004 (R2 0.51 to 0.67 in Table 15). As 
will be shown below, adding regional trade blocs explains only a fraction of additional 
variation. This is consistent with findings for OECD countries. Thus, Baier and Bergstrand 
(2001) find that GDP growth explains 67 percent of the average trade growth in OECD 
countries in the period between late 1950s and late 1980s.  
The increasing hampering effect of distance is remarkable. In the era of globalisation this 
effect is expected to decrease over time, which does not seem to happen in this case. Buch et 
                                                          
80 In order to decompose the effect of Ukraine’s GDP growth from that of the importing partners’ GDP we ran a 
separate regression, leaving only natural logarithm of importing partners’ GDP instead of the product of GDP. 
The results confirmed that the coefficient on the product of GDPs is driven by the variation in partner countries’ 
data, since Ukraine’s GDP is constant in each annual regression.  
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al (2004) note that the distance coefficient over time cannot be interpreted in terms of the 
rising or falling distance costs. Rather, an increasing distance coefficient indicates that trade 
with countries far away decreases relative to trade with countries closer to the home country.  
Unlike hypothesised, GDP per capita is of a negative sign. Following the discussion above, 
two competing hypotheses can be considered when interpreting this negative sign. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory would predict a positive sign, as countries with dissimilar 
endowments, or capital/labour ratios (proxied by GDP per capita), would tend to trade more 
with each other, implying a positive sign on the difference between per capita incomes81. On 
the other hand, another perspective proposed by Linder (1961), and related to the developed 
later Krugman’s new trade theory, suggests that countries with similar levels of income will 
have similar preferences for analogous, but differentiated products (i.e. causing more intra-
industry trade), thereby predicting a negative sign – the bigger the difference between 
partners’ GDP per capita, the lower will be the trade between them.  
Therefore the negative sign on per capita income most likely reflects the confirmation of the 
Linder hypothesis – ceteris paribus Ukraine sells less goods to countries with higher level of 
income (and of economic development) and more to countries of similar level of income. This 
seems plausible, given the high share of CIS and Asian countries in total Ukrainian exports, 
and relates back to the analysis of trade patterns in CHAPTER 3, which showed little 
reorientation of Ukrainian exports towards European Union and other advanced economies.  
Passing on to the ‘Neighbour effect’ (H3), the effect of common border is indeed positive and 
significant, increasing Ukrainian export performance by 145-300 percent (exp(.9)-1=1.45 and 
exp(1.4)-1=3.00). Thus, neighbours do tend to trade more than otherwise equal countries not 
sharing a common border and therefore will be interested in forming regional trade 
agreements to increase this trade further. The fact, however, that this positive effect declines 
from 1996 to 2001 suggests that Ukraine has somewhat diversified its trade away from 
immediate neighbours – Central and East European countries and bordering CIS members 
(Russia, Belarus and Moldova; trade with Moldova, however, has increased, therefore only 
Russia and Belarus could have exhibited a negative effect). 
As to the other fixed country effects, the hypothesis of larger countries being more self-
sufficient (H4) cannot be rejected only in three years out of nine (Table 15). The hypothesis of 
lower trade with landlocked countries (H5) also finds little support in the basic specification.  
                                                          
81 In our case, although we have products of GDPs per capita, and not difference, higher values of our 
observations are analogous to bigger difference from Ukrainian GDP per capita.  
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Basic gravity variables: income and fixed-country effects – non-steel exports 
When steel exports are taken out from the above specification (Table 4), the magnitude of the 
negative effect of the GDP per capita is less pronounced and is significant only in the last 
three years. This means that the higher the level of income of Ukraine’s trading partners, the 
less steel-containing products Ukraine will sell there. This result could relate to the finding of 
Bergstrand (1989), who suggested that traded commodities tend in an average sense to be 
more labour-intensive or necessities, if the sign on per capita income of the importing country 
enters the equation with a negative sign82. Besides, among countries with higher income USA 
and the EU account for the biggest share, and precisely these countries have very protectionist 
policies for steel imports, which could have determined this result. 
The coefficients on distance are 15-30 percent higher for non-steel products, depending on the 
year, which is logical, given the fact that non-steel products contain ‘perishable’ goods, such 
as agricultural products and dangerous to transport chemicals, on which distance will have a 
stronger negative effect.  
The ‘neighbour effect’ is even stronger for non-steel exports than for steel-containing exports, 
as it is significant in all but one year under analysis. This most probably reflects higher 
competitiveness of Ukrainian manufactured products on CIS markets due to similar tastes, 
standards and quality requirements.  
The effect of being landlocked is still insignificant, as with aggregate exports. The effect of 
geographic size, although slightly significant for steel-containing exports, for non-steel 
products is not significant at all.  
Having explored the natural geographic effects and the effect of economic mass, the chapter 
proceeds to look at how, on top of these, regional trade agreements can further increase trade.  
Regional trade agreements 
CIS 
What can be noted with respect to the regional trade groupings is first of all the strongest 
positive effect of the CIS dummy, which boosts Ukraine’s export performance by 360-1500 
percent.83 And this effect goes beyond the ‘neighbour effect’ – it is always significant and 
much higher in magnitude. This answers one of the above research questions – free trade 
                                                          
82 And this is similar to our specification, as in a one-equation setting the product of incomes per capita captures 
constant Ukrainian GDP per capita, and variable importers’ GDP per capita. 
83 Exp(1.53)-1=3.6 in 2003 and exp((2.82)-1=15.8 in 1996.  
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agreements signed between neighbours (CIS members) do increase trade further than their 
economic masses and fixed country-effects would predict. 
The strong positive coefficient on the CIS dummy, however, incorporates factors other than 
‘neighbour effect’ and free trade regimes. Similar tastes, quality and technical standards, 
common language and low level of cultural barriers account for a fair share of this positive 
effect.  
The positive CIS effect was declining between 1998 and 2003, but picked up again in 2004. A 
possible explanation for the decline can relate to what was said above – Russian economy, the 
single most important partner in the CIS, started to grow buoyantly since 1999, to some extent 
crowding out products of similar quality from Ukraine. Besides, Russian economy became 
more competitive also in terms of its exchange rate, due to higher devaluation of the ruble 
relative to hryvnia. The pick-up since 2003 could reflect the adjustment of Ukrainian 
producers to the new market conditions in the CIS economies, and diversifying away from the 
more competitive Russian market to other CIS markets. Thus, in the period under 
investigation, Russia’s share in total exports reduced from 38.6 percent in 1996 to 17.83 in 
2004, that of Belarus – from 5 percent to 1.7 respectively, while the share of Moldova grew 
from 1.6 to 2 percent, and Kazakhstan – from 0.6 to 1.9 percent. 
The coefficients on the CIS dummy for the aggregate exports regression are over 2 until 2001 
and are declining thereafter. Freinkman et al. (2004: 37) obtain similar coefficients for overall 
CIS trade, however their coefficients are increasing from 1.52 in 1994 to 1.92 in 2001. The 
years after 2001 are not covered in their analysis. 
Non-steel exports to CIS 
The effect of CIS membership on non-steel exports is also consistently positive, does not 
exhibit a declining trend as with aggregate exports, and is stronger than the latter, suggesting 
that non-steel products have been more competitive on the CIS market. Moreover, more 
recently the positive difference has become bigger than before (in 2001-2004 the coefficients 
on CIS dummy were 40-80 percent higher in non-steel regression than in the aggregate one, 
while until 2001 this difference did not exceed 30 percent). This means that Ukraine has 
diversified the commodity structure of CIS exports away from steel, which fact, most 
probably, is chiefly explained by Russia’s growing self-sufficiency in production of steel 
pipes since 2001. On the other hand, such a reduced access for one major commodity can be 
positive in the medium- to long-term as it exerts a competitive pressure on producers to 
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diversify production, and not only within the same product group, but to other products as 
well, which eventually reduces the vulnerability to external price shocks.  
The strong performance of non-steel exports, in fact the strongest among the controlled RTAs, 
is due to the effects other than aggregate demand growth and relative income per capita, as 
these are captured in the GDP and GDPCAP variables. Therefore the positive effect of the 
CIS is likely to be due to similarity in the markets, consumer tastes, and preserved integrated 
production processes in certain industries (e.g. in aviation and military production).  
Aggregate exports to the EU-15 
The European Union is an external trade bloc, with which Ukraine enjoys a preferential 
trading regime under the Generalised System of Preferences, which reduces import tariffs on 
non-sensitive products. Steel and agricultural products fall outside this regime – they are 
protected by high import duties and other non-tariff restrictions. It is worth noting that while 
with the rest of the world the EU applies ad hoc steel quotas (such as those introduced in 
2002), with Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan it applies a regular quota regime on the basis of 
annually concluded agreements.84 Quotas, as a restrictive measure running against WTO 
rules, clearly inhibit a potentially positive effect that the EU given its proximity and high level 
of income could have. 
From the regression analysis in Table 18 one can see that throughout the period in question 
the EU-15 has a negative sign, which turns statistically significant as of 2000. Therefore, the 
observed positive trends in absolute volumes of exports to the EU are not supported by the 
statistical analysis – there are some, especially recently, barriers to deeper economic 
integration. Comparing aggregate and non-steel exports can help to reveal the roots of these 
barriers.  
As to the findings in the literature on trade creation / diversion effects of the EU customs 
union, it has been found that the EU customs union has generated substantial increase in intra-
regional trade, often at the expense of the rest of the world (e.g. Carrere, 2006; Soloaga and 
Winters, 2001; Frankel et al., 1997). A similar negative sign on trade between the EU and CIS 
countries has also been found by Kalyna (2001) – CIS countries under-trade approximately by 
15 percent with the EU. Hence, there is a “domino effect” for Ukraine – the incentive for 
countries left out of the customs union to join as well, or at least to obtain a free trade regime 
with the latter. Some studies, done however in a multi-equation setting, have found a positive 
                                                          
84 Until Ukraine’s accession to WTO in 2008.  
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sign on the EU dummy in trade (not exports) with Ukraine (e.g. Maryanchuk, 2005) or with 
CIS (e.g. Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc, 2003), although the latter study did find a negative effect in 
the period 1990-1994. As far as Maryanchuk’s result is concerned, the finding is that average 
trade is positively related, not exports – therefore this effect could be driven by growing 
imports from the EU, not exports.  
Non-steel exports to the EU-15 
The most striking difference between aggregate and non-steel exports to the EU is that EU-15 
dummy in the latter case does not have a statistically significant negative effect during most 
of the period under analysis, except 2004. This means that Ukraine is under-exporting 
particularly steel exports to the EU. Therefore, it can be assumed that if it were not for the 
dampening effect of quotas, the effect of the EU could be positive.  
The direct reason for the significantly negative effect on exports that include steel must be the 
quotas on steel imported from Ukraine, and their reduction in 2003 by 30 percent. This was 
done in response to Ukraine’s imposition of a substantial export duty on scrap metal, doubling 
the existing 15 Euro/tonne to 30 Euros (World Bank, 2005).  
On the other hand, absence of a significantly positive effect of the EU-15 with non-steel 
exports shows that these products are not yet competitive on the EU market. Part of the 
suppressed positive effect could be due to high protection in agriculture, but until Ukrainian 
products comply with the standards and sanitary and phyto-sanitary requirements of the EU it 
is hard to say whether only tariff protection is holding back Ukraine’s positive performance in 
this sector. Sectors other than steel and agriculture are not that highly protected by the EU, 
therefore it is most probably not due to trade diversion. However, in order to be more specific 
a more disaggregated analysis of non-steel exports would be needed.  
CEFTA 
As far as CEFTA countries are concerned, no significant effect is observed when aggregate 
exports are taken as a dependent variable.85 This as well could be taken as evidence of a 
suppressed positive effect, as CEFTA countries are neighbouring Ukraine and due to 
previously close economic integration within Comecon could be expected to be positively 
associated with Ukraine’s export performance. On the other hand, the positive effect could be 
suppressed by preparation to the EU accession, accompanied by trade liberalisation with the 
                                                          
85 Although CEFTA variable has a 0.51 correlation with border, when an alternative regression is run without 
border, no significant change of coefficients on CEFTA is observed.  
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EU since early 1990s, and by the tendency of economic agents to reorient their trade away 
from the former Soviet Union bloc. However, before making such a conclusion, the study 
looks more closely at the possible reasons for this effect, comparing the total and non-steel 
export results.  
Non-steel exports to CEFTA 
What is seen with non-steel exports is that here CEFTA has a significantly positive effect in 
most years under observation. It declines however since 2002, as the accession gets closer. 
The differential on the coefficients is quite strong as well – Ukraine tends to sell 200-400 
percent86 more non-steel products to CEFTA than to an otherwise equal country.  
The following reasons can account for the underperformance of steel products: 
§ First of all, CEFTA countries, in particular Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia 
have their own steel industries, manufacturing products of a quality/price range similar to that 
of Ukrainian steel products.  
§ Secondly, steel products are mainly transported by sea, and land transportation increases the 
cost of exported products. This is confirmed by the significant negative effect of landlockness 
dummy in the steel-containing specification – lack of access to the sea makes Ukraine sell on 
average 40-70 percent less steel products to that country. At the same time this factor is 
insignificant in the non-steel specification.  
At the same time membership in CEFTA is positively associated with non-steel exports. The 
most dynamically growing groups in trade with CEE were wood and articles of wood and 
paper, machinery and equipment, textile and clothing, mineral fuels, some organic chemicals 
and plastics. Partially this positive effect could be explained by the same factors that play a 
role in trade with CIS – similarity in tastes, preserved business links from the past, lower 
language barriers. On the other hand, foreign direct investment (e.g. in wood processing, or 
outsourcing in textile and clothing industries) is one of the driving forces as well.  
Why could this positive CEFTA effect cease since 2002? Looking at the dynamics of exports 
from CEFTA countries as a share of respective exports to the world Annex 8, it occurs that 
the main non-steel category that experienced a decline since 2002 is “Mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related materials” (mainly represented by refined petroleum products and coal/coke 
exports) – while in 2000 around 44 percent of total exports of this category went to CEFTA 
                                                          
86 The coefficient varies in the range 1.15 – 1.9, exp(1.15) -1 = 2.15 and exp(1.65) – 1 =4.20 
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countries, in 2001 – 33 percent, since 2002 this figure has been down to around 27 percent. In 
this group the biggest decline was observed in exports of coal and coke to Bulgaria – it 
accounted for 34.2 percent of exports of this category in 2001, and only for 9.4 percent in 
2004, and Slovakia – down to 2.8 percent from 9.7 percent respectively.87 Whereas no decline 
in absolute terms was observed with exports of petroleum products to CEFTA, this region’s 
share decreased due to significant increase of petroleum exports to Singapore (from 0.43 
percent in exports of refined petroleum to the world to 5.14 percent), Switzerland (from 1.34 
to 10.62 percent), Turkey (from 0.3 to 4 percent).  
As already mentioned in CHAPTER 3, the decline in exports of coal and coke to CEE 
countries was due to the domestic structural issues in the sector, not due to a protection or a 
lower demand on the East European markets. Therefore it cannot be concluded that the 
disappearing positive CEFTA effect in non-steel specification is an early trade diverting effect 
of an enlarging EU customs union. The reasons for the disappearing positive effect were of 
structural nature.  
Total and non-steel exports to CHINA and TURKEY 
Table 17 shows that China used to have a very strong positive effect from 1996 until 2001, 
but since then there has been a clear trend of its declining importance. Besides, the trend is 
almost the same for non-steel exports. Hence it is not the growing China’s capacity in steel 
production that is accountable for this. Arguably the reason can be China’s import substituting 
growth, as the whole economy is booming, plus the weaker Chinese currency, renminbi, 
making imports to China less competitive. Ukraine is losing its competitive advantage on this 
market, and the share of China in the Ukrainian exports fell from 5.3 percent of total exports 
in 1996 to 2.5 percent in 2004.  
The Turkey dummy has also shown a strong positive effect on Ukrainian export intensity, 
which, however, has also disappeared since 2001 in both aggregate and non-steel exports. The 
extent of the positive effect is also higher with non-steel exports.  
5.6. Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis several conclusions can be made.  
                                                          
87 Decline of exports of coke was also discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.3.2.  
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Firstly, regional trade agreements do increase trade beyond the naturally higher levels 
observed between neighbours, controlling for other geographic characteristics.88  
Secondly, as far as specific RTAs are concerned, the internal trade bloc (CIS) clearly boosts 
Ukrainian export performance most. This does not come as a surprise given the common 
economic, historical and cultural legacies. There is a slight trend, however, of falling positive 
effect in steel exports and increasing in non-steel exports, which is a positive sign in terms of 
lower concentration and lower exposure to external price or policy shocks.  
In terms of external trade blocs, Ukraine seems to under-export to the bloc of EU-15. Given 
the economic mass and proximity of the EU, Ukraine would be expected to export more. 
Underperformance on the EU market is, however, significant primarily with steel. The special 
quota regime applied by the EU in steel trade with Ukraine, Russia and Kazakhstan in the 
period under analysis appears to be suppressing a potentially strong export performance of 
these countries. With non-steel exports the EU-15 effect was statistically insignificant 
throughout most of the years under analysis, turning negative and statistically significant only 
in 2004.  
The effect of the second external trade bloc, CEFTA, is also asymmetrical – insignificant for 
steel exports and significantly positive for non-steel exports. Ukraine demonstrates good 
export performance with non-steel products with CEFTA countries, suggesting that there is a 
good potential for achieving a higher share on this market, but this positive performance is 
disappearing since 2002. The reason for this was geographic diversification of exports of 
minerals and fuels, and not necessarily related to trade liberalisation between CEFTA and the 
EU-15. Hence, a trade diverting effect from candidate countries’ forthcoming accession to the 
EU customs union cannot be ascertained.  
Thirdly, steel products perform less well than non-steel products on most markets. A general 
conclusion seems to emerge that due to Ukraine’s high production capacity in steel and steel 
being a sensitive product (sold in a very competitive global market), it on average tends to 
under-sell – to CIS (positive effect of CIS on steel exports is declining), to the EU (quotas and 
anti-dumping investigations limiting the volume of exports), and to China more recently.  
                                                          
88 Thus, the effect of having a common border with the economic partners is very positive for Ukrainian export 
performance, but not as strong as the partners’ membership in the CIS, which among themselves have bilateral 
free trade agreements. Membership in CEFTA, where with most countries Ukraine shares a common border, has 
a positive effect on aggregate Ukrainian exports, but it is not statistically significant. 
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In sum, Ukraine faces a number of challenges with its merchandise exports, the main ones 
being high exposure to external shocks and the need to diversify the commodity composition 
away from ‘sensitive’ products. This would allow increasing the share of quality-competing 
vs. price-competing products in its export portfolio. This would in turn increase the 
competitiveness on the more advanced markets and facilitate the geographic reorientation of 
exports. This need is universally acknowledged by the Ukrainian policy makers and 
increasingly by producers themselves89.  
The limitations of this analysis should be acknowledged. Firstly, the single-equation gravity 
model does not allow comparing the observed levels of exports from Ukraine to the “normal” 
or “potential” levels, which is done in multi-equation studies. Secondly, although gravity 
model explores macro-level determinants, it should be remembered that it only captures 
overall economic mass and relative income per capita, overlooking many other macro-
economic factors. It does not explore the direction of causality between growth of exports and 
economic growth either. This is, however, the specifics of the methodology of gravity models, 
and more in-depth analysis of the relationship between exports and macro-economic variables 
is usually the subject of the time series analysis, which falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
Thirdly, although this study tried to minimise the bias created by a high concentration of 
exports in one industry (metallurgy), more detailed industry-level analysis may have given 
additional insight. Next chapter attempts to compensate for these shortcomings and enrich the 
findings of the gravity model by looking at firm-level determinants of export performance of 
Ukraine, further breaking it down by industries.  
                                                          
89 Large financial industrial groups built around steel diversify their portfolios to other goods, such as machinery 
and equipment, and services.  
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CHAPTER 6. MICRO-LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF THE 
UKRAINIAN EXPORTS: FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE FOR 2000-2006 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters looked at the premises for trade reorientation of Ukrainian exporters 
(CHAPTER 2), at the quality of exports from Ukraine to the EU and its evolution (CHAPTER 
3), and at the macro-level factors that determine the existing degree of trade reorientation 
(CHAPTER 5). Departing from the initial idea that reorienting trade flows from previously 
relatively isolated region towards more advanced neighbouring markets was a logical route 
for Ukraine, the study proceeds with exploring whether this is taking place, and whether 
commodity composition is improving in trade with the EU. This chapter aims to shift the 
focus from macro factors and trends to the firm-level analysis.  
Ukraine, as all other former Soviet Union republics, from the first days of independence had 
to cope with the consequences of disintegrated common market, collapsed demand in FSU 
countries and falling domestic industrial production. The fall of demand in former Comecon 
(Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) area necessitated reorientation of exports to other 
global markets. In terms of geographic proximity and the size of aggregate demand, European 
Union was the most logical destination for reorientation of exports. As discussed at length in 
CHAPTER 3, and as is seen from Figure 23, indeed this reorientation was steadily gaining 
momentum between 1996 and 2003. The post-Orange revolution period, however, was 
marked by CIS regaining importance as a destination market for Ukrainian exports, although 
never reaching the scale it had earlier – 51 percent in 1996.  
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Figure 23. Geographic composition of Ukrainian exports – major partners, 1996-2007 
 
Note: Since 1996 EU recalculated as EU-27. 
Source: Ukrainian State Statistics Agency (2009). http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/  
The macro-level reasons for a slow reorientation include delayed structural and regulatory 
reforms, which did not set off until mid 1990s, low level of inward FDI and, respectively, low 
degree of industrial upgrading that would make Ukrainian products more competitive on the 
advanced markets, and obsolete infrastructure. At the same time, the gravity model analysis in 
previous chapter has also shown that one of the most important determinants of export 
performance is demand (measured by GDP) in the partner countries, which partially explains 
the growing share of CIS since early 2000s, as this is when the region entered into a phase of 
robust recovery. There is also econometric evidence that Ukraine is under-exporting steel 
products to the EU-15, most likely due to quantitative restrictions that had been in place until 
2008. These and other macro-level reasons are discussed in CHAPTER 1, CHAPTER 3 and 
CHAPTER 5 of this thesis, but this chapter aims to explore the micro-foundations of this 
reorientation, to identify the specific characteristics that made firms more or less likely to 
export to the EU.  
Arguably, the shock of transition, with its deteriorating institutional, financial and macro-
economic conditions, unstable political and regulatory environments, makes it difficult for 
firms in former Soviet Union to enter external markets at all, or to maintain existing external 
links. Exporting is associated with significant sunk costs that are not easy to meet even for 
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firms in advanced economies, which enjoy more favourable conditions. Entering more 
advanced markets, while starting from a below-optimal position and facing stringent 
competition from more efficient and established suppliers already serving those markets, is a 
double challenge for Ukrainian enterprises. The challenge was further reinforced by the deep 
and fast integration of the EU-15 with Central and East European economies, which offered 
similar geographic proximity, labour skills/costs and industrial structure. On top of early 
removal of trade barriers and significant EU-funded infrastructure investment, they enjoyed a 
first-mover advantage, which can be no less important than all the other factors. Therefore, in 
order to enter European markets, effectively Ukrainian firms would have to offer better 
products at better conditions than their East European and other global competitors.  
This process is looked at from two angles here. On the one hand, the determinants of the 
internationalisation process as such are explored, i.e. of capacity of Ukrainian firms to serve 
external markets. Secondly, it is argued that in the context of economies in transition the 
process of internationalisation can be destination-specific, and will refer to trade reorientation 
from previously highly integrated and isolated from the global economy markets towards 
more advanced and competitive markets.  
6.2. Literature review 
6.2.1. Internationalisation 
On the theoretical plane, the analysis starts with the issue of internationalisation of a firm, as 
reflecting increased competitiveness on a firm-level in particular and ultimately of the 
economy at large in a transitional context. Internationalisation process is usually considered as 
starting with an entry to the export market, gradually leading to the establishment of 
subsidiaries or wholly owned ventures in the destination country (Andersen, 1993). For firms 
originating in the economies in transition the latter stage is particularly challenging as it 
requires a rather high level of competitiveness and purchasing power, especially if the 
destination market is that of advanced economies. In fact, it is typically the first stage that 
already constitutes a substantial challenge, as firms in transition first of all need to start 
exporting to the developed markets, provided they can meet the requirements in terms of 
price, quality, design and post-sale service (Zloch-Christy, 1998). In the case of Ukraine it is 
only metallurgy enterprises that managed to establish downward or outward subsidiaries in 
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Western Europe, as discussed in CHAPTER 7. on the political economy of business 
mobilisation. 
The issue of firm-level internationalisation determinants and strategies originally entered into 
focus in business and international marketing literature90, where managerial behaviour is 
taken as a major determinant of export performance. In trade economics for a long time the 
dominant approach to analysing export determinants had been to focus on sectors and 
countries rather than firms, trying to explain the commodity specialisation of trade and/or 
determinants of cross-country specialisation. Firms, the actual entities that are producing 
goods and are trading, had long been ignored. In new trade theory firms are first explicitly 
present, however they are not the subject of research. More recently new theories of the firm 
and international trade, mostly built on the model of heterogeneous firms first developed by 
Melitz (2003), incorporated the micro-level approach to internationalisation into trade 
theory/globalisation literature (see Greenaway and Kneller, 2005, or Greenaway, 2004, for a 
survey). In this literature, productivity and efficiency feature as the main determinants of a 
firm’s ability to enter foreign markets. The direction of causality between productivity and 
internationalisation has been a key issue – whether more productive firms self-select into 
becoming exporters, or whether there is a ‘learning-by-doing’ effect at work. There has been 
an increasing body of literature failing to find the learning-by-doing effect in either developed 
(US, Canada, Spain) or developing economies (Mexico, Colombia, Taiwan) instead finding 
that firms tend to self-select into being exporters, which implies that more productive firms 
are more capable of bearing the fixed costs related to entering the external markets. There was 
also consistent cross-country evidence that only a fraction of firms export, and exporters are 
larger than non-exporters, as well as more productive.91  
This approach was expanded to embrace endogenous growth theory postulates.92 Applied to 
trade, the main premise of this literature is two-fold: openness to trade fosters product market 
competition and creates an incentive for a firm to innovate; in turn, innovation is a 
                                                          
90 See Aaby and Stanley (1989), Anderson (1993), Zou and Stan (1998) and Leonidou et al. (1998) for reviews. 
91 See Sofronis K. Clerides, Lach, and James R. Tybout (1998) for Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco; Bernard 
and Jensen (1999) for the United States; Bee-Yan Aw, Sukkyun Chung, and Mark J. Roberts (2000) for Taiwan; 
Miguel A. Delgado, Jose C. Farifias, and Sonia Ruano (2002) for Spain; and John R. Baldwin and Wulong Gu 
(2003) for Canada.  
92 Endogenous growth theory argues that economic growth is enhanced by the development of the nation’s 
human capital by means of development of new forms of technology and efficient and effective means of 
production. The main implication being that policies that promote openness, competition, change and innovation 
will promote growth.  
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prerequisite for firms to gain access to foreign consumer markets via exports (Becker and 
Egger, 2007). Along these lines, continuous efforts to sustain internal growth – innovation, 
R&D, international technology transfer – and foreign links are expected to be positively 
associated with export propensity (Baldwin and Gu, 2004; Nassimbeni, 2001; Kneller, 2007; 
Alvarez, 2007).  
Innovation, measured in various ways, has been generally found to have a positive effect on 
the likelihood of firms to export (Baldwin and Gu, 2004; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; 
Lachenmaier and Wößmann, 2006), although Wakelin (1998) finds that it is larger innovative 
firms that are more likely to export than smaller innovative firms, whereas given the same 
size non-innovative firms will be more likely to export. Product rather than process 
innovation has been found to be more important in increasing export propensity (Becker and 
Egger, 2007; Bernard and Jensen, 2004). Along the same lines, skill intensity can capture the 
potential for technological or research activities, and can therefore also be positively 
associated with export propensity, a hypothesis confirmed by Bernard and Jensen (2004) and 
Alvarez (2007).  
By extension, the effect of product diversification or specialisation has also been featuring 
prominently in the literature, being of particular relevance to the economies in transition as 
their products from planned economy times would be uncompetitive in free market 
conditions. Hottop et al. (2005) consider the link between trade and industrial upgrading in 
Central and East European economies, as measured by product specialisation versus product 
diversification in countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Increased scale – higher volume of 
export transactions – is taken as a proxy for the learning-by-doing effect, whereas increased 
product diversification – as a reflection of product innovation. They find that in early years of 
transition the dominant mode of learning is scope based – countries that opened up to world 
markets start to experiment with selling additional products, while in the later years scope-
based learning (diversification) is complemented by an increase in the scale of exports. 
Baldwin and Gu (2004) find that product specialisation (i.e. lower diversification) is 
positively linked to productivity and that exporters tend to be more specialised after entering 
export markets. In a more general context, the literature on the relationship between trade and 
growth provides evidence for the positive impact of both product variety and specialisation 
on economic growth. Amable (2000), Laursen (2000) and Peneder (2002) find evidence for an 
impact of trade specialization on economic growth, which stems in particular from 
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specialisation in technology-intensive sectors. Funke (2000), for OECD economies, and 
Funke (2005) for East European transition economies, including Ukraine, finds that export 
diversification matters for growth, in particular variety of capital-intensive products as 
opposed to labour-intensive.  
Other potential determinants of export propensity were drawn from corporate governance or 
industrial organisation literature, and among others include: access to finance, capital 
intensity, structure of ownership, foreign links, exposure to domestic or foreign competition, 
and age of the firm.   
Capital intensity has not yielded consistent results – Bernard and Jensen (1999) find that 
American exporters have higher capital intensity; Zhao and Li (1997), on the contrary, find 
that for Chinese firms capital intensity is negatively associated with export propensity; and 
Wakelin (1998) reports a positive but statistically not significant effect for the UK firms. 
Foreign ownership is often found to have a strong positive effect (e.g. Aitken et al., 1997), 
although Baldwin and Gu (2004) fail to find a statistically significant positive effect, after 
controlling for size, age and productivity. In particular, it has been argued in corporate 
governance literature that the type of ownership has a crucial impact on access to the 
investment capital and technological upgrading: insufficient internal finance, combined with 
poor access to credit, makes foreign partners almost the only source of financing such 
investments (Cantwell and Piscitello, 1997). At the same time, the privatisation strategy in 
Ukraine, discouraging majority foreign ownership, limited this channel as foreign partners 
would not commit large amounts of money without having a substantial control (Filatotchev 
et al., 1999). Competition is, rather classically, also believed to be conducive to innovation 
and productivity growth, and hence potentially improving the ability of a firm to export, and 
this effect was confirmed by Nickel (1996), while Baldwin and Gu (2004) find that 
competition is an important factor after entering the foreign markets, but not before. It also 
seems that the older the firm, the more likely it is to export (e.g. Roberts and Tybout, 1997).  
Greenaway et. al. (2005) found that financially healthiest firms find it easier to enter export 
markets, making it easier for them to meet the fixed costs related to exporting. 
Formal micro-level research into this issue in Ukraine is very scarce, as is the available firm-
level data. Most of the research has been concentrated in corporate governance literature. The 
central premise of this literature is that enterprises in transition economies would first have to 
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undergo a substantial internal restructuring before they can become competitive on external 
markets, and therefore corporate governance practices were at the centre of the attention. At 
the same time, they also explore the role of some traditional trade theory determinants. Wright 
et al. (2002) and Filatotchev et al. (2001) find a strong positive relationship between the 
presence of foreign partners and export intensity in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. The latter 
study also finds positive effect of new product development and previous export experience, 
whereas non-export-oriented acquisitions seem to exert the opposite effect. This finding 
suggests that operational restructuring needs to be targeted, and that not any expansionary 
policy will yield positive results in terms of internationalisation. Filatotchev et al. (1999) also 
find a strong positive effect of an increase in the share of new products in sales (i.e. 
diversification), foreign links and management turnover.  
6.2.2. Destination-specific internationalisation  
As has been mentioned above, apart from starting to serve foreign markets, at the start of 
transition Ukrainian enterprises were faced with at least two challenges with regard to 
internationalisation: on the one hand, collapsed demand in the former Soviet Union 
economies (accompanied by so-called disorganisation – the break-down of industrial links 
between formerly SOEs, including intra-USSR links), and on the other, a potential to start 
supplying to the rest of the world – in particular geographically close Western European 
economies – which were previously inaccessible. Therefore in the Ukrainian context it is 
impossible to discuss the issue of internationalisation without reorientation, or destination-
specific internationalisation.  
In trade-related literature this issue has received relatively little attention. Falvey, Greenaway 
and Yu (2003) focus on the size of an exporting economy and find that the smaller the 
exporting country and the lower its average efficiency, the less likely its firms are to survive 
in the more efficient markets. When a country faces higher trade costs on a given market than 
another country, its firms will need even higher efficiency to withstand competition on that 
export market. This hypothesis was confirmed in Damijan et al. (2004) on the example of 
Slovenia, who found that productivity is higher for firms entering advanced markets, but not 
necessarily to economies with the same level of efficiency frontier. Graner and Isaksson 
(2007) explore the destination-specific export determinants for Kenyan enterprises, and 
suggest that entry costs in trade with non-African (North) countries are going to be higher 
 130 
 
than those in trade with Africa (South), and hence size and efficiency would be expected to 
have a positive effect on the likelihood to export to the North versus South, a hypothesis 
confirmed in their analysis. They also explore the role of human and physical capital intensity 
and find that it is higher in South-South trade than in North-South trade. 
Indeed, in terms of trade costs of exporting to the EU, smaller economies outside of the EU 
internal market and/or with no preferential agreement, are effectively facing twice the 
challenge, first having to meet the fixed costs related to entering more advanced export 
markets, and then having to compete with numerous competitors that enjoy preferential terms 
of trade with the EU. Thus, Central and East European economies that joined European Union 
in 2004 and 2007 had relatively similar production structures, resource endowments, and 
labour skills and costs to those of Ukraine from the start of transition, but were granted free 
trade regimes in early 1990s and thus enjoyed a first mover advantage. Hence reorientation 
towards the EU for Ukrainian enterprises has been complicated even further by the vast 
competition from CEE economies. Moreover, most neighbouring countries of the EU (apart 
from Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia) enjoy some form of free trade arrangement with 
the EU.  
6.3. Empirical analysis: general hypotheses  
In what follows, first the determinants of general internationalisation strategy of Ukrainian 
enterprises (‘internationalisation model’) are explored, and then the destination-specific 
export determinants are looked at – comparing specific characteristics of enterprises exporting 
to the EU and CIS (‘trade reorientation model’). This is done based on two different datasets, 
as no single comprehensive dataset that would allow exploring both angles is available for 
Ukraine. The World Bank/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS) offers a distinction between exporters and non-exporters, while data provided by the 
European Commission project on the Economic and Social Consequences of Industrial 
Restructuring in Russia and Ukraine allows us to differentiate between exporters to the CIS 
versus exporters to the EU.  
In line with the literature reviewed above, the study is focusing on the following determinants, 
some of which are common to both models, while others were only available in either of the 
datasets. Thus, determinants present in both models are: 
 131 
 
Size. Larger firms are expected to be more capable of meeting the fixed costs of entering 
foreign markets, and, respectively, the costs of entering more advanced market of the EU, 
which are assumed to be higher than those of traditional markets of FSU republics. In the 
internationalisation model the size is measured by the number of full-time employees and in 
the trade reorientation model – by the total value of exports.93  
Foreign ownership, which is expected to be positively associated with both export propensity 
and the likelihood to export to the EU, as foreign contacts might be beneficial for finding 
export partners, may facilitate the transfer of more advanced technology and/or ease access to 
finance.  
Innovation is expected to result from competitive pressure and may in turn increase the 
competitiveness of the firm on both domestic and external markets. Different measures of 
innovation are used in each of the models. In the internationalisation model innovation is 
measured by whether a firm introduced new products or product lines in the past 3 years 
(which is effectively product innovation), while in the trade reorientation model it is measured 
by the value of expenditures on new technologies and ICT (information and computer 
technologies), which is more reminiscent of process innovation. This difference needs to be 
borne in mind when interpreting the results.  
In addition to these common variables, in the trade reorientation model product diversification 
was added, which, combined with the scale effect, may provide an insight into the pattern of 
industrial upgrading, as suggested by Hottop et al. (2005). On the other hand, product 
diversification may serve as a measure of product innovation.  
The data availability in the internationalisation model allows to control for other factors as 
well – the age of the firm (we distinguish between those established prior to 1991, and after 
1991 – usually referred to as de novo enterprises); skill intensity (number of employees with 
university degree), capital intensity and upgrading, access to finance, role of competition from 
overseas suppliers, and imports of inputs and raw materials.  
                                                          
93 We tried running the model with the dummy variable for size (1 if large, 0 if small enterprise), but since the 
overwhelming majority of firms in the dataset were large, the results were distorted. This, however, is consistent 
with the literature - e.g. Helpman (2006) highlights that exporters are more productive, and size is positively 
associated with productivity, therefore the very fact that the majority of exporters in our dataset are large is an 
expected result.  
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Below the two models are described, as well as the respective datasets, and the results of these 
models.  
6.4. Empirical analysis: Internationalisation of Ukrainian enterprises 
6.4.1. Data description and stylised facts about exporters  
The data was taken from the World Bank/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS), which covers a panel of Ukrainian enterprises in 2002, 2005 
and 2009.  
In 2002 444 firms responded to the interview, in 2005 – 524, and in 2009 – 668. Exporters 
constituted 26 percent of all respondents in 2002 and 2009, and 19 percent in 2005, or 24 
percent on average. Unfortunately, the questionnaire did not include the question on the 
destination of exports, therefore only export propensity can be analysed in this section in this 
section.  
Regional distribution of exporters (reported only in 2005 and 2009), was as follows: North 
and Kiev had the highest proportion of exporters – 30 percent and 27 percent respectively; 
East and Crimea had the lowest proportion of exporters – 16 percent and 17 percent 
respectively. However, Eastern region had the highest number of respondents, and in absolute 
terms ranks the third in terms of exporting firms – with 55 firms, versus 71 in the North and 
57 in Kiev.  
Between 2005 and 2009, the share of exporters in the total sample grew most in the Northern 
and Western regions – from 18 percent to 37 percent, and from 16 percent to 25 percent 
respectively. The share of exporters also grew in the East – from 15 percent to 20 percent, but 
fell in Kiev from 27 percent to 26 percent, and in the South – from 33 percent to 22 percent.  
In terms of the legal status: publicly traded companies have the highest proportion of 
exporters – 42 percent. 26-27 percent of partnerships and privately traded companies are 
engaging in exporting activities, while sole proprietorship and limited partnership companies 
have the lowest share of exporters – 10 percent and 14 percent respectively.  
Most of the enterprises that responded to the question about the origin of their firm were de 
novo enterprises – 1045 of 1518, or 69 percent; 21 percent were privatised enterprises, 6 
percent - joint ventures with foreign partners, and 3 percent - private subsidiaries of formerly 
state-owned firms. Only 5 of 1518 were state-owned enterprises (SOEs), of which 4 were 
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exporters. In general, joint ventures were most actively engaging in exporting activity – 42 
percent of total, followed by privatised former SOEs – 33 percent. Interestingly, de novo 
enterprises are much less active as exporters – only 18 percent of them engage in foreign 
trade. The same proportion of private subsidiaries of ex-SOEs were exporters.  
In terms of the type of ownership, mirroring the above findings on joint ventures, companies 
with private foreign ownership have the highest export propensity – 46 percent of total firms 
in this category. On the contrary, of enterprises with private domestic ownership, only 19 
percent were exporters.  
Table 19. Type of ownership and exporter status, average for 2002, 2005 and 2009  
 Private 
domestic 
Private 
foreign 
State Other Total 
Non-exporter 1,090 104 8 46 1,248 
Exporter 263 87 10 28 388 
Total 1,353 191 18 74 1,636 
Exporters share 19% 46% 56% 38% 24% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BEEPS dataset 
The share of exporters among enterprises with private foreign ownership increased from 37 
percent in 2002, 48 percent in 2005 and to 56 percent in 2009. Whereas among enterprises 
with private domestic ownership the share of exporters varied from 22 percent in 2002 and 
2009, down to 13 percent in 2005.  
As can be expected, enterprises with internationally recognised quality certification (IQC) are 
more likely to be exporters – 48 percent of respondents with such a certification are engaging 
in exporting activities, while only 20 percent of those without international certification do. 
Although it should be noted that this is quite a substantial proportion anyway – therefore 
international quality certification is not a prerequisite for exporting certain products.  
Table 20. International quality certification and exporter status 
 Has IQC No IQC Total 
Non-exporter 109 1,134 1,243 
Exporter 99 285 384 
Total 208 1,419 1,627 
Exporter share 48% 20% 24% 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BEEPS dataset 
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6.4.2. Model description 
In this model the following research questions are explored:  
1) What specific characteristics distinguish Ukrainian exporting firms from non-
exporting firms?  
2) Does size (measured by the number of full-time employees) and age affect the firm’s 
export propensity?  
3) Does foreign ownership increase the likelihood of a firm to export? 
4) Does product innovation increase the chances of a firm to export?  
5) Does skill-intensity increase the likelihood of internationalisation? 
6) Does capital-intensity increase the likelihood of internationalisation? 
7) We also reiterate the above model controlling for: the presence of international quality 
certification, directly imported inputs, perceptions of the importance of foreign pressure for 
the development of new products, the need to provide collateral for the loans (the only 
measure of access to finance that had sufficient data for the model to run), or the cost of 
existing machinery and buildings.  
A random-effects probit panel data regression model is run, consistent with Clerides et al. 
(1998) and Winker (1999). In the first model the dependent variable is the exporter status 
dummy, and the explanatory variables as per points 1-6 above (age – established pre- or post-
1991, private foreign ownership, number of full-time employees, new product in the last 3 
years, number of employees with university degree, new land or buildings in the last 3 years). 
Then variables from point 7 (international quality certification, directly imported inputs, 
foreign pressure for the development of new products, financing for loan/credit line, cost of 
repurchasing machinery and buildings) are consecutively added, rendering five additional 
estimations. The number of firms in each of the models varies between 133 and 249, covering 
two years – 2002 and 2005.94 The correlation matrix of the variables used in the regression is 
presented in Annex 10.  
  
                                                          
94 The 2009 data was of poor quality and therefore had to be omitted from the regression analysis. 
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6.4.3. Results 
The results of the six estimation models are shown below in Table 21. 
Table 21. Random effects probit panel data estimation of export propensity  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Exporter       
Established pre-1991 0.081 0.072 0.077 0.048 0.303 0.309 
Private foreign Ownership 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013 0.014** 
ln FT employees 0.676*** 0.684*** 0.679*** 0.591*** 0.777*** 0.804*** 
New product in the last 3yrs -0.777** -0.784** -0.792** -0.620** -0.485 -0.886** 
ln nr of empl. w/uni degree 0.386*** 0.389*** 0.381** 0.341** 0.723*** 0.330* 
New land/build. in 3yrs -0.549**   -0.545** -0.568** -0.461** -1.043*** -0.392 
Int. Quality certif.  0.12     
Directly imported inputs   -0.127    
For. Pressure for new 
products 
   0.216**   
Financing for loan/credit line     -0.054  
Cost of repurch. Mach/build.      -0.114 
Constant -2.762*** -3.022*** -2.644*** -2.991*** -3.892*** -2.484** 
lnsig2u       
Constant -0.452 -0.44 -0.443 -1.178* -0.296 -1.122* 
Statistics       
N obs 287 287 286 284 144 195 
N firms 249 249 248 247 133 173 
Ll -125.02 -124.95 -124.54 -122.21 -62.26 -84.66 
df_m 6 7 7 7 7 7 
chi2 47.391 48.038 47.668 59.54 28.711 43.531 
Rho 0.389 0.392 0.391 0.235 0.427 0.246 
Note: Statistical significance * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 confidence level.  
Source: author’s calculations using STATA 9.1 
In line with the findings of most of the international literature, e.g. see Helpman (2006) for a 
review, size has a very strong positive effect on export propensity. Unfortunately no measure 
of productivity or efficiency was available in our dataset. A mitigating general knowledge 
however, is that exporters not only tend to be large, but also more productive than non-
exporters (Helpman, 2006). Moreover, using a sample of Ukrainian enterprises, Pavlenko and 
Vakhitova (2008) find that larger firms are more likely to be continuous innovators and 
indeed are more productive, while smaller firms might be more likely to start innovating in a 
recent past. 
 136 
 
Also consistent with the theoretical literature is the positive effect of foreign ownership, 
although it is not as strong as that of size. Lutz et al. (2006) obtain similar results for 
Ukrainian firms. They find that foreign presence positively affects firms’ output and exports; 
moreover, this effect is stronger for large firms, and producers of durable vs. non-durable 
goods.  
Somewhat contrary to the predictions of the endogenous growth theory, the measure of 
innovation – product upgrade in the past 3 years – has a consistently negative effect on the 
likelihood that a firm exports. Skill-intensity, however, increases export propensity of the 
firms in our sample. Upgrading of capital – acquisition of new land or buildings – also has a 
negative effect. However it must be noted that this variable represents a relative measure of 
increase in capital, not its absolute measure. When we include the cost of repurchasing of the 
existing machinery and buildings, this variable proves to have no significant effect. Age of the 
firm – whether it was established pre-1991 – appears to have a slight positive effect, but it is 
also statistically insignificant.  
Of all the additional variables tested in models 2-6, only one variable proved significant – 
foreign pressure for introduction of new products is positively associated with export 
propensity. It is somewhat counter-intuitive, as introduction of new products as such has a 
negative effect on internationalisation of firms in our sample. It might mean that in general 
enterprises whose products are exposed to foreign competition tend to be exporters.  
Quality certification has a positive but statistically insignificant effect. None of the measures 
of access to finance had sufficiently good data to yield meaningful results in our estimations. 
The need to provide collateral for loans has a small negative, but statistically insignificant 
effect. Direct import of inputs, another measure of foreign links, also is not significant.  
What can we conclude from these results? The profile of a typical Ukrainian exporter, judging 
from this analysis, seems to be – a large firm with foreign ownership and educated labour, 
but which does little product innovation and upgrading of capital. Hence, it seems that it is 
well established, large and less dynamic firms that tend to export, albeit with a higher number 
of educated staff. Although in part running contrary to expectations, these results do not come 
as a surprise if one thinks about the commodity composition of Ukrainian exports, dominated 
by resource-intensive and low-value added products.  
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Similar findings were made in other studies. Rankin et al. (2006) find that size, foreign 
ownership and skills are also a strong determinant of internationalisation of African firms. 
While, although theory predicts the contrary, Wakelin (1998) found that non-innovative UK 
firms are more likely to export than innovative firms. She also finds that the number of past 
innovations (something that our data lacks, beyond the past 3 years), has a positive impact on 
the likelihood of a firm to export.  
These findings mask sectoral differences, and suffer from insufficient dynamics, which could 
potentially reveal positive signs of change. Future improvements in the available data might 
shed more light on these and other firm characteristics that we could not uncover in this 
analysis.  
The second dataset offers an advantage of exploring destination-specific determinants, 
detailed sectoral distribution and covers seven years instead of two. So next we move on to 
describing the trade reorientation model and its results.  
6.5. Empirical analysis: Trade reorientation model 
6.5.1. Data description  
The data was provided by and collected within the European Commission project on the 
Economic and Social Consequences of Industrial Restructuring in Russia and Ukraine, and is 
based on the Ukrainian Customs data and official financial reports of the enterprises. It 
included: firm-level export transactions data at 4-digit level (in HS1996 commodity 
classification), amount of the transaction in US dollars (in current prices), country of 
destination (rather than contract country), innovation,  measured by expenditures on 
technological innovations and ICT expenditures, and presence of FDI – 1 if foreign ownership 
was present in that firm in a particular year, 0 – otherwise. Although this innovation data is 
not the best measure of innovation, as it does not provide information on the introduction or 
discontinuation of products or product lines, or separate R&D and technology expenditures, 
ICT expenditures are, however, the best measure available at the moment on Ukrainian firms. 
From the available data we also constructed new variables – total amount of exports per firm 
per year per destination country, and total number of commodities per firm per year per 
destination country. The former is meant to reflect the trends in the scale of exporting activity 
of a firm, and the latter – the scope, or commodity diversification. We also tried including the 
competitiveness variable, defined as a share of exports by firm i of product j (at 4-digit level) 
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to the total exports of product j by all firms in Ukraine (in the sample), but it proved to be 
correlated with the “scale” variable (+0.46), which would cause multi-collinearity in the 
regressions, and therefore was left out of the analysis. 
The firm-level exports dataset is based on the Ukrainian customs data and includes all 
Ukrainian exporting enterprises.  However when the availability of dependent variables is 
taken into account we result with 1956 enterprises in pooled regressions (2000-2005), and 
from 477 to 974 in cross-sectional annual regressions. Although the difference in the number 
of observations across years may create a selection bias, one has to bear in mind the scarcity 
of such data on Ukraine – such coverage of Ukrainian enterprises already represents a unique 
dataset. Annex 12 shows the distribution of exports by regions and commodities in the 
original dataset. The data covers seven years – 2000-2006 – however the FDI data in 2006 
was found to be problematic, and therefore in annual 2006 regressions FDI is absent and 
pooled regressions are run only on data from 2000 to 2005.  
6.5.2. Model description 
In this model we follow the approach of Hottop et al. (2005), who explore the mechanisms 
that link trade and restructuring in transition economies through a learning and industrial 
upgrading perspective. They use product-level export data to derive diversification versus 
specialisation trends that may explain restructuring in East European economies. We change 
the level of this analysis by looking at the firm-level diversification and specialisation trends, 
adding a destination-specific and sectoral dimension in export performance. We also look at 
the variables explored in the internationalisation model – foreign ownership (FDI) and 
innovation. We measure diversification as the number of 4-digit (HS 1996 classification) 
products exported by a firm, in each year, to each of the partner countries, and specialisation – 
by total value of exports, respectively by each firm to each of the partner countries. The latter 
variable can also be interpreted as a measure of size.  
After exploring the general regional and sectoral effects, this section takes a somewhat 
unconventional approach – it compensates the lack of explanatory variables by going back to 
the detailed trade data to try and see what industries are driving the results.  
In this model we are asking the following research questions: 
1) Is there a systematic difference between Ukrainian firms exporting to the EU and 
those serving the CIS markets? 
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2) Is an increase in the scale of exports associated with higher or lower probability of 
exporting to the EU market? Or, in other words, do economies of scale help a firm to 
enter the EU market? 
3) Is higher product diversification associated with higher or lower probability of 
exporting to the EU? 
4) Are firms serving the EU market more innovative, judging from either product or 
process innovation? 
5) Are firms with foreign links more likely to internationalise? Enter the EU market? 
This section is based on cross-sectional, rather than panel data analysis, in order to explore to 
the maximum the limited possibilities offered by the dataset – panel data analysis would 
envisage a single observation per each firm, thus losing country-specific product 
diversification and specialisation, which proved more accurate than general, non-country-
specific approach.  
Cross-sectional bivariate logit regression with robust standard errors was run with the 
following binary dependent variables95:  
§ EU-15 (1 or 0) 
§ EU-12 (1 if a country was an EU candidate or one of the 12 new members in the 
period 2000-2006, 0 otherwise) 
§ CIS (1 if a country was a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the 
period from 2000-2006, 0 otherwise) 
Explanatory variables: 
§ Total value of exports per firm per year per destination country, as a reflection of scale 
effects (Scale defined as: a sum of exports of all products by firm i in year t to country 
a.) 
§ Total number of commodities per firm per year per destination country, as a proxy for 
commodity diversification or scope effects.  
                                                          
95 Multinomial logit model was used by Becker and Egger (2007), bivariate logit – by Zhao and Li (1997), 
Nassimbeni (2001) 
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§ FDI – dummy variable, 1 if the firm had foreign ownership in a particular year, 0 – 
otherwise.  
§ Innovation expenditures – expenditures on technological innovations and ICT 
expenditures. 
6.5.3. Results 
From the first aggregate (pooled over 2000-2005)96 regression shown in Table 22, based on 
data from 1956 firms, some corroboration of the results obtained in the first part of this 
chapter can be observed – innovation has a negative effect on the export propensity with 
regard to all regions – EU-15, EU-12 and CIS. Foreign ownership, which had a pronounced 
positive effect in the first exercise, here seems to have a positive effect only in trade with the 
EU-15. Also consistent with the internationalisation model, the scale effect, which can be 
approximated with size, has a positive effect in trade with most regions, apart from EU-12.  
Some asymmetry can be observed by regions: EU-15, EU-12 and CIS. In trade with the CIS 
the scale effects are positive, whereas with the EU-15 they are only marginally positive. 
Commodity diversification (in a firm’s trade with a specific country) has a positive effect in 
trade with CIS only. Innovation is negative in trade with all regions, while FDI has a strong 
positive effect on exports to the EU-15. A somewhat unexpected result is the negative effect 
of all explanatory variables for the EU-12. However, in order to interpret these effects 
correctly, the time and sectoral dimensions are looked at next.  
The finding about the negative effect of both innovation and diversification in trade with the 
EU, at the risk of generalisation, can be paralleled with the results of Pavlenko and Vakhitova 
(2008), who study the effect of innovation on productivity in Ukrainian enterprises. Using 
firm’s main market as one of the controls, they find negative association between productivity 
and exporting to non-CIS countries status. This is an important observation, since it echoes a 
more general fact – little improvement in the quality of exports from Ukraine to the EU, as 
reflected in the commodity composition described in detail in CHAPTER 3.  
                                                          
96 No data on FDI is available in 2006, this variable is therefore omitted and this should be borne in mind when 
interpreting the coefficients on the remaining variables.  
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Table 22. Dependent variables: EU15, EU12, CIS dummy variables, 2000-2005 
Variable EU-15 EU-12 CIS 
Scale 0.010* -0.065*** 0.079*** 
Diversification -0.097*** -0.025*** 0.024*** 
Innovation -0.050*** -0.013*** -0.011*** 
FDI 0.495*** -0.160*** -0.059** 
Constant -1.389*** -0.272*** -1.472*** 
N 1956 1956 1956 
N 50199 50199 50199 
ll -25,600 -25,600 -32,800 
df_m 4 4 4 
chi2 582.977 291.773 459.552 
Note: Statistical significance * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 confidence level. Pooled cross-sectional 
logit regression with robust standard errors.  
Source: author’s calculations using STATA 9.1.  
Time and sectoral dimension 
EU-15 
Starting with the EU-15, what can be noted first of all from the sectoral regressions in Table 
23 is a strong positive effect of FDI across many sectors: Minerals, Textiles, apparel and 
leather, Wood, Machinery and transport equipment and Other. At the same time, Table 24 
shows that FDI gains a consistent positive effect as of 2002. Scale effects are positive for 
agriculture and textiles, although on aggregate this effect was pronounced between 2000 and 
2002 and disappeared since then. Ukraine is known to be a major outsourcing destination for 
textiles and clothing industries, and it seems that Ukraine has achieved a degree of 
specialisation in this area in trade with the EU.  
Innovation, although negative on aggregate, has a positive effect on Machinery and 
equipment and Other products.  In order to see which precisely products are driving these 
effects, the analysis is done at 2- or, when this is not informative enough, at 4-digit level.  
As far as FDI is concerned, it produces a positive effect on the likelihood to export to the EU 
across a number of sectors – minerals, textiles, wood, machinery and transport equipment and 
other products.  
The most important products in group Minerals are “Minerals fuels” and “Ores, slag and ash”, 
whose share of total exports to the EU-15 has grown considerably between 2000 and 2005 – 
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from 9.5 percent to 22 percent, and from 0.62 percent to 6.55 percent respectively. Indeed, in 
case of both mineral fuels and ores, there has been a lot of Russian (or Russian originating) 
and other foreign direct investment in oil refineries and ore enrichment plants, which seems to 
have been at least in part export-oriented.97  
Textiles are traditionally an FDI-intensive sector in emerging markets, and Ukraine is no 
exception, and the biggest share in this group has been accounted for by product 62 “Articles 
of apparel and clothing, not knitted or crocheted”, whose relative share has somewhat fallen 
from 6.6 percent to 3.8 percent between 2000 and 2006.  
Ukraine had the largest wood-processing sectors in the former Soviet Union, and as a 
dynamically growing industry, wood-processing, including furniture manufacturing, has 
attracted a lot of FDI, particularly in forest-rich Western and Central Ukraine. Furniture is one 
of the important product lines in the category Other, where FDI also has a positive effect on 
the likelihood of exporting to the EU-15. And although a lot of FDI into furniture is market-
seeking, supplying Ukrainian and neighbouring CIS market, a fair amount of re-export into 
the European Union is taking place. As mentioned in Terterov (2005: 117-118), in 2001 of 
3,653 companies operating in the wood-processing and furniture industry in Ukraine, 10 
percent are joint ventures or foreign-owned companies, and these and the majority of other 
enterprises were using foreign, mainly EU-made equipment. The main export destinations 
have also been EU countries – Germany, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Spain, as well as Turkey.  
Machinery, equipment and transport equipment is also positively affected by FDI, and is 
dominated by categories 85 “Electrical machinery and equipment and parts, TV and sound 
recorders and reproducers” and 89 “Ships, boats and floating structures”.  
Ship-building industry is mainly represented by the Mykolayiv plant “Okean”, which was 
bought by the Dutch group Damen Shipyards in 2000, since when the share of exports of 
ships to the EU-15 has grown significantly (from zero in 2000, to 1.7 percent in 2001 and 4.6 
percent in 2004).   
As far as commodity group 85 is concerned – the largest share of exports to the EU in this 
category has consistently been accounted for by insulated wires and cables / optical wires and 
                                                          
97 E.g. “Zaporizhya Iron Ore Industrial Complex” – FDI from the Slovak firm MINERFIN. “Ukrtatnafta” 
(Kremenchug Oil Refinery) – Russian Tatnafta; “Lukoil- Odessa Refinery” – Lukoil (Russia); “Kherson Oil 
Refinery” – 40% by off-shore British Virgin Islands-registered Rayholt Invest S.A. and Faymarsh Company 
Ltd., both controlled by Ukrainian investors.  
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cables (HS commodity 8544), its share of commodity-line 85 has varied between 33 percent 
and 69 percent from 2000 to 2005. Indeed, Ukraine, along with Poland and Turkey, is 
considered one of the key markets for insulated wire in emerging Europe, with key players 
being foreign-owned companies, which explains the positive FDI effect.98 Another well 
performing industry in Machinery, equipment and transport equipment was “Audio-electronic 
equipment, except recording devices” (HS 8518), which has comprised 10-30 percent of 
exports of group 85 to the EU-15, falling to 10-11 percent in 2003-2005. The FDI link here 
could be related to the implementation of a radio-electronic equipment production project in 
the Special Economic Zone “Porto-Franko” in Odessa region in 2002. 
Another promising finding with regard to Machinery and Equipment is a positive effect of 
innovation. It is hard to tell which products are behind this effect – it would have to be 
products, which are not assembled from imported parts or materials, and ship-building could 
be one of them – but the important thing already is to know that there are signs of innovation 
leading to higher exports to the EU-15 – a very competitive market. Group “Other” in trade 
with the EU-15 is dominated by three 2-digit commodities: Optical, photographic, measuring, 
precision and other instruments (HS 1996 90), Furniture (94), and Toys, games and sports 
requisites and parts (95). It has already been mentioned that furniture has attracted a lot of 
FDI, which proves to be at least in part export-oriented, but little information on FDI into the 
other two groups is available. 
                                                          
98 Draka Holding N.V. (The Netherlands) and Tele-Fonika Kable Handel S.A. (Poland), Leoni AG (Germany) 
http://www.electronics.ca/publications/products/Insulated-Wire-And-Cable:-A-Global-Strategic-Business-
Report.html accessed on 19/09/2009.  
 14
4 
 
T
ab
le
 2
3.
 S
ec
to
r-
by
-s
ec
to
r 
lo
gi
t r
eg
re
ss
io
n,
 p
oo
le
d 
cr
os
s-
se
ct
io
na
l 2
00
0-
20
05
  
EU
-1
5 
 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 
Fo
od
 
M
in
er
al
s 
Ch
em
ic
al
s 
Te
xt
ile
s_
l~
h 
   
   
 
W
oo
d 
M
et
al
s 
   
M
ac
h_
tr
an
sp
 
O
th
er
   
   
 
Sc
al
e 
0.
09
**
* 
-0
.2
2*
**
 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
2 
0.
21
**
* 
   
   
  
0.
01
 
0.
01
 
-0
.0
5*
**
 
-0
.0
1 
di
ve
rs
ifi
ca
tio
n 
-0
.0
2 
0.
03
 
-0
.1
8*
**
 
0.
01
 
-0
.3
7*
**
 
-0
.1
5*
**
 
-0
.1
5*
**
   
-0
.1
6*
**
 
-0
.1
9*
**
   
In
no
va
tio
n 
0 
0.
01
 
0.
02
 
0.
02
 
-0
.1
4*
**
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
-0
.1
3*
**
 
-0
.0
7*
**
   
0.
08
**
* 
0.
03
**
   
 
FD
I 
0.
03
 
-0
.2
2 
0.
36
**
 
-0
.0
8 
0.
76
**
* 
   
   
  
0.
61
**
* 
-0
.1
5*
* 
   
1.
24
**
* 
0.
65
**
* 
  
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
-2
.5
3*
**
 
0.
45
 
-1
.3
3*
**
 
-1
.5
4*
**
 
-2
.4
4*
**
   
   
  
-0
.5
8*
* 
-0
.9
3*
**
   
-1
.7
9*
**
 
-1
.3
0*
**
   
N
r o
f f
irm
s 
33
7 
24
8 
26
7 
61
6 
42
4 
46
2 
64
7 
85
7 
54
5 
N
 
30
31
 
37
87
 
24
47
 
67
15
 
48
51
 
39
00
 
10
62
1 
11
21
2 
47
04
 
Ll
 
-1
47
7.
4 
-1
23
5.
16
 
-1
07
8.
11
 
-2
79
7.
04
 
-5
16
3.
65
 
-2
36
8.
98
 
-4
51
5.
22
 
-5
83
7.
46
 
-2
54
0.
1 
df
_m
 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
ch
i2
 
11
.9
6 
80
.3
9 
21
.4
 
3.
81
 
42
9.
36
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
17
9.
56
 
11
0.
62
 
32
7.
41
 
10
3.
51
 
EU
-1
2 
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 
Fo
od
 
M
in
er
al
s 
Ch
em
ic
al
s 
Te
xt
ile
s_
l~
h 
W
oo
d 
M
et
al
s 
M
ac
h_
tr
an
s~
p 
O
th
er
 
Sc
al
e 
-0
.1
2*
**
 
-0
.1
6*
**
 
0.
08
**
* 
-0
.0
5*
**
 
-0
.0
7*
**
 
-0
.0
5*
**
 
-0
.1
1*
**
 
-0
.0
9*
**
 
-0
.1
0*
**
 
di
ve
rs
ifi
ca
tio
n 
0.
33
**
* 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.1
2*
**
 
0.
05
**
 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.1
5*
**
 
0 
0.
05
**
 
0.
05
 
In
no
va
tio
n 
-0
.1
3*
**
 
0.
05
**
* 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
2*
* 
0.
02
* 
-0
.0
3*
 
0.
01
 
-0
.0
5*
**
 
-0
.0
3*
* 
FD
I 
-0
.3
3*
 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.5
5*
**
 
-0
.3
5*
**
 
-0
.1
2 
0.
21
 
-0
.0
4 
0.
36
**
* 
0.
06
 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
0.
15
 
0.
14
 
-1
.0
4*
**
 
-0
.5
4*
**
 
-0
.3
7 
-0
.3
7 
0.
11
 
-0
.6
2*
**
 
-0
.2
4 
N
r o
f f
irm
s 
33
7 
24
8 
26
7 
61
6 
42
4 
46
2 
64
7 
85
7 
54
5 
N
 
30
31
 
37
87
 
24
47
 
67
15
 
48
51
 
39
00
 
10
62
1 
11
21
2 
47
04
 
ll 
-1
26
6.
86
 
-1
75
5.
3 
-1
54
0.
22
 
-3
35
8.
6 
-2
50
3.
21
 
-2
13
7.
14
 
-5
67
5.
22
 
-5
25
4.
92
 
-2
25
0.
07
 
df
_m
 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
ch
i2
 
86
.3
6 
10
3.
08
 
51
.2
 
43
.8
2 
27
.0
6 
57
.7
4 
12
0.
71
 
14
6.
95
 
59
.3
2 
C
on
tin
ue
d 
ov
er
le
af
. 
 
 
 14
5 
 
CI
S 
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
 
Fo
od
 
M
in
er
al
s 
Ch
em
ic
al
s 
Te
xt
ile
s_
l~
h 
W
oo
d 
M
et
al
s 
M
ac
h_
tr
an
s~
p 
O
th
er
 
Sc
al
e 
-0
.0
5*
* 
0.
45
**
* 
-0
.0
7*
**
 
0.
11
**
* 
-0
.0
3*
* 
0.
15
**
* 
0.
08
**
* 
0.
19
**
* 
0.
18
**
* 
di
ve
rs
ifi
ca
tio
n 
-0
.2
8*
**
 
-0
.4
2*
**
 
0.
12
**
* 
-0
.2
0*
**
 
0.
24
**
* 
0.
04
 
0.
16
**
* 
-0
.1
1*
**
 
-0
.1
1*
**
 
In
no
va
tio
n 
0.
07
**
* 
-0
.0
0 
-0
.0
7*
**
 
-0
.0
8*
**
 
0.
08
**
* 
0.
19
**
* 
-0
.0
5*
**
 
-0
.0
7*
**
 
-0
.0
3*
**
 
FD
I 
0.
32
* 
0.
09
 
0.
17
 
0.
51
**
* 
0.
15
 
-0
.4
1*
**
 
0.
21
**
* 
-0
.6
9*
**
 
-0
.6
0*
**
 
Co
ns
ta
nt
 
-0
.7
2*
* 
-4
.5
9*
**
 
0.
04
 
-0
.9
2*
**
 
-1
.7
5*
**
 
-3
.2
9*
**
 
-2
.0
7*
**
 
-1
.3
9*
**
 
-1
.5
8*
**
 
N
r o
f f
irm
s 
33
7 
24
8 
26
7 
61
6 
42
4 
46
2 
64
7 
85
7 
54
5 
N
 
30
31
 
37
87
 
24
47
 
67
15
 
48
51
 
39
00
 
10
62
1 
11
21
2.
00
 
47
04
.0
0 
ll 
-1
66
0.
07
 
-2
27
1.
61
 
-1
45
1.
19
 
-4
48
3.
89
 
-2
76
5.
04
 
-2
14
4.
75
 
-6
59
2.
82
 
-7
26
0.
69
 
-3
03
4.
94
 
df
_m
 
4.
00
 
4.
00
 
4.
00
 
4.
00
 
4.
00
 
4.
00
 
4.
00
 
4.
00
 
4.
00
 
ch
i2
 
30
.2
8 
49
4.
43
 
54
.1
9 
32
8.
85
 
16
2.
75
 
33
3.
27
 
16
1.
83
 
63
8.
60
 
21
7.
63
 
N
ot
e:
 S
ta
tis
tic
al
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nc
e 
* 
p<
0.
1;
 *
* 
p<
0.
05
; *
**
 p
<0
.0
1 
co
nf
id
en
ce
 le
ve
l. 
 
So
ur
ce
: A
ut
ho
r’
s 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
ns
 u
si
ng
 S
TA
TA
 9
.1
. 
 146 
 
EU-12 
Although in the general pooled regression in Table 22 the EU-12 dummy showed a puzzling 
result – all variables having a negative aggregate effect, on a cross-sector and year-by-year 
basis some pronounced positive effects can be seen.  
Thus, scale – i.e. both the volumes of exports and, as a proxy, the size of an enterprise, 
increases the likelihood of minerals to be exported to the EU-12, while commodity 
diversification is positive for chemicals and machinery and transport equipment.  
The scale effect is driven by a very high share of ores, coke and mineral fuels in both exports 
of minerals and total exports to the EU-12, which has been growing between 2000 and 2005: 
ores – from 14.3 percent to 24.5 percent, mineral fuels – from 9.7 percent to 20 percent. It is 
rather unsurprising to observe that bigger size of an enterprise is conducive to higher exports 
of these products.  
As far as the effect of commodity diversification on chemicals is concerned, group 29 
“Organic chemicals” (in particular acyclic hydrocarbons and halogenated derivatives) and 
group 31 “Fertilisers” are driving the results.  
Machinery and transport equipment exports to the EU-12 are positively affected both by 
commodity diversification and FDI. Exports in this group are represented by groups 84 
(Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances) and 85 (Electrical 
machinery and equipment and parts thereof). In order to understand better which exactly 
products could be driving the effect of commodity diversification and FDI, products at 4-digit 
level and the most important products in groups 84 and 85 are looked at next.  
In group 85, as in trade with the EU-15, insulated cables and wires are the top exported 
product, whose share in the group grew from 1 percent in 2000 to 48 percent in 2005. It has 
already been mentioned that this industry is highly exposed to FDI. The next top performers 
are group 8531 “Electric sound or visual signal equipment”, which on average constituted 19 
percent of group 85 exports from 2000 to 2005, and group 8537 “Electrical power, etc, 
control and distribution boards” – 16 percent on average. Both of which are likely to represent 
some FDI-exposed producers (e.g. UK firm Schneider Electric in case of the latter, which 
works both for the domestic and export markets, while electric and sound equipment is likely 
to represent re-export of assembled parts, imported from Asian countries).  
Products in group 84 are less concentrated and perhaps this is what is driving the commodity 
diversification effect. The top performers have been: 8419 “Machinery, non-domestic, 
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involving heating or cooling” (11 percent of group 84 on average for 2000-2005); 8482 “Ball 
or roller bearings”, of which Ukraine is one of the top producers in Europe (8 percent on 
average); 8471 “Automatic data processing machines (computers)” (grew to 29 percent in 
2005, 7 percent on average); 8414 “Air, vacuum pumps, compressors, ventilating fans”, 6 
percent on average; 8455 “Metal rolling mills and rolls” (8 percent); as well as 8410 
“Hydraulic turbines etc”, 8409 “Parts of internal combustion spark ignition engines”; 8473 
“Parts, accessories, except covers, for office machines” (all 5 percent on average). In 
industrial machinery Ukraine has traditionally had a relative competitive advantage, and little 
FDI (unless it is of Ukrainian origin re-diverted through Cyprus, as is very often practiced) is 
present there, whereas office equipment and computers are most likely produced as part of an 
international value chain, with either majority or minority foreign presence, which would 
explain the positive FDI effect.  
Innovation has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of a firm to export to the 
EU-12 in 2002, 2003 and 2006, in particular food and textiles & leather, with a weaker 
statistical significance for the latter.  
Food products are mainly represented by group 21 Miscellaneous edible preparations, 19 
Preparations of cereals, flour, starch/milk etc. and 20, Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts 
etc. Textiles include group 61 Articles of apparel and clothing access, knitted or crocheted 
and 62 Articles of apparel and clothing access, not knitted or crocheted.  
CIS 
In the aggregate CIS regressions scale and diversification have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of a firm to export to the CIS. In the sectoral breakdown one can see that the scale 
effect is positive for most commodity groups – Food, Wood and articles of wood, Base 
metals, machinery and transport equipment and other products, which suggests that bigger 
enterprises or enterprises with bigger production capacity (export production capacity, as only 
exporting enterprises are compared) are more successful in entering CIS market rather than 
European markets.  
Diversification is positive for three groups – minerals, textiles and metals. Although slightly 
surprising, the diversification in minerals must be driven by the groups 28 “Inorganic 
chemicals, organic and inorganic compounds of precious metals, or rare earth metals” (5.24 
percent of total exports to CIS from 2000 to 2005) and 27 “Mineral fuels, oil and product of 
their distillation” (which amounted to 4 percent of total exports on average).  
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Textiles, leather and footwear products only comprised from 1 percent to 3 percent of total 
exports to CIS in our sample, falling from 3.6 percent to 1.96 percent between 2000 and 2005. 
Within this group the most important products have been carpets and other floor coverings, 
raw hides and skins, and wool and other yarn and hair.  
Metals include groups 72 “Iron and steel” – the share of which grew from 6 percent in 2000 to 
22 percent in 2005, and 73 “Articles of iron and steel”, which grew from 0.7 percent in 2000 
to 9 percent in 2005. Group 72 represents goods of lower level of processing, therefore they 
are likely to be less diversified than goods in group 73. Besides, the share of the latter has 
grown much faster than that of group 72 – by 67 percent vs. 31 percent (CAGR) respectively.  
Interestingly, innovation is positive not for technology intensive products, but for agricultural 
products, textiles, and wood. This may relate to the fact that even in lower added value 
categories Ukraine tends to export goods of higher level of processing to CIS than to the EU 
markets.  
FDI is positive and significant for chemicals and metals. In chemicals the most important 
products are: rubber and articles thereof (on average accounting for 5.4 percent of total 
exports to CIS in our sample), Plastics and articles thereof (1.4 percent of total exports to 
CIS), and Miscellaneous chemical products. The positive effect of FDI on exports of 
chemicals can be explained by the fact that the main producers of polymers in Ukraine are 
enterprises with foreign participation – Karpatneftekhim (Russian Lukoil-Neftekhim Group), 
Linos (Russian TNK-BP Group) and JSC Stirol (with partial US and Canadian ownership).99 
A similar situation is observed in metallurgy, where Russian presence has been substantial – 
Evraz Group (controlled by the Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich) owes part of the 
metallurgical assets of Privat Group; Smart Holding has merged assets with Metinvest, the 
biggest metallurgical producer in Ukraine controlled by Rinat Akhmetov; Rusal (owned by 
the Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska) also owns aluminium production capacities in Ukraine.  
  
                                                          
99  Market Report Company (2007) “Rynok polimerov v Ukraine 2007”. Available at 
http://www.mrcplast.ru/reports/polymers-in-ukraine-2007.html , retrieved on 23rd of March 2010.  
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Table 24. Dependent variable – exporting to the EU-15, 2000-2006 
Variable  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Scale  0.055*** 0.042*** 0.048*** 0 0 -0.007 -0.021*** 
Diversification -0.313*** -0.109*** -0.094*** 0.078*** -0.147*** -0.124*** -0.199*** 
Innovation  0.021 -0.054*** -0.037*** -0.108*** -0.041*** -0.051*** 0.006 
FDI  0.519 0.058 0.937*** 0.475*** 0.603*** 0.700***  
Constant  -1.884*** -1.333*** -2.295*** -1.225*** -1.278*** -1.407*** -1.110*** 
n 477 654 754 795 948 974 n/a 
N  3448 6391 7831 8742 11599 12188 49510 
ll  -1811.324 -3280.55 -3952.051 -4598.661 -5878.415 -5903.613 -20500 
df_m  4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
chi2  84.208 51.591 156.16 131.329 225.788 176.506 476.442 
Note: This regression and below – cross-sectional logit with robust standard errors.  
Statistical significance: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 confidence level.  
Source: Author’s calculations using STATA 9.1.  
Table 25. Dependent variable – exporting to the EU-12, 2000-2006 
Variable  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Scale  -0.108*** -0.112*** -0.062*** -0.040*** -0.071*** -0.052*** -0.111*** 
Diversification -0.043 -0.016 -0.245*** -0.032 -0.005 0.019 -0.020* 
Innovation  -0.094*** -0.002 0.071*** 0.019* -0.051*** -0.043*** 0.009** 
FDI  0.518 -1.003*** 0.085 0.206** -0.188*** -0.025  
Constant  -0.205 0.987*** -0.582*** -1.036*** -0.079 -0.444*** -0.158*** 
 477 654 754 795 948 974  
N  3448 6391 7831 8742 11599 12188 49510 
ll  -1666.548 -3349.802 -3879.342 -4495.637 -5727.103 -6238.526 -23300 
df_m  4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
chi2  83.063 228.764 170.448 26.898 119.725 75.192 529.167 
Note: Statistical significance * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 confidence level.  
Source: Author’s calculations using STATA 9.1  
Table 26. Dependent variable – exports to the CIS, 2000-2006 
Variable  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Scale 0.024 0.074*** 0.052*** 0.086*** 0.132*** 0.047*** 0.099*** 
Diversification 0.167*** 0.006 0.139*** -0.031* 0.049*** 0.011 -0.097*** 
Innovation  0.039*** 0.024** -0.060*** 0.005 -0.017** -0.005 -0.045*** 
FDI  -1.251*** 0.548*** -0.365*** -0.138** 0.128** -0.343*** 
Constant  -0.081 -2.142*** -0.866*** -1.471*** -2.279*** -0.806*** -1.004*** 
N  477 654 754 795 948 974 
ll  3448 6391 7831 8742 11599 12188 49510 
df_m  -2247.02 -4062.77 -5058.74 -5661.38 -7547.42 -8024.58 -33700 
chi2  4 4 4 4 4 4 3 
Note: Statistical significance * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 confidence level.  
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6.5.4. Trade reorientation model: Findings and conclusions 
Based on the above detailed analysis, and theoretical considerations outlined earlier in the 
chapter, the following conclusions can be made, focusing on CIS and EU-15. 
To recall – Hottop et al. (2005) argue that the link between trade and economic growth will be 
stronger, when a country (and its enterprises) manages to establish strong positions with 
foreign markets both in terms of product specialisation (higher scale) and product variety 
(diversification). Higher specialisation signifies the learning-by-doing effect, while 
commodity diversification – product innovation. On top of that, we are exploring FDI and 
innovation effects as additional indicators of industrial upgrading, innovation and higher 
competitiveness on the external markets. What has the empirical analysis shown in this 
regard?  
Exports to the CIS are positively affected by both scale and commodity diversification. In 
terms of timing, Table 24 shows that the scale effect has been consistently pronounced since 
2001, while diversification has been positive on and off between 2000 and 2006, suggesting a 
continuous learning-by-doing effect and an intermittent product innovation effect. Innovation 
also had a positive effect on exports to the CIS, but for a more limited range of products. FDI, 
on the other hand, had no positive effect on exports to the CIS.  
At the same time, in trade with the EU, specialisation (scale) is only marginally positive 
(mainly driven by agriculture and textiles), while commodity diversification (and hence 
product innovation) and innovation costs, are negative on aggregate. While there are more 
positive signs on a sector-by-sector basis in trade with the EU-15, the aggregate-level picture 
suggests that industrial upgrading efforts of Ukrainian enterprises, measured by higher 
diversification and innovation expenditures, have had a more positive effect on exports to the 
CIS than to other regions; or could have been made because the demand on the CIS markets 
has been driving this industrial upgrading. Evidence-based reasons for this cannot be given in 
this chapter, but, as was already observed in Chapter 3 with the use of the gravity model, 
geographical proximity (plus longer common borders), as well as cultural proximity 
(language used as a proxy) are strong positive factors here. Cultural proximity also represents 
path dependency and similarity in demand and tastes due to common past – some Ukrainian 
products have traditionally been sold to the USSR markets. Speaking of higher value-added 
products, CIS consumers are more likely to opt for a newer model of some Ukrainian product, 
e.g. a piece of home appliance or kitchen utensils, than a European consumer, who is not 
acquainted with Ukrainian products at all. This particularly concerns ready-made products, 
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raw materials and parts are less subject to this effect. Therefore it is not surprising that 
diversification and innovation are not producing a positive effect on the likelihood of 
exporting to the EU-15. In this case a European producer might more readily buy Ukrainian-
made but well-known global brand product. This may also explain the positive effect of FDI 
on exports to the EU. And although some literature (e.g. Kudina, 1999) suggests that inward 
Ukrainian FDI has been mainly market seeking, a consistently positive and significant effect 
of FDI can be observed in the EU-15 regression as of 2002 (see Table 24). The next logical 
question would be whether this FDI is in itself leading to industrial upgrading and innovation. 
In the sample used in this analysis it does not seem to be the case – as can be seen from the 
correlation matrix in Annex 11, FDI is statistically and significantly correlated only with scale 
(i.e. higher specialisation), but not with innovation and diversification. This concerns all trade 
partners, regardless of the region. No attempt is made to interpret this as a finding, but there 
are little grounds for a positive association between these variables in the regression analysis.  
Hence, it can be said that in the period 2000-2006 enterprises exporting mainly to the CIS 
were characterised by both higher specialisation and diversification of their products, and 
hence – relative industrial upgrading. With regard to the latter it is important to note that the 
results of the study do not suggest that exporting to the CIS causes industrial upgrading (or 
productivity growth), as that would require regressing previous period’s exports on current 
period innovation. If any causality were to be inferred, the results are more indicative of 
diversification or product upgrading increasing the likelihood of a firm to export to the CIS 
than to the EU, rather than exporting causing product upgrading. Although a mutually 
reinforcing process is likely as well, it has not been tested in this analysis. In reality, the most 
relevant interpretation of the results is that the data shows that Ukrainian enterprises tend to 
sell more diverse products to the CIS than to the EU.  
Exporting to the EU-15 was positively affected by FDI, and only marginally by specialisation. 
On aggregate there is little evidence to suggest that this FDI was conducive to industrial 
upgrading, but this is seen as a positive finding in any case, as it shows that not all FDI to 
Ukraine is market-seeking. Particularly positive in terms of higher-value added content of 
Ukrainian exports is a strong and positive sign of FDI on exports to the EU of machinery, 
transport and other equipment.  
  
 152 
 
6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter explored various determinants of internationalisation of Ukrainian manufacturing 
enterprises. In line with the argument in the previous sections of this thesis, this section 
departs from the premise that in the Ukrainian context a successful internationalisation 
strategy should involve penetration to more advanced markets, as well as maintaining 
traditional markets of the former Soviet Union. Ukrainian foreign economic policy has been 
directed towards European integration, and deep and comprehensive free trade agreement is 
being negotiated. Therefore it is important to explore the differences between firm-level 
characteristics that are associated with exporting to the EU and those that are more typical for 
exporters to the CIS.  
The first exercise showed that a typical Ukrainian exporter tends to be a large firm with 
foreign ownership and educated labour, but which does little product innovation and 
upgrading of capital. It seems that it is well established, large and less dynamic firms that 
tend to export. These results do not come as a surprise if one thinks about the commodity 
composition of Ukrainian exports, dominated by resource-intensive and low value-added 
products.  
The second exercise turned to the destination-specific export determinants, trying to reveal the 
factors that increase the chances of a firm to export to the EU as opposed to the CIS. Some of 
the findings of the first exercise are corroborated in the second model. Contrary to the 
theoretical expectations, innovation has a negative effect on export propensity with regard to 
all regions in question – EU-15, EU-12 and CIS. Foreign ownership, which had a pronounced 
positive effect in the first exercise, in the second model has a positive effect only in trade with 
the EU-15. Also consistent with the first model, the scale effect, which can be approximated 
with size, has a positive effect in trade with most regions, apart from EU-12.  
In addition to the above, exports to the CIS were found to be positively affected by both 
specialisation (scale) and commodity diversification. Innovation also had a positive effect on 
exports to the CIS, but for a more limited range of products (surprisingly, agriculture, as well 
as textiles and wood and related industries). FDI, on the other hand, had no positive effect on 
exports to the CIS.  
At the same time, in trade with the EU, specialisation had only a marginally positive effect 
(mainly pronounced in agriculture and textiles), while commodity diversification (and hence 
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product innovation) and innovation expenditures (process innovation) are negative on 
aggregate.  
While there are more positive signs on a sector-by-sector basis in trade with the EU-15, the 
aggregate-level picture suggests that industrial upgrading efforts of Ukrainian enterprises, 
measured by higher diversification and innovation expenditures, have had a more positive 
effect on exports to the CIS than to other regions; or could have been made because the 
demand on CIS markets was driving this industrial upgrading. 
 154 
 
CHAPTER 7. THE ROLE OF BUSINESS ELITES IN THE EU-
UKRAINE TRADE POLICY-MAKING: POLITICAL ECONOMY 
FRAMEWORK 
7.1. Introduction  
While the previous chapter looked at a population of Ukrainian firms to explore the 
characteristics that make firms more or less likely to export to the EU versus CIS markets, this 
chapter aims to pay due attention to individual businesses that have a disproportionately high 
influence both on overall exports and on trade policy-making, and therefore deserve a 
separate, qualitative, enquiry.  
The textbook economics says that free trade is the most optimal outcome in the world 
economy. Political scientists, on the contrary, claim that vested interests will always prevent 
complete trade liberalisation from taking place and wonder why so much liberalisation is 
observed (Krueger, 1992). The political economy of trade attempts to marry these two views 
in order to explain how bilateral and multilateral trade policy coalitions are formed and thus 
solve the puzzle. The consensus has emerged that the resulting level of trade liberalisation 
will be determined by an interaction of economic considerations, special interests within a 
society and political institutions that shape trade policy formation, both on a country-level and 
internationally (Krueger, 1992; and Alt et al., 1996).   
This is exactly what this chapter will focus on – the degree of mobilisation of special interests, 
in particular large business actors, with respect to bilateral trade liberalisation in a particular 
case of a country and a trade bloc – Ukraine and the EU respectively – taking into account the 
other two components acknowledged as central to the political economy of trade – economic 
factors and political institutions. Normally in the literature the degree of trade liberalisation is 
the dependent variable, with economic factors, special interests and political institutions held 
exogenous. Whereas the assumption of business interests being one of the determinants of the 
degree of trade liberalisation is still kept here, the focus is shifted slightly, narrowing down 
the question and taking the degree of business mobilisation as the main dependent variable, 
looking at its interaction with the above mentioned and some other exogenous variables. 
Ukraine and the EU represent a case of moving from very little trade throughout most of the 
twentieth century to a comprehensive trade liberalisation within a wider economic integration 
exercise. Although the volumes of trade have grown substantially since the collapse of the 
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Soviet bloc, and free trade area was already envisaged in the EU-Ukraine Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement signed in 1998, efforts to liberalise trade have gained momentum 
quite recently – in the late years of Kuchma presidency (2003-2004). This was probably rather 
EU-driven, as the union was preparing a New Neighbourhood policy as a response to 
membership demands by some of its new neighbours, in particular Ukraine and Moldova. 
However, trade liberalisation efforts intensified substantially after the December 2004 Orange 
revolution with the election of a pro-Western government under the presidency of Victor 
Yushchenko. At the same time, despite trade liberalisation being debated in the academic and 
policy-making fora for quite a while, business community, the ones who actually conduct 
trade, have started to pay attention to this process only in the last couple of years (2006-2007). 
And this early interest is still hard to call mobilisation. Perhaps this is why this aspect has also 
seen very little reflection in the literature (see Puglisi, 2007; Shumylo, 2006, for some of the 
few enquiries). The early stage of business actors’ mobilisation has implications for the extent 
of our analysis, but the situation is very likely to develop dynamically as the negotiations 
between the EU and Ukraine on the Free Trade Area are about to progress. On the other hand, 
some inferences can be made from an earlier trade liberalisation exercise – WTO accession, 
which lasted for fifteen years from 1993 until early 2008. Although the two processes are in 
some sense asymmetric – WTO implies liberalisation of imports and investment for Ukraine, 
while the EU integration is more important for liberalisation of Ukrainian exports to the EU – 
there are some systemic issues that are similar in the way business tends to mobilise on trade 
matters, and they will affect the eventual policy outcome of the EU-Ukraine free trade 
agreement. 
The structure of this chapter will be as follows – section 7.2 reviews the theoretical 
considerations of business mobilisation and coalition formation in trade policy-making, which 
consists of sub-sections on identifying economic stakes and on collective action costs and 
political institutions as factors determining mobilisation. Section 7.3 turns to the analysis of 
trade-related lobbying in Ukraine, and consists of an introduction to WTO and EU trade 
liberalisation efforts, the framework chosen for the qualitative analysis, and sub-sections on 
the problems of asymmetrical and incomplete information, economic factors (comparing 
factors at play and mobilisation with regard to WTO accession and EU-Ukraine Free Trade 
Agreement), and collective action costs and political institutions in the Ukrainian case.  
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7.2. Business mobilisation and trade policy-making: theoretical 
approach 
To put it very simply, the degree of business mobilisation with respect to trade policy making 
depends on the perceived gains from mobilising and its costs, i.e. as with any economic 
decision – on the cost-and-benefit analysis. On the benefits side economic theories had more 
to say than on the costs side – in trade theoretical literature the stakes of trade liberalisation 
for businesses and their resulting trade preferences are perceived to be determined by industry 
characteristics, or more specifically by the characteristics of the factors of production (e.g. 
labour and capital). At the same time economic theories say very little about how these trade 
preferences are eventually transformed into policy outcomes (Alt and Gilligan, 1994), as 
preferences will vary and individual business actors will face significant costs in trying to 
push through their own preferred policy. Here the new institutional economics and political 
science come into play and argue that apart from stakes of liberalisation, policy outcomes will 
be determined, inter alia, by collective action costs and political institutions.  
Alt et al. (1996) conclude that convergence is taking place in the literature on the appropriate 
model of political economy of trade: 
(1) To lay out the implications of different trade policies on the incomes of sectoral groups or 
broad factor owners;  
(2) To deduce the policy outcomes from: 
(a) The organisational strength of these actors and  
(b) The nature of prevailing political institutions. 
This framework is also used in constructing our argument about Ukraine, first looking at the 
economic factors that define businesses’ trade policy preferences, then discussing the 
interaction of businesses’ organisational strength (i.e. how they overcome the costs of 
collective action) and the institutional environment that they operate in.  
7.2.1. Identifying the stakes: economic factors 
Trade theoretical literature uses three main models to shape the argument about the impact of 
trade liberalisation on incomes of producers – Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS), Ricardo-
Viner and increasing returns to scale models. The first two models place the factors of 
production (like capital and labour) at the core of producers’ decision-making about the need 
to intervene in the trade policy formation process.  
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Factor specificity 
In the HOS model trade benefits the owners of abundant factors (as products making use of 
these factors will be most competitive in a particular country) and harms the owners of scarce 
factors, hence the former will support trade liberalisation and the latter will be protectionist. 
But factors of production are presumed to be mobile, and therefore if needed harmed 
producers can redeploy them to sectors that are better off from freer trade. Pressure politics 
will be employed if the adjustment costs (costs of switching the factors of production) are 
higher than the costs of lobbying.  
Ricardo-Viner model, on the contrary, assumes that factors cannot easily move across sectors, 
therefore the resulting fall in prices following trade liberalisation will benefit export-oriented 
industries and will harm import-competing industries, which will compete with each other to 
influence the decision-makers. Thus it logically follows that the higher the factor specificity, 
the higher are the costs of adjustment to trade liberalisation for worse off sectors, and hence 
the more likely are they to mobilise to lobby for their preferences. A good example would the 
automobile lobby in the Ukrainian parliament, which consistently acts as an anti-liberalisation 
force.  
These assumptions shaped the early research on the politics of international trade, in 
particular the endogenous tariff theory (Mayer, 1984; Grossman and Helpman, 1994) – this 
mainstream approach assumed all trade decisions to be the result of lobbying. In simple terms, 
the logic ran as follows – politicians enact policies because they need votes; consumers are 
the main winners from free trade, but they are numerous and face prohibitive costs of 
collective action; producers are less dispersed than the consumers and can overcome the costs 
of collective action easier and therefore are more successful in promoting their interests, 
which often happen to be protectionist (Stigler, 1971). Most of endogenous tariff literature 
uses the Ricardo-Viner assumption of highly specific (immobile) factors of production, where 
industries serving the domestic market will be worse off from free trade and thus more likely 
to mobilise to lobby.  
Thus, early literature (in 1970-80s) focused more on the demand for protection in trade policy 
coalition formation. Although more recent economic literature has demonstrated that 
business-government relations in trade matters can be much more complex than that, some 
authors acknowledge that such dynamics is still relevant in not fully liberalised and/or 
transition economies. Referring to Russia, Woll and Artigas (2007) note that in the emerging 
economies the stakes with tariff reductions are higher, their lobby opportunity structure is 
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more obscure, and therefore anti-trade lobby can still dominate in the resulting policy 
equilibrium.  
New trade theory and increasing returns to scale 
As global industrial organisation was undergoing a major change and multinational 
corporations were gaining an unprecedented strength, the trade lobby agenda changed as well, 
making business actors’ demands more complex. The resulting balance of preferences was 
more and more often pro-free trade (as shown in Milner’s 1988 influential study). Milner and 
Yoffie (1989) extended the argument to say that trade preferences will not always be 
exogenously determined, i.e. always pro-trade for exporters and anti-trade for import-
competing sectors. They can be significantly dependent upon external (foreign governments’ 
policy interventions) and dynamic (changing industry structure) factors, rather than solely on 
static factor endowments. And in this framework the main model of new trade theory is used 
– the increasing returns to scale (IRS) model – which leaves behind the factor specificity 
debate. It embraces Krugman’s arguments that competitiveness of the firm is defined by the 
nature of an individual market and the size of the firm, while presence of economies of scale 
makes larger firms more competitive internationally and smaller – more protectionist. Large 
business actors can then advocate their own “strategic policy” of trade barriers if foreign 
markets are protected (Milner and Yoffie, 1989). Moreover, sectors with IRS will be expected 
to lobby more and support more open trade (Alt et al., 1996). 
Economic models help to identify the stakes. But in reality incomplete information may make 
identification of these stakes difficult.  
Identifying the stakes: Uncertainty and incomplete information 
Incomplete information is an important barrier for business actors in their quest to identify the 
potential stakes of liberalisation. The importance of information in international economic 
relations has been acknowledged in numerous studies (e.g. Keohane, 1984; Krueger, 1992). 
Woll (2005) also underlines that identification of preferences is a lengthy process linked to 
the interactions between business and government representatives, and that uncertainty affects 
both the way firms conceive of the interests and the way in which they mobilise.  
Better information about the distributional implications of an FTA can have a significant 
effect on the incentives of domestic business groups to mobilise and pressure their 
governments to adopt policies that favour them. Thus, Goldstein and Martin (2000) argue that 
in multilateral trade talks the ability of a government to sign an agreement may depend on the 
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groups mobilised for or against. Moreover, depending on the status quo and on the degree of 
information precision, information can have different empowering effect on exporters or 
protectionists – sometimes complete information can increase the incentives for protectionists 
to mobilise, and therefore governments should aim to maintain the right balance between too 
much and too little information in order not to lead the talks to a stalemate.  
In reference specifically to the EU integration policies, Leblond (2007: 9) notes that:  
Economic interests initially face great uncertainty as to the precise costs and benefits of 
integrating a particular policy area; only once the ‘fog of integration’ lifts—as a result of 
concrete legislative proposals being tabled by the Commission—are economic interests able to 
calculate these costs and benefits and, consequently, decide whether to lobby for or against the 
proposal.  
This is of particular relevance to the Ukraine-EU trade liberalisation case, where little in terms 
of concrete legislative proposals has been done at the time of this research (2007-2008).  
What is crucial in our case, and as has also been acknowledged in the literature (Dur, 2007), 
businesses tend to perceive the stakes to be higher when a trade policy measure or an 
agreement entail potential losses rather than gains – in the undertaken cost-and-benefit 
analysis the perspective of suffering losses will make business actors more eager to overcome 
the costs of mobilising. In particular, when discriminatory trade agreements are concluded, 
exporters of the third countries that are likely to suffer from trade diversion will mobilise 
either to receive compensation or to join these preferential agreements.  
Kingstone (2001) goes further and criticises classifying business preferences based purely on 
economic criteria. He believes that politicians can use incomplete information as a tool to 
shape coalitions, especially when economic positions are undetermined. He quotes Verdier 
(1994), who argues that politicians can even create factor specificity through policy.  
After making their judgements on the potential economic stakes of trade liberalisation, in 
conditions of higher or lower information availability, influenced or not by politicians, 
businesses will anyway face costs in turning these trade policy preferences into policy 
outcomes, which will be related to costs of organising the lobby and the institutions that shape 
the policy-making process. 
7.2.2. Costs of mobilising: collective action costs and political institutions 
In the quest to assess the degree of business mobilisation with regard to trade liberalisation 
efforts, under mobilisation we do not necessarily imply formal collective organisation. We 
look for various ways – both individual/direct and collective – that business community 
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members may employ to convey their trade-related interests to the government, so-called 
“voice” strategy, as opposed to passive acceptance of proposed policies and adjustment (e.g. 
Hathaway, 1998). Whenever interests of several firms coincide, it would be logical to expect 
some form of collective action, to produce more weight in their lobbying, but not necessarily 
– the firms may resort to individual / direct lobbying methods. The chosen mode of 
intervention will be shaped by: the nature of policy question (i.e. how many industries it 
concerns), presence of common interests, industry characteristics (competition, 
concentration), the related costs of organising and the institutions in which the business 
operates.  
The very essence of the Olsonian (Olson, 1965) collective action costs argument is about the 
difficulty of achieving a common good for a group of individuals – the bigger the group, the 
bigger will be the incentive of free-riding for some or most of the group members, which 
complicates the realisation of this common goal. In contrast, individual interests are much 
easier to achieve, as are interests pursued by smaller groups. From this argument it follows 
that concentrated industries will find it easier to sustain their lobbying efforts (which found 
empirical support in Magee, 2002). Industries operating in monopolistic or oligopolistic 
environments (e.g. aircraft building or car manufacturing, respectively) will also have an 
advantage over industries characterised by near-perfect competition (such as textiles).  
With regard to political institutions, there have been several ways to look at this aspect. The 
first view focuses on the electoral systems and the difference between majoritarian versus 
proportional representation systems (e.g. Rogowski, 1987; Mansfield and Busch, 1995). 
Proportional representation is expected to result in higher autonomy from interest groups and 
in higher stability (Rogowski, 1987). In turn, strong parties and large electoral districts are 
also likely to insulate the legislature from protectionist private interests. On the other hand, 
majority voting may make it easier for an industry that dominates in the electoral district (the 
easier the smaller the district) to have its loyal representative elected to the legislature and 
hence provide protection to the industry (Grossman and Helpman, 2005; Fredriksson et al. 
2008). Proportional representation insulates policy makers from protectionist demands, and 
may therefore result in lower levels of protection.  
Majoritarian systems encourage mass political movements, which is conducive to the 
formation of broad-based coalitions on certain policy issues. On the contrary, if institutions 
are less majoritarian, or ‘insulating’, interests will not be willing to form massive movements 
and will resort to back-room lobbying, which is conducive to specific and rent-seeking 
 161 
 
policies. Thus, Woll (2005) notes that in the European Union, where policy-making process 
encourages broad-based coalitions, narrow specific trade policies can no longer find an easy 
way into legislation. 
Party system also plays a role. Weak parties do not adhere as strongly to the party’s position 
on the right-to-left spectrum and their pre-electoral promises can be less specific, therefore its 
members have more room for manoeuvre in their policies. In such conditions they are more 
susceptible to influence by specific interests and therefore the policies adopted are also likely 
to be more specific (Hillman and Keim, 1995). Institutional literature also emphasises that if 
issues are decided upon a sector-by-sector or industry-by-industry basis special interests will 
have a larger influence than if the decisions were made on an across-the-board basis (North, 
1990). 
The third view focuses on the relative strength of various branches of power – mainly 
legislature and bureaucracy – and their relationship with the constituency, including producers 
and consumers, or only businessmen, depending on the focus. Nevertheless, obviously the 
desire of politicians to be re-elected remains an assumption in any political science approach 
to trade policy-making. In American literature this relationship was coined as “iron triangle”, 
which consists of politicians, bureaucrats and constituency (Krueger, 1992). Politicians want 
to be re-elected and therefore are ready to provide favours to constituency. As far as 
producers are concerned, they find favours more apparent when they are the outcome of the 
bureaucratic or administered process, and therefore politicians approve legislation that permits 
the bureaucracy to provide these favours.  
In a more recent article, exploring the link between political institutions and protectionism in 
trade, Ehrlich (2007) criticises some of the above propositions, in particular the bipolar 
approach to majoritarian and non-majoritarian systems. He introduces broader institutional 
theory to the mainstream political science literature, suggesting that what is crucial is the 
number of access points to decision-makers, not the difference between majoritarian and non-
majoritarian electoral systems.100 Higher number of access points will make lobbying less 
costly, benefiting the protectionists. Once these factors are controlled for, majoritarian vs. 
non-majoritarian system would have no impact on trade policy.  
This proposition is contradicted in Frye and Mansfield’s (2003) study on trade liberalisation 
and political institutions in the post-Communist world. They find that fragmented power, 
                                                          
100 These access points will depend on the number of parties in government, the number of electoral districts, the 
nature of the vote, and other institutions. 
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reflected in 2-, 3- or more party parliamentary coalitions, or presidential systems with 
majority support in the parliament, makes trade liberalisation more likely. They also find that 
in non-democracies (which Ukraine was considered to be according to their classification), a 
more fragmented power under Kuchma, but also dispersed away from protectionist elites 
affiliated with the prior (communist) regime, has created a political space for interest groups 
favouring openness to increase their influence over trade policy.  
Hence, the views in the literature on the role of political institutions in the political economy 
of trade policy-making are somewhat contradictory. Section 7.5.2 will try to reveal the 
respective mechanisms at work in Ukraine.  
7.3. Trade liberalisation in Ukraine and the conceptual framework of 
business mobilisation 
At the moment of writing Ukraine is undertaking two main trade liberalisation initiatives – a 
multilateral one aimed at WTO accession, and a bilateral regional initiative aimed at 
establishing a free trade area with the European Union.101 While the main question in this 
study is what role Ukrainian business community plays in the EU-Ukraine trade policy-
making, the example of WTO is added here as to some extent the two processes are inter-
related – WTO accession was a clear precondition for starting negotiations on the EU-Ukraine 
DCFTA, and, secondly, WTO provides a major example of business mobilisation with regard 
to trade in Ukraine. 
These two processes differ significantly. WTO accession negotiations have started as far back 
as 1993. Technically WTO accession entails liberalisation of trade and investments mainly on 
the Ukrainian side, with some regulatory treatment consequences on the part of WTO 
members that will simplify exports from Ukraine, such as elimination of quotas on Ukrainian 
steel exports or easier dealing with anti-dumping investigations. More generally, however, 
WTO increases the attractiveness of the Ukrainian market and sends a positive sign to 
investors, thereby bearing the potential of increasing Ukrainian export performance. For most 
of the accession history the reforms were stalled, largely due to strong industrial lobby, but in 
2005 there was a turn in the attitudes and most of the necessary laws were passed. This 
chapter will try to shed light on what economic and political factors contributed to the initial 
opposition and the eventual turn-around.  
                                                          
101 While there are also free trade agreements with CIS countries, and there is a pending Russia-led initiative to 
establish Single Economic Space between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, trade liberalisation efforts 
in this direction have been stalled for some time now. 
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Compared to WTO accession, which by and large has always been an economic project, EU-
Ukraine trade liberalisation came about from a wider and rather political agenda. The 
intentions to liberalise trade were voiced back in 1998 in the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement, but, as with most PCAs, very little progress had been made. As the EU was 
approaching its fifth wave of enlargement in 2004 the new Eastern neighbours, in particular 
Ukraine and Moldova, were demanding membership prospects. Since for various reasons the 
EU was not willing to make such promises, the time came to offer some tangible alternatives. 
Thus, on the backdrop of political motives, the economic idea of trade liberalisation came 
about as the best “carrot” the EU was prepared to give away, suggesting to make it as 
comprehensive as possible and aim towards giving full access to the internal market. This 
would, at the same time, be of direct economic benefit to the EU itself. In contrast to WTO 
accession, this is also a very recent process. While both sides intensified calls for an FTA 
since 2005 (in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan), officially the beginning of DCFTA negotiations 
has only been announced in February 2008 (later than the fieldwork within this research was 
done).102 Informal exploratory talks have been under way since spring 2007, but only on the 
inter-ministerial level, the business still was not given any official reason to start thinking 
about the potential impact of an FTA.  
Unlike with WTO, where the discourse was mainly centred on import and domestic industry 
protection, with the EU-Ukraine DCFTA the opening up of the EU market for Ukrainian 
exporters is more important. Further removal of Ukrainian import tariff barriers is likely to be 
marginal, apart from the agricultural sector and services, if both sides decide to go for an 
extended liberalisation. The discourse will also differ substantially because the stress is being 
made on a deep format of this FTA, foreseeing major legislative harmonisation and removal 
of non-tariff barriers.103 Such issues are even more difficult for the producers to grasp and 
estimate the potential impact of. As to the current EU-Ukraine trade policy matters, outside 
the future FTA debate, the nature of lobbying will also differ from that with WTO, as there is 
no common measure of concern for multiple sectors that they can deal with collectively, and 
hence less collective action can be expected.  
                                                          
102 EU-Ukraine Action Plan, February 2005,  
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf  , retrieved on 10 May 2008.  The 
Council of the European Union (18 February 2008) “Council Conclusions on European Neighbourhood Policy”, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/gena/98790.pdf . retrieved on 10 May 
2008. 
103 Namely liberalisation of access to the services market, harmonisation of standards and product certification, 
customs procedures, competition policy, state procurement and subsidies, investment climate (including sale of 
land), environmental standards and intellectual property rights.  
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Table 27 roughly outlines the way the author sees business mobilisation in Ukraine as being 
in line with the framework described above. Economic factors are the ‘why’ of mobilisation, 
and political institutions and collective action costs are the ‘how’. In other words, economic 
factors determine the stakes of trade liberalisation and the underlying incentive structure of 
business actors with regard to this process, while political institutions and collective action 
costs prevailing in the country will shape the strategy that will actually be undertaken – 
mobilise or not, and how. The stakes of liberalisation and response will vary depending on the 
size of businesses – a distinction is made here between largest businesses, medium to large 
enterprises and SMEs. The largest businesses in Ukraine, as well as in Russia,  have become 
known as oligarchs. Although traditionally the term oligarchy has been applied to denote the 
power structures where power rests with a small segment of society distinguished by royalty, 
wealth, family ties or military control104, in its current meaning in Russia the term oligarch 
denotes a large businessman who controls sufficient resources to influence politics (Guriev 
and Rachinsky, 2004: 3). Due to the term’s widespread use, in the rest of the document the 
largest businesses are referred to as oligarchs. This term may be interchangeably used with a 
more formal definition ‘financial-industrial groups’ (FIGs). The term ‘large businesses’ will 
be applied to large enterprises, which are generally smaller than FIGs and do not possess a 
similar degree of political influence.  
On the economic side, the ‘why’ of mobilisation, there are two main factors affecting the 
degree of mobilisation – the perception of losses or gains from liberalisation and the size of 
business concerned. Depending on these, the political side, the ‘how’ of mobilisation, will 
determine whether there will be response from the business community and in what form it 
will come. The amount of information available on either WTO or EU trade matters will also 
affect the way the stakes are perceived by businesses and the resulting response. 
Therefore these three elements are described next – information asymmetry in section 7.4.1, 
economic factors in sections 7.4.2 to 7.4.6, and political factors and collective action costs  in 
section 7.5.  
                                                          
104 ὀλιγαρχία, Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, on Perseus Digital Library. The 
word oligarchy is from the Greek words “ὀλίγος” (olígos), “a few” and the verb "ἄρχω" (archo), “to rule, to 
govern, to command”, or, in other words “the power of a few”. 
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7.4. Trade policy and lobbying in Ukraine: Economic dimension 
7.4.1. Asymmetrical and incomplete information 
Availability of information concerns businesses of all size and both trade liberalisation 
initiatives – within WTO and with the EU. When information is too incomplete – the costs of 
informing oneself can be too prohibitive for any mobilisation to take place. Availability of 
some, but insufficient information, results in information asymmetry and in ‘uninformed 
opposition’ to the liberalisation process, often unjustified. The former situation is more 
characteristic of current EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation, while the latter – of WTO accession. 
In turn, the amount of information available to business actors will depend on the following 
factors: (1) how advanced the trade liberalisation negotiations are, (2) how active the 
government is in raising public (and business) awareness of the potential consequences of 
liberalisation (or indeed how willing it is to do so) and (3) how capable business actors 
themselves are of taking action and gaining information, when it’s not readily available or 
difficult to interpret. The latter point depends upon financial and organisational capacities of 
enterprises themselves. If business associations are active and efficient in the country, 
individual businesses can gain information through this channel. In the absence of effective 
collective means, individual approach becomes the preferred option. The larger the company, 
the more capable it will be to meet the costs of a proactive action in this respect.  
Thus, with regard to WTO, there is evidence available that unawareness and lack of 
understanding of the process has been a major stumbling factor in adopting the necessary 
WTO-compliant legislation. As the government started a more active information awareness 
campaign, conducting seminars, roundtables and public awareness workshops in the capital of 
Ukraine and in the regions, and progressed in this process, the opposition has ceased.105 Better 
understanding of the process is said to be the main reason for the break-through in passing of 
the WTO-compliant legislation.  
With regard to the EU, as far as institutionalised trade liberalisation process is concerned, 
information asymmetry is even greater. First of all, public discussions and round tables on this 
matter rarely address or involve business representatives, mainly held between civil society 
                                                          
105 Interview with an anonymous interviewee, former member of WTO negotiating team of the Ukrainian 
Ministry of Economy.  
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and government representatives. Secondly, lack of concrete legislative proposals also gives 
little ground for business actors to act upon. If one looks at the ongoing trade relations, 
information asymmetry is less of a problem – policy issues are decided on a sector-by-sector 
basis, the consequences of a particular policy proposal by the EU can be directly assessed by 
business actors and, most often when losses are involved, the response or mobilisation is 
likely to follow. 
The key to information asymmetry, however, comes from the top – the government lacks both 
a strategy of foreign economic relations in general, and a clear strategy on EU integration in 
particular.106 It also lacks a vision on how to develop a formal framework for business-
government relations. Unpredictability of investment and trade regime are viewed as seriously 
detrimental to the country’s competitiveness by both domestic and foreign business actors. 
Therefore only better strategic planning by the government can help to consolidate the efforts 
of civil society and individual efforts of business actors.  
7.4.2. Economic factors 
As a reminder – economic theories on business mobilisation on trade matters depart from 
factor specificity. The neoclassic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model based on mobile factors 
of production predicts higher adjustability of businesses that are worse off from trade 
liberalisation, while Ricardo-Viner model predicts higher mobilisation for or against trade 
liberalisation due to lower factor mobility. Strategic trade policy argument (based on the IRS 
model, the main model of new trade theory) takes the debate a step further and focuses on 
industries with increasing returns to scale. What can be said about Ukrainian business and 
theoretical predictions? 
Firstly, there are views in the literature arguing that such a dichotomous classification is not 
only very difficult to provide measures for, but is also erroneous as all factors are relatively 
mobile, not either mobile or specific (Kingstone, 2001: 990). Alt and Gilligan (1994) 
themselves admit that “whenever an industry can receive protection at a lower cost in terms of 
lobbying than the cost of switching industries, factors are not more mobile in the long-run 
than in the short-run”. Considering the nature of Ukrainian politics, where lobbying and 
informal networks are embedded in policy-making process, and where poor business climate 
                                                          
106 Interview with the representative of the Ministry of Economy, Department for EU integration. Kyiv, 
September 2007. 
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complicates factor mobility, it can be presumed that the costs of lobbying will often be lower 
in Ukraine than the costs of switching assets between industries, unless business has other 
incentives to switch. Therefore a Ricardo-Viner type behaviour can be expected, with pro-
trade versus anti-trade coalitions. Pro-trade coalitions are, however, subject to further 
reservations – first of all, as was noted earlier, the perspective of bearing losses, even if 
uncertain, can be treated by businesses as more conducive to mobilisation than the perspective 
of obtaining uncertain gains; secondly, the costs of mobilising can exceed potential gains. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, import-competing industries seem to be more likely to mobilise 
than export-oriented ones. Here, however, size enters the story. The costs of mobilisation in 
Ukraine are highest for small businesses and lowest for large oligarchic holding companies, 
with large-to-medium companies falling in between. More about this will be said in section 
7.5. 
Large vertically integrated industrial groups, concentrated mainly in metallurgy and related 
industries (energy production, heavy machinery, transport parts and equipment), are 
traditionally export-oriented. And they have the financial and political means to overcome the 
costs of mobilisation even when expecting gains, rather than losses, from liberalisation. Their 
factor mobility is potentially higher than that of smaller businesses, but it is also questionable. 
One the one hand, they can diversify their portfolio within the group, as they do – by 
investing in services, in particular in finance, telecommunications and the media. On the other 
hand, the vertically integrated metallurgical component (with coal/coke and energy 
production included in the chain) requires very high capital investments that once made are 
hard to recover. Moreover so, since in the existing conditions their assets are likely to be 
significantly undervalued. And this part of their business is by far the biggest in terms of 
investments. Therefore, the third economic model – increasing returns to scale, which 
predicts bigger companies to be more competitive internationally and more pro-free-trade – is 
more of use here. Using the example of Chile, Silva (1996) also argues that conglomerates 
can more easily switch assets between industries and thus more easily adapt to import 
competition, making overall pro-liberalisation stance a more likely outcome in countries 
where conglomerates are powerful. Therefore, pro-trade lobbying seems to be a logically 
expected behaviour for Ukrainian FIGs, both due to their size and the sector that they belong 
to.  
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Indeed, recently the groups whose interests are diversified (e.g. Kolomoyskiy’s ‘PrivatBank’ 
group, Kostyantyn Zhevago’s ‘Finansy i kredit’) tended to support the then president Victor 
Yushchenko and the Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, who actively promote EU, and Euro-
Atlantic integration more generally. They are more active and flexible in the way they run 
their businesses – Ihor Kolomoyskiy has recently sold all his metallurgical assets to Russian 
EvrazGroup, while Kostyantyn Zhevago, the youngest of the oligarchs (he is in his early 30s), 
was the first one to list his iron ore company Ferrexpo on the London Stock Exchange. 
Perhaps this is why they stand for more rapid economic reforms and liberalisation of the 
economy, although they do not openly state their position on EU integration.107 Businessmen 
supporting the ex-Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich, apart from Rinat Akhmetov, have less 
diversified holdings. For example, quite a powerful figure in the Party of Regions, Andrei 
Klyuev, has a relatively small holding ‘Ukrpidshipnik’ (his total assets are estimated at 
US$144m), operating in machine building, metallurgy, energy and insurance services, and his 
factor mobility can be considered as rather low, as he built his wealth from scratch and would 
not easily exit from the existing business. And although he is a major exporter (of roller 
bearings) to the EU, he has been a keen supporter of stronger links with CIS countries and 
within Single Economic Space.108 Dmitriy Firtash, another businessman supported by the 
Party of Regions and one of the richest people in Ukraine, built his wealth around gas trade; 
owns part of an opaque intermediary between Russia and Ukraine RosUkrEnergo, as well as 
the reseller on the domestic Ukrainian market UkrGazEnergo. Clearly his factor specificity is 
rather high, and status quo or closer ties with Russia would clearly be a preferred option.  
Rinat Akhmetov, also a deputy on the Party of Regions list, is the owner of the biggest 
vertically integrated metallurgical group in Ukraine, and has been diversifying his assets 
increasingly in the past 5 years – into telecommunications, media, real estate and financial 
services. Along with this he has set on an internationalisation path, as will be described 
below, and is showing all signs of pro-liberalisation behaviour.  
                                                          
107 According to the political analyst Andrei Ermolaev. Olearchyk Roman and Stefan Wagstyl (2007) “Oligarchs 
loom over Ukraine polls”. Financial Times, 20 September 2007.  
108 Ukrayinska Pravda, 14 April 2006. “Andrei Klyuev: Shtab Yanukovicha v Muzeynom pereulke byl 
prodoljeniem “Zoryanogo”” http://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2006/4/14/40966.htm , accessed in May 2008.    
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The next question is then – if large financial-industrial groups are more likely to be pro-free-
trade, whilst medium and small business that are likely to lose out from greater openness 
more protectionist – what policy equilibrium could be expected with regard to particular trade 
liberalisation initiatives? This will depend first of all on the distribution of potential ‘winners 
and losers’ in the economy as a result of liberalisation; secondly, on the costs of organising 
and pushing through the preferred policy; and, thirdly, on structural and dynamic factors. 
Earlier WTO accession experience will also allow seeing whether our hypotheses on the size 
of businesses and trade theoretical behaviour are true or not. Next section therefore looks at 
the potential losers and winners.  
7.4.3. Potential losers and winners of trade liberalisation 
In the process of accession to WTO the average weighted applied tariff rates were reduced 
from 19.7 percent to 10.07 percent on agricultural products, and from 8.3 to 4.77 percent on 
industrial goods, bringing the overall average to 5.09 percent (US Trade Representative, 
2006). DCFTA with the EU will involve limited further reduction of the average tariff, but 
extensive reduction of tariffs on some sensitive agricultural products and liberalisation of 
services. 
Based on these assumptions, several quantitative assessments have been made using a 
computable general equilibrium model as to the potential sectoral gains or losses. Table 28 
summarises their results, under the most likely scenario of a limited FTA with substantial 
agricultural tariffs retained, but with services liberalised (which are, however, not listed, as 
the effect on sectors other than financial and legal services is small).109  
Although different assumptions and models make the results contradicting at times, all three 
models conclude that agriculture (especially sugar and other processed food, which in 
particular concerns milk and meat) and minerals (especially coal-mining), producers of 
transport equipment, as well as financial services, are the losers from liberalisation.110 
Usually the losers are those sectors/industries that currently benefit from substantial 
protection – either in the form of subsidies, tax concessions or border protection. 
                                                          
109 This is a scenario similarly approached by CASE and IER. CEPS considered deep and shallow trade 
liberalisation scenarios, with the former reported here, which may affect the outcomes. It should be borne in 
mind, however, that conditions of an FTA are far from clear to both parties at this stage – it may also result in 
substantial liberalisation of agricultural trade.   
110 Estimation made by CEPS used a high level of aggregation (into 6 industries), and therefore they are more 
difficult to compare with the other two. 
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Table 28. Gains and losses from WTO accession and EU-UA FTA 
Sector CASE IER CEPS 
 WTO WTO+ 
FTAa 
WTO WTO+ 
FTAb 
FTA 
Agriculture, fisheries, forestry - - - +/- - Agriculture 
Coal, oil, gas - - +/- + - Minerals 
Minerals nec - - + + 
Bovine animals + + - - + Food processing 
Vegetable oils and fats + + 
Dairy products + + 
Processed rice, sugar - - 
Food products, nes + + 
Beverages and tobacco - - 
Textiles and apparel + + - + + Textiles 
Wood products, paper products - + - - + Light 
manufacturing 
Petroleum, coal products + + + + - Minerals 
Chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
+ + + + + Light 
manufacturing 
Mineral products, nes + - - - + 
Metals and metal products + + + + + Metals 
Motor vehicles and parts + + -c - + Heavy 
manufacturing Transport equipment - - 
Electronic equipment, M&E + + + Light/heavy 
manufacturing Manufactures nes + + + - 
Financial services, insurance 
(other services omitted) 
- - + + - Services 
a Limited FTA (with high agricultural tariffs), including services liberalisation 
b WTO and FTA - including services liberalisation 
c IER aggregates the effect for all three industries – Motor vehicles and parts, transport equipment and 
Electronic equipment, M&E. Since the highest level of protection is received by Transport equipment, 
and it accounts for about 40 percent of these three industries, the negative effect dominates in this 
aggregation (e-mail correspondence with the author). 
Source: author’s compilation based on CASE (2007), IER (2006a), CEPS (2006). 
Certain agricultural sectors, such as meat and milk producers, will have to increase prices, 
because the majority of their initial suppliers are small private farms, which are exempt from 
VAT, but will be subject to VAT upon accession. Coal-mining industry received substantial 
subsidies and de facto prices are dampened, which is also not economically efficient since 
coal prices should be allowed to move in parallel with metal prices, which would make this 
industry profitable. Transport-equipment and financial services currently benefit from high 
protection from external competition. 
The biggest winners are going to be textiles and apparel industry, electronics and equipment, 
as well as metallurgy. Although the effects for metallurgy are divided – on balance, despite 
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losing protection (such as restrictions on export of scrap metals and subsidised coal-mining), 
producers of pipes and products exported to WTO members are gaining, while those not 
oriented at such market are losing out. On average, however, the industry is expected to be a 
winner from liberalisation. Overall, automobile sector is expected to benefit from 
liberalisation, mostly because of the expected relocation of some blocs of the European car 
manufacturing supply chains, but it is clear that national producers will not resist the 
competition of opening up.  
An important assumption in the above CGE models – full mobility of factors of production – 
i.e. falling output in any of the sectors results in increased output in some other sector, as 
labour and capital can freely move between sectors of the economy. In terms of predictions 
described above, this would reduce the potential losses for sectors that are worse off and thus 
reduce their incentives to mobilise against liberalisation. However, as has already emerged 
from the discussion above, this may be an unrealistic assumption. Therefore, by simple 
accounts, sectors that are likely to lose from EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation – which are 
agriculture and food processing, minerals, transport equipment and financial services – should 
have high incentives to mobilise and lobby against such liberalisation; sectors benefiting from 
liberalisation – textiles and apparel, metallurgy and electronics and equipment – should have 
incentives to mobilise in favour of liberalisation. As mentioned above, the outcome will 
further be determined by costs of organising and the nature of existing institutions.  
From CGE estimations above one can see that in most cases the direction of the effect is the 
same for both WTO accession and FTA with the EU. Therefore from the past experience with 
WTO accession the strategies undertaken by business actors can be traced and their attitudes 
to the EU integration can be projected.  
A wider issue, however, is the fact the real winners of trade liberalisation are the industries 
and firms that do not exist yet – such as those that may emerge as a result of deeper 
involvement of Ukraine in global production chains. New businesses, producing a wider 
range of products (or providing distribution services, as part of forward linkages) and bringing 
about a rise in average factor productivity, are probably the main winners of the future trade 
liberalisation. And here no lobbying or business mobilisation can be expected, and change 
should be facilitated by the policy measures.  
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7.4.4. Economic factors and mobilisation with regard to WTO accession 
In the process of WTO accession four sectors voiced their position most actively – 
agriculture, automobile industry, metallurgy and financial services. Some examples of interest 
group politics are given below.  
Losers 
Automobile sector, although not estimated to lose from trade liberalisation on average, is 
bound to see national producers and suppliers worse off in the face of freer access to foreign 
investors. It has been a clear example of interest group politics, traditionally having had 
strong lobbyists in the Parliament.111  Individual enterprises (in particular the main car 
manufacturer ZAZ) received exemption from customs duties, reduced tax rates, some of 
which contradicted with WTO and PCA requirements. However, most contradicting 
privileges were removed in 2005. Domestic production of cars is not competitive 
internationally, as there has been little foreign investment. The only foreign investor with the 
full production cycle, Daewoo, which had invested in ZAZ, went bankrupt in 2000. Therefore 
the sector will not resist competition from budget Central European, Russian and Chinese cars 
(CEPS, 2006). Automobile lobby against WTO in the Parliament was mainly represented by 
the head of an organisation holding 12 percent of the Ukrainian automotive market.112 
Allegedly, he has been leading automobile lobby because he is the only lobbyist whose 
interests are solely concentrated in the automobile industry – and this confirms the 
proposition of highly specific factor owners being more likely to mobilise. 
On the other hand, another example confirms the importance of information asymmetry – 
already after Ukraine joined the WTO, automobile, alcohol, confectionery and meat producers 
joined forces in a deed of remarkable collective action trying to maintain import tariffs until 
end-2008 – supported by 367 votes in the Parliament, but eventually vetoed by the President.  
Winners 
In terms of the domestic effect, metallurgy is one of the biggest losers due to the high level of 
protection prior to accession – currently restrictions on export of scrap metal, but until 2002 
substantial subsidies were received as well. On the one hand, since metallurgy is an export-
                                                          
111 Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) note the same about Russian automobile sector. 
112 Dmytro Svyatash, AIS corporation, distributing most Russian brands in Ukraine, some European, and 
controlling the Kremenchug car assembly plant. www.news.finance.ua 
 174 
 
driven sector, the positive effects from the removal of export barriers – quantitative quotas on 
export of steel, as well as easier handling of anti-dumping (AD) investigations – are expected 
to offset the negative ones. Originally, the bulk of AD investigations were introduced in 
reaction to significant state support granted to metallurgy in 1999 within the experiment in 
metallurgy and mining sector. Although the experiment was subsequently abolished in 2003, 
the restrictions on exports of raw materials (scrap) remained as the last and significant 
protectionist measure. Therefore AD investigations are expected to ease once these 
restrictions are eliminated. There were estimations that on balance the industry would gain 
around US$200 million from elimination of AD measures, whilst the budget would save 
US$580 million from abolition of subsidies, with the overall positive effect for the economy 
in the range of 1 percent of GDP (Eremenko and Lisenkova, 2005). However, despite these 
potential benefits, in 2005 metallurgy was still blocking the law on dropping the ban on 
export of scrap metal. In 2006, when it became clear that there was no hope to receive 
concessions on this, they gave way to the new law, still keeping export duties on scrap metals. 
This again became a turning point with the EU already in late 2007, when the EU was 
insisting on complete elimination of export duties. Such position is partly explained by the 
fact that most of Ukrainian steel is exported to Asia, not to the OECD countries, and therefore 
losses from losing cheap inputs were perceived as being higher than gains from additional 
exports to relatively small markets of the EU and the US.  
A number of structural and dynamic factors have contributed to a shift towards pro-
liberalisation stance, in particular the need to upgrade obsolete capital, to capitalise assets and 
protect them from unstable political regime and other factors. They will be described in more 
detail below, as they relate equally to EU integration. By and large, although it is difficult to 
call Ukrainian industrial lobby strategic in the original Milner’s sense – i.e. being pro-
liberalisation – clearly large businesses have been positioning themselves as pro-free-trade, 
but tried to give up as little as possible of already existing protection, leading an ambiguous 
dual game.  
Why did other sectors not mobilise to support WTO accession? One of the reasons refers back 
to the Dur’s (2007) argument that business is much more likely to mobilise in the face of 
losses than in the hope of benefits. Secondly, mobilisation can only realistically be expected 
in response to concrete legislative proposals being laid on the table. There were no legislative 
changes targeting specifically electronics and equipment. Electronics and equipment are 
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expected to benefit from investment into middle and high-technology production, like TV 
transmission, computer assembly, etc. and is as already showing signs of growth.  No 
evidence was available as to WTO-related lobbying. The reasons were probably lack of much 
legislative impact to react to, dispersed nature of the industry, plus incomplete information as 
to potential stakes and difficulty of predicting positive outcomes. 
Textiles and apparel is also a dispersed sector, composed of many small and micro-producers, 
i.e. has inherently high collective action costs, and in Ukraine it is not very well organised.   
Incomplete and asymmetrical information is a crucial factor – businesses are hardly aware of 
the expected effect of trade liberalisation. The then speaker of the Parliament, Litvin, was 
quoted as saying: “The Laws required for the WTO accession are not getting passed by the 
Parliament because the government is not giving us a clear economically grounded cost and 
benefit analysis for the economy from passing this legislation” (UNIAN, October 2005).  At 
the same time, in-house assessments entail substantial costs, and only a few enterprises could 
afford to do so and have undertaken such studies. According to the former Ministry of 
Economy official from the WTO accession department, there were requests from several 
enterprises to the ministry to conduct individual assessments of the consequences of WTO 
accession. These were primarily large, but not oligarchic enterprises – such as exporters of 
machinery and importers of metals. This fact confirms that oligarchic businesses have an in-
house administrative and financial capacity to evaluate the stakes from trade liberalisation for 
them, while large enterprises could request such an evaluation either from the respective 
ministerial department or from external consultancies. Smaller businesses seemingly had none 
of these opportunities, or did not perceive taking such action as necessary. A typical free-rider 
argument – “this is beyond our control” could also play a role, and relates to the costs of 
collective action described in more detail below.  
To summarise, to what extent are trade theoretical predictions useful in explaining Ukraine’s 
WTO-related trade liberalisation experience? On the whole, none of the theories on its own 
explains the degree of business mobilisation in Ukraine. Looking at enterprises of different 
size, however, a correlation emerges with certain theories – medium-to-large enterprises are 
more likely to take anti-liberalisation position, according to neoclassical predictions of 
Ricardo-Viner model, while large export-oriented oligarchic enterprises can act strategically, 
trying to achieve both liberalisation for their exports and preserve whenever possible existing 
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protection. They thus behave in a way similar to that of multinationals, whose ‘strategic trade 
policy’ lobbying was related to the increasing returns to scale model. Small and medium 
enterprises in theory would also be expected to behave according to neoclassical predictions, 
but their degree of mobilisation is very much determined by political institutions in place in 
Ukraine, which will be discussed below in section 7.5.  
7.4.5. Economic factors and mobilisation with regard to the EU-Ukraine trade 
Here a clear distinction needs to be made between the ongoing trade relations and perspective 
trade liberalisation on the basis of a free trade agreement. The lobbying strategy is much 
simpler with ongoing trade policy-making. Lobbying arises in response to concrete trade-
related measures, which tend to be addressed at a particular sector. Assessment of economic 
losses or gains in case of anti-dumping measures or bans on particular products is usually 
straightforward. The sector affected by such measure, provided it has necessary organisational 
and institutional capacity, will respond by lobbying either its own government, or government 
bodies in the partner country, or other economic agents that can have an influence on the 
government that imposed a particular trade measure. A typical example of such lobbying 
process is export of Ukrainian steel products.  
Interpipe, belonging to Kuchma’s son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk, is the main and quite aggressive 
lobbying force in Ukraine when it comes to quotas on steel, set both by the EU and Russia. It 
is doing a bulk of lobbying in the process of signing of an annual agreement on steel quotas 
with the EU, as well as in the antidumping investigations. On one occasion, in response to the 
antidumping investigation initiated by the EU in 2005 on Ukrainian steel pipes (which 
Interpipe considered to be unfair to Ukraine, as different evaluation methods were applied to 
Ukraine on the one hand, and to Russia and Romania on another), it collected all necessary 
evidence to initiate a retaliatory anti-discriminatory investigation against the EU and the 
Ministry of Economy was close to starting this investigation. Although the process was halted 
by the Ministry of Foreign affairs, reportedly the reaction of European Commission was very 
negative to such methods.113  
Andrey Klyuev, the owner of the corporation ‘Ukrpidshipnik’ (Ukrainian roller bearings) also 
initiated a wide lobbying campaign when Austrian authorities favoured a local buyer in the 
                                                          
113 Interviews with an anonymous representative of Interpipe and a representative of EU-Ukraine Business 
Council, July and October 2007 respectively.  
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sale of the bank Burgenland, although the Ukrainian consortium offered a higher price. As a 
result of a formal complaint to the EU Competition directorate general and extensive lobbying 
activities (including though the EU-Ukraine Business council) they won a case and the sale 
was declared discriminatory, and the Austrian buyer has to pay a higher price. Currently the 
consortium even plans to claim compensation for moral damage.  
Therefore with regard to ongoing trade relations information asymmetry is minimal. In 
general there is a link between the size of the business and the level of the targeted policy-
makers can be described as follows: 
§ Largest business actors have the capacity to target the government and/or legislators, 
both domestic and foreign, as well as foreign business associations, and hire 
international public relations consultancies;  
§ Non-oligarchic large businesses have fewer resources to approach foreign 
governments and hire international consultants, but will still have some access to the 
domestic government. They may also have relatively less access to legislators and act 
through line ministries and trade associations (e.g. the Union of Chemists with anti-
dumping investigations, but they will represent first of all the interests of enterprises 
that do not belong to oligarchic structures). Such businesses are also likely to approach 
Ukrainian diplomatic mission in the EU, as they either cannot afford or do not 
appreciate the benefits of external lobby agencies.  
§ Small enterprises struggle with centralised collective representation of their interests 
in Ukraine, as will be described below, but may use services of the regional Chambers 
of Commerce. 
The forthcoming trade liberalisation is a territory of high information uncertainty, where 
the stakes are more difficult to identify. Despite some quantitative assessments already 
available to decision-makers, the degree to which such studies are taken into consideration by 
business managers is very low. First of all, because of the fundamentally low level of 
interaction between the business community and academia in Ukraine. Secondly, because of 
general scepticism towards quantitative models among non-economists, businessmen and 
policy makers alike (as the author could observe at the CASE study presentation in the 
European Delegation in Ukraine). Therefore, on the benefits side of our approach – the 
potential economic gains and losses are far from clear to business actors, and in Leblond’s 
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words, in the absence of any legislative proposals the prospects of integration have been too 
‘foggy’ for a visible mobilisation of interests to take place.  
Therefore, only the increasing returns to scale model applies, where actors capable of 
behaving strategically, whose stakes from liberalisation are large enough, can try to overcome 
the barriers of incomplete information and even to influence the informational space. 
Ukrainian financial-industrial groups could and did undertake such strategy, due to both 
economies of scale effects and institutional factors, but a number of additional external and 
internal structural economic factors have served as a ‘push’ factor for this mobilisation. They 
affected the support for both WTO accession and the EU integration.  
7.4.6. Structural economic factors as a ‘push’ factor for mobilisation 
Financial-industrial groups in Ukraine operate mainly in the mining and metallurgy sector, 
including energy generation and machine building. Oligarchs also control important assets in 
services, in particular financial services, sports, media, telecommunications, as well as in 
chemicals and food industry. Diversification into services, however, has taken place recently 
and metallurgy is still the main sector for most FIGs. Therefore structural trends in this sector 
are of great importance to the behaviour of influential business actors.  
Global steel market. Mining and metallurgy accounts for 25 percent of Ukrainian industrial 
output and for over 30 percent of total exports. Steel is the most important metal resource. 
Therefore the main structural change that affected the state of Ukrainian economy in general 
was growth of world steel prices – by 50 percent from 2003 to 2006.114 This contributed both 
to macro-economic growth – the sector accounted for 20 percent of economic growth in 2004, 
and to growth at a micro- or enterprise-level. Thus, assets of System Capital Management, the 
biggest FIG in Ukraine specialising on production of steel, have more than doubled between 
2004 and 2006 – from US$5.2bn to US$11.4bn.115  
 To demonstrate the role of oligarchs in the mining and metallurgy sector the table below 
compares production volumes of individual FIGs with the total output of respective products 
in the country. SCM’s Metinvest accounts for a quarter of total production of crude steel and 
almost a third of rolled products. Interpipe produces almost half of all pipes, while IUD and 
                                                          
114 CRUspi Global Steel Index 
http://cruonline.crugroup.com/SteelandFerroalloys/CRUSteelPrices/CRUSteelPriceIndexCRUspi/tabid/143/Defa
ult.aspx , retrieved in May 2008.  
115 www.scm.com.ua  
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Metinvest share production of another half. Not all groups have their own resource capacity – 
IUD, Interpipe (which is anyway primarily a pipe producer), as well as Zaporozhstal and 
Mariupol Metallurgical Plant ‘Ilyich’ do not have iron ore production capacities. This also 
crucially affects their development strategies.  
Table 29. Metallurgy output by major enterprises, 2006, mln tonnes 
 Iron orea Cast iron Crude steel Rolled steel Pipes, Mt 
Metinvest 26  10.8  11  0.6  
IUD -  6.2  5.8 0.78 
Interpipe -    1.2 
Privat   1.25  1.1  
Total in Ukraine116 77.4 35.6 42.8 36.2 2.6 
a Iron ore production by FIGs: SCM Metinvest – 36.1%, Novinskiy’s Smart Group 33.5%, Kostyantyn 
Zhevago’s Ferrexpo – 12.5%, Mittal Arcelor Kryvyi Rih – 10%, Privat – 7.5%. 
Source: corporate web-sites, media reports. 
Such individual power and growth potential make internationalisation the only viable long-
term strategy for FIGs. And it is arguably the main driving force behind oligarchs’ 
mobilisation in favour of WTO accession and EU integration. This is rather a ‘pull factor’, 
while situation within the industry – urgent need to finance modernisation, to access 
additional extractive and metal processing capacities abroad, as well as to access restricted 
export markets – were strong ‘push factors’.  
Vertical integration. The structure of the industry has been undergoing a major change since 
late 1990s early 2000s. Oligarchs as a class are said to emerge only in 1998-1999, before then 
they had been accumulating capital mainly by commercial activities (trade in gas and metals). 
Having gained sufficient level of capital, they started to invest in productive capacities. The 
early stage of this process was characterised by high degree of interdependence and cross-
ownership between individual businessmen (e.g. Privat group and SCM sharing ownership of 
“Ukrrudprom” iron ore mine; SCM and IUD – “Azovstal’” plant, Khartsyz Pipe Plant, 
“Azovmash”), Grygorishin and Medvedchuk – “Dneprospetsstal”) and high fragmentation.117 
As of early 2000s oligarchs embarked on a path of steady consolidation and vertical 
integration of their assets.  
                                                          
116 Interfax Ukraine quoting Ministry of Industrial Policy. www.economica.com.ua/metal/news/111063.html . 
Accessed in February 2008.  
117 Expert Online (2004). “Deti gaza i stali”. http://www.expert.ru/printissues/ukraine/2004/01/01uk-fpg/ . 
Accessed in February 2008.  
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A link is being made in the literature between the quality of the rule of law in Ukraine and 
vertical integration – Aslund (2006) argues that vertical integration and establishment of 
control of complete production chains was the most convenient strategy in the conditions of 
high uncertainty of property rights. Puglisi (2007) questions the exogeneity of the rule of law 
to oligarchs, blaming oligarchy itself for the stagnation in the legal environment, as it allowed 
them to continue unobstructed redistribution or ‘grabbing’ of assets. The truth is probably 
somewhere in between, as oligarchs could block certain legislation, but not all the package of 
reforms. Indeed, the Company Act has been repeatedly submitted to the Parliament, but never 
passed. And this is clearly beneficial to those participating in redistribution of assets, as 
regulatory uncertainty facilitates privileged access to tenders, potentially depresses the value 
of assets, and makes reversal of acquisitions and privatisations more complicated. In fact, this 
connection is arguably of secondary concern altogether – vertical integration is known to be a 
preferred model of industrial organisation in the worldwide business practice due to its cost 
minimising benefit. Multinationals are opting for cross-border integration due to lower 
overseas labour or other input costs. Vertical integration in Ukraine was initially domestic due 
to availability of all necessary components – raw material extraction, coke, energy generation 
and cast iron and steel smelting capacities, labour, and possible due to domestically oriented 
privatisation process. Poor competition policy, characteristic for all transition economies, was 
also a facilitating factor. Once allowed, consolidation and further vertical expansion of FIGs 
has ever since been a path dependency rather than anything else.  
Need for reconstruction and modernisation. Traditionally oriented at Soviet markets, the 
commodity composition of Ukrainian steel industry differed from the world market demand 
structure, with high share of low value-added and semi-finished products. The subsequent 
introduction of restrictive quotas by the EU and USA lead to further increase in the share of 
such products, as they were less subject to restrictions. At the same time the productive assets 
are obsolete (43 percent of steel is produced in open-hearth furnaces) and require urgent 
modernisation (InfoMine Research Group, 2007).118 The sector reached a crisis in late 1990s 
and the government attempted to reanimate it by conducting a large-scale subsidisation 
experiment between 1999 and 2002. In line with a rebound in global steel prices as of second 
half of 2002, this experiment significantly helped the industry to revive. It coincided with the 
                                                          
118 INFOMINE Research Group (2007) “Steel and rolled steel in Ukraine - 2007”. http://www.the-
infoshop.com/study/info55288-rolled-steel.html . Accessed in March 2008.  
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consolidation of the sector in the hands of large businessmen, which is also believed to have 
contributed to increase in efficiency and partial modernisation.119 However at the end of 2006 
depreciation of the operating facilities still exceeded 60 percent, with blast and open-hearth 
furnaces almost 90 percent depreciated (InfoMine Research Group, 2007).  
Modernisation has already started - between 2001 and 2006 some US$3.6bn were invested in 
metallurgy, mainly in modernisation of existing crude steel production capacities, allowing to 
sustain the existing volume of output or increase it, at the same time reducing the costs. 
Individual enterprises’ modernisation plans, foreseeing installation of converter-type furnaces, 
include projects worth around US$1-2bn each.120 These changes concern mainly basic steel 
smelting processes. The equipment for the production of finished and semi-finished products 
remains largely obsolete, but is covered by the aforementioned medium-term plans. Producers 
realise that diversified production will render higher shareholder returns than specialisation in 
semi-finished products. But the shift towards higher value-added products is rather on a long-
term agenda, as it requires a much more extensive development package, including further 
debt financing or equity issue, cross-border mergers and acquisitions and so on. 
Until recently capital investments had been made from retained earnings, as foreign banks had 
not engaged in more than lending for working capital, while best local banks could not afford 
to lend more than US$100 million.121 As of 2004-2005 the FIGs started to secure access to 
larger credits. Industrial Union of Donbass, for example, in 2006-2007 attracted about 
US$750 million in credits, including from EBRD and IFC, and issued bonds for US$150 
million, while SCM agreed a US$545 million credit from BNP Paribas (with total foreign 
credit liabilities reaching about US$800 million).  
Internationalisation. It is normal to expect export-oriented enterprises, which belong to the 
8th biggest steel and 5th iron ore production industries in the world, to pursue some cross-
border investment activity. Outward investment is the next stage in internationalisation 
                                                          
119 By buying out the debts of enterprises, optimising sales processes, eliminating unnecessary intermediaries, 
establishing new contacts with local and foreign traders.  
120 The following investment plans are in progress: Mariupol Metallurgical Plant – US$0.5 billion, belongs to the 
only ‘red director’ who managed to retain ownership after initial privatisation – Vladimir Boyko; System Capital 
Management (Rinat Akhmetov) - US$4 billion in mining and metallurgy capacities in the coming 5 years; 
Industrial Union of Donbass - US$3.3 billion in 5 years; ArcelorMittal Krivoi Rog – US$ 2 billion. Ukrrudprom. 
12 March 2007. “Stalnye mashiny”. http://ukrrudprom.com/digest/dstaln120307.html  , accessed in February 
2008.  
121 Expert-Ukraina, No. 8(13), 7 March 2005. “Tretii stsenariy dlya Ukrainskoi stali” 
http://www.expert.ru/printissues/ukraine/2005/08/08uk-8-meta/ , accessed in February 2008.  
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process after exporting, and requires a certain degree of success in operations, which 
Ukrainian FIGs have been demonstrating recently. It is being done both upstream – getting 
access to additional inputs or processing capacities, and downstream – to ensure access to 
export markets. If additional productive capacities are located in export markets, the two can 
be combined.  
Most of the investments by Ukrainian oligarchs have been made with the purpose of getting 
access to the European export markets, which are protected by restrictive steel quotas. It was 
partially a response to the EU enlargement, which restricted access to markets of the new EU 
members, and partially due to restrained exports to Russia and the need to further diversify 
exports geographically. IUD’s acquisition of bankrupt Polish and Hungarian steel mills (Huta 
Czestochowa and Dunaferr respectively), as well as of Gdansk shipyard is a case in hand. 
This also provides IUD with upstream benefits – diversification of the product range and 
additional processing capacities. SCM’s purchase of Ferriera Valsider and Trametal steel 
mills in Italy, as well as Spartan in the UK is a similar case, but differs in that plants in Italy 
and the UK are more modern than those in Hungary and Poland, and thus allow increasing the 
value-added content in overall output. SCM admits that investments in Italy and the UK 
“perfectly fit with the long-term strategy of producing more value-added products and 
improving the company’s industrial balance”.122 Kostyantyn Zhevago, the founder of the 
‘Finansy and Kredit’ group is looking to obtain control of a Bulgarian steel mill.123  
On the back of the global consolidation of steel assets (Mittal vs. Arcelor, BHP Billiton bid 
for Rio Tinto), Ukrainian producers have followed suit initiating mergers with Russian 
counterparts, with access to iron ore resources being the main driver behind these initiatives. 
IUD negotiations on a merger with Metalloinvest, the results of which are not yet known 
however, would solve IUD’s problem of lack of natural resource base. SCM’s Metinvest 
merger with Smart Group, whose assets are based in Ukraine, but owned by a Russian 
businessman, further consolidated iron ore production in the hands of SCM (70 percent of all 
production in Ukraine), and gave Akhmetov access to cooperation with a major Russian 
metallurgical company EvrazGroup, whose main shareholder is Roman Abramovich. In turn, 
                                                          
122 Metinvest Press Release, 12 November 2007 “Metinvest signs agreement to buy Trametal and Spartan UK”. 
http://www.metinvestholding.com/en/press-centre/news/2007/11/9 . Accessed in March 2008.  
123 “Finansy i Kredit” is a name of a bank, not of a FIG, but is unofficially used to refer to the assets belonging to 
Kostyantyn Zhevago, which also include metallurgy, iron ore production and machine building. 
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Evraz Group has bought metallurgical assets of Privat, which also holds significant control of 
iron ore enrichment.  
Growth potential, the desire to be internationally recognised and the need to raise capital have 
prompted FIGs to consider undertaking initial public offerings (IPOs) on international stock 
exchanges. Kostyantyn Zhevago’s Ferrexpo was the first one to list on the main London 
Stock Exchange market, and the value of its shares has grown 144 percent since listing in 
mid-2007. 124 Industrial Union of Donbass, Interpipe, SCM and its Metinvest holding have all 
announced plans for IPOs as well. 
Both debt and equity issue, and international recognition in general, require substantial 
restructuring effort – corporate as well as image restructuring, or, as Puglisi (2008) calls it – 
‘social legitimisation’. All the biggest groups (SCM, IUD, Interpipe) have launched a major 
overhaul of their corporate and management structures, aiming to make them simpler and 
more transparent, streamlining individual enterprises in larger holdings; introduced financial 
reporting compliant with international accounting standards, as well as external auditing; 
attracted foreign managers; launched extensive social corporate responsibility campaigns. The 
boards of directors have an option of having external directors, but to the best of the author’s 
knowledge so far this option has not been used.  
Image restructuring involves a whole range of measures, from direct engagement of 
international PR agencies (SCM – Burson-Marsteller, Interpipe - Hill and Knowlton), through 
media statements and campaigns to philanthropic and social corporate responsibility 
activities.  
Thus, while economic factors were defining the costs and benefits of mobilisation, the so-
called ‘why mobilise?’ question posed in our conceptual framework (see Table 27), the next 
question is ‘how to mobilise?’, which is determined by institutions and collective action costs 
imminent in the system.  
                                                          
124 “Ferrexpo beats expectations and plans fourfold production increase”. 
http://www.investegate.co.uk/invarticle.aspx?id=4525  . Accessed in March 2008.  
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7.5. Trade policy and lobbying in Ukraine: Collective action costs and 
political institutions  
As has been mentioned above, the mode of intervention that business actors will choose to 
influence trade policy-making will depend on the following factors: the nature of the policy 
question (how many industries it concerns and how much it affects them), presence of 
common interests, nature of competition within the industry, the related direct or indirect 
costs of organising, as well as formal and informal institutions in which business is operating 
(which in turn shape business-government relations).  
7.5.1. Nature of the policy question and collective action costs 
The nature of the policy question is the first and foremost question. Trade liberalisation 
within Ukraine’s WTO accession negotiations implied mainly the reduction of protection by 
Ukraine, not by its partners, and proceeded on a sector-by-sector basis. Therefore, although 
not always correctly and objectively, specific industries could perceive potential stakes from 
abolition or reduction of existing protection levels. Most often such stakes were perceived as 
losses, as individual businesses rarely apprehend the dynamic effects of increased 
competition, leading to higher efficiency and quality, or positive effects of learning from 
competitors or investors.  
The free trade area with the EU entails only limited import tariff reduction on top of WTO 
commitments, going further and targeting non-tariff barriers to trade, and therefore the 
immediate negative consequences can be perceived as minimal. Although the majority of 
industries are affected and aware of the existing differences in standards and technical 
requirements (agriculture being more affected than manufacturing) and that harmonisation 
will entail substantial costs, they cannot yet make sensible estimations of the economic costs 
and benefits and decide on a necessary mode of intervention. This is due to an early stage and 
a rather general agenda of negotiations to date. 
Assuming that business actors were better informed and motivated to voice their position on 
trade liberalisation with the EU, how would the structure of competition within an industry 
affect this? Industries controlled by oligarchs, by virtue of vertical integration, are 
characterised by high degree of concentration. Therefore the Olsonian costs of collective 
action would be expected to be lower in metallurgy and mining, energy, machine building and 
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automotive industries. The same process that brought about concentration and near-oligopoly 
market structure has, however, created fierce competition between oligarchs – redistribution 
of property left some of the oligarchs lifetime enemies, making collective initiatives between 
them nearly impossible. 125 This, however, does not mean that oligarchs do not have other 
channels for promoting their interests – individually they can achieve just as much if not 
more.  
What about non-oligarch-controlled business? The degree of organisation varies – it is 
traditionally better for resource-dependent sectors – such as metallurgy, chemicals and 
agriculture, and for large enterprises that are members of the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists 
and Entrepreneurs (‘USPP’), and worse for other, non-resource-rich industries. Dispersed 
industries, such as textiles, consumer manufactures and, to a lesser degree, chemicals have 
higher barriers to organisation due to intrinsic collective action problems. Although, 
agriculture, not being a concentrated sector in terms of the number of enterprises, is a very 
strong lobby in Ukraine, and managed to form a major resistance to WTO-required reforms.  
USPP is best positioned to channel its interests to the government – it has an official 
Memorandum for cooperation with the Cabinet of Ministers, and established dialogue with 
various government agencies (Ministry of Industry, National Bank, Fiscal Administration 
etc.). Moreover, throughout its history it has had influential politicians as its presidents – 
shortly before becoming a president of Ukraine in 1994 Kuchma held this post, since 1997 it 
has been Anatoliy Kinakh, whose latest post was a Minister of Economy in the Government 
of Viktor Yanukovich. It has, however, been criticised for representing the views primarily of 
former ‘red directors’ (e.g. Kubicek, 2001). Largest businessmen, even if on the list of 
members (such as Viktor Pinchuk), do not use USPP to promote their interests, while interests 
of small and medium enterprises are not consolidated and represented well enough within this 
organisation. 
Referring back to Table 27, size of an individual business matters a lot in Ukrainian business-
government relations. The existing traditions, inherited from the Soviet times, favour direct 
lobbying, a so-called ‘survival of the fittest’ practice, which as a consequence suppresses 
collective bargaining with small and medium business. Due to these historical and 
                                                          
125 For example, the separation of assets between SCM and IUD that left the latter without any iron ore 
enrichment capacities, or the controversy over ownership of Nikopol Ferro-Alloy Plant between Viktor Pinchuk 
and Ihor Kolomoyskiy. 
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‘organisational’ reasons the next section is heavily skewed towards the largest, oligarchic, 
business, as they were the ones who, given the combination of economic costs and benefits 
and the costs of collective action, were most likely to mobilise in favour or against EU 
integration and trade liberalisation.  
7.5.2. Formal and informal institutions and business-government relations 
The role of formal and informal institutions in business-government relations in Ukraine and 
other CIS countries has been the subject of extensive literature.  
Hellman’s ‘state capture’ (1998) and Aslund’s ‘rent-seeking’ are the most quoted ways to 
describe this relationship. The former departs from the ‘partial reform’ proposition – gradual 
and incomplete reforms allowed vested interests to use reform distortions to their benefit, 
locking in the political system in this state. These captors are respectively not interested in 
furthering the reforms, preferring the status quo. The latter, ‘rent-seeking’ concept, is similar 
in meaning, but makes more focus on the goal of capture or influence on the state – profit 
maximisation by means of obtaining privileges from the government, such as subsidies, 
accumulation of tax arrears, monopoly status and alike. Aslund (2005a), however, rightly 
notes that the room for rent-seeking has been considerably reduced since the 1990s – in 2000-
2001 the reforms of the then prime minister Viktor Yushchenko eliminated most of the 
subsidies and privileges benefiting individual enterprises, banning barter and off-sets and 
demanding that all payments to the state be made in cash, as well as enforcing timely 
payments by large enterprises for gas in trade with Russia. This reduced the profit-related 
dependence of business on political elites, and partially contributed to improved efficiency of 
enterprises, but strong links with political structures were still necessary to protect the very 
right of ownership, as opaque initial privatisation / acquisition deals meant that there was 
always a threat of re-privatisation, depending on who was in power.  
Some authors (Zimmer, 2006) question the notion of state capture, since it implies a clear 
separation between public and private spheres, whereas in Ukraine there is rather an “overlap 
of informal personal networks with formal political organisations” (Easter, 2001, quoted in 
Zimmer, 2006, p. 281). Indeed, it was reinforced in 2002, the year of most oligarchic coalition 
government (under the rule of Viktor Yanukovich), when 364 out of 450 deputies of the 
Verkhovna Rada were directly or indirectly connected with commercial structures (Zimmer, 
2006). It is also worth mentioning that the draft law on lobbying has repeatedly failed even to 
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reach the parliament – twice in 1999 and once in 2005 – being either declined by the 
parliamentary committee or passed for deputies’ consideration but never voted on.  
Although both political and economic elites were in constant competition, which was 
encouraged by the President Kuchma, the core political orbits of key political figures had 
been more or less stable during his time in office.126 Orange revolution and subsequent 
constitutional changes have brought about substantial dynamic changes, not necessarily 
diminishing the influence of oligarchs, but changing it qualitatively and modifying the 
political orbits.  
Constitutional reforms of 2004 shifted the power from the president to the legislature and 
abolished the semi-majoritarian system of parliamentary elections, introducing proportional 
representation (PR) as of 2006.127 Interestingly, contrary to the general rule of thumb, in 
Ukraine the majoritarian system had resulted in a rather fragmented and unstructured 
legislature, with weak parties and a lot of independent deputies in the Verkhovna Rada128. 
This was the result of a young democracy and lack of polarisation of people’s preferences. In 
terms of the influence of this system on trade liberalisation, the situation in Ukraine prior to 
Orange revolution indeed corroborates the predictions of the endogenous tariff literature (e.g. 
Grossman and Helpman, 2005; Fredriksson et al. 2008; Rogowski, 1987). Majoritarian 
electoral system with small electoral districts resulted in high representation of regional and 
sectoral interests in the Parliament, which respectively often promoted individualistic interests 
with regard to trade. Strong presidency also did not help in establishing a more liberal trade 
policy – the president, who has a strong motivation to keep the office, provides privileges to 
interest groups in exchange for loyalty (as Rogowski, 1987 argued). At the same time weak 
and numerous parties and big number of independents, as Ehrlich (2007) rightly emphasises, 
made it cheaper for lobbyists to push through their preferred policy options.  
The institutional environment that emerged after the 2004 Orange revolution is more difficult 
to assess against the same criteria. While “competitive authoritarianism” was the key issue in 
the business-government relations in the previous regime, de-concentration of power and 
                                                          
126  E.g. Pinchuk and Medvedchuk-Surkis group were consistently favoured by Kuchma, the former not 
surprisingly, being Kuchma’s son-in-law. Prime Minister Yanukovich was closely connected with Rinat 
Akhmetov and other businessmen of Donetsk origin. 
127 In 1990 and 1994 parliamentary elections all 450 members of parliament were elected by majority voting. In 
1998 and 2002 the system was changed into a mix of majority voting and proportional representation.  
128 Thus, in 1998 the Parliament comprised of 11 parliamentary factions and 3 deputy groups. One of the reasons 
was strong regional division of electoral preferences and semi-PR system allowing many independents in.  
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political instability129 became the main features in the new one, even before the shift in the 
balance between the executive and the legislature (which came into force with the election of 
the new parliament in 2006). At the same time, political reform did matter. The parliamentary 
elections in 2006, conducted under the proportional representation rule, resulted in 
restructuring and consolidation of parties with emergence of 5-6 strong parliamentary 
factions. Gradually, the whole concept of lobbying and business-government connections in 
Ukraine changed – instability made relying on one particular political figure (or party) very 
risky, while party consolidation made lobbying more complicated and expensive. Thus, for 
oligarchs hedging the bets by simultaneously supporting several figures became one of the 
strategies, but ensuring property rights was an even more pressing issue. A broader campaign, 
involving the internationalisation strategy described in section 7.4.6 as well as a 
comprehensive PR, was a more certain tool for achieving this.  
As a result of regime change some of the oligarchs found themselves out of favour (and out of 
Parliament, e.g. Viktor Pinchuk, Viktor Medvedchuk, Grigoriy Surkis, Volodymyr Boyko). 
At the same time, although one of the slogans of the Orange Revolution was to draw a line 
between business and oligarchs, it has only brought about reshuffling – the places of those 
who left were taken by others – Akhmetov, as well as Dmytro Kolesnikov, Serhiy Klyuev 
with the Party of Regions, and many others. But the ensuing constant instability – hard-to-
form and collapsing coalition governments, parliamentary elections in 2006 followed by 
premature elections in 2007, four prime ministers (Timoshenko, Yekhanurov, Yanukovich, 
Timoshenko again) in the course of 3 years – all this made backing particular political figures 
and relying on their support extremely risky for oligarchs. Instability prompted them to seek 
new options for protecting their positions. And this implied both back-up political protection 
and corporate and financial changes.  
Thus, the founder of the Privat Bank group, Kolomoysky, is told to support both the Bloc of 
Yulia Timoshenko party, as well as Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine. Recently he has shifted his 
allegiances towards Viktor Yushchenko.130 Vitalii Gaiduk (co-owner of the Industrial Union 
of Donbass) and Dmitriy Firtash (co-owner of the monopoly gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo) 
have also been hedging their bets on different electoral blocs, as does, most interestingly, 
                                                          
129 Largely due to inability of the president Viktor Yuschenko and the Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, former 
allies in the revolution, to agree on any policy stance.  
130 Ukrayinska Pravda, 28 March 2008 “Igor Kolomoyskiy: “Esli prezidentom stanet Timoshenko, ia sebia viju v 
emigratsii”…”. http://www.pravda.com.ua/ru/news/2008/3/28/73735.htm  Accessed on 15 April 2008.  
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Rinat Akhmetov, who has realised the decline of the positions of his protégé Yanukovich and 
allegedly started to gradually get closer to Viktor Yushchenko.  
7.5.3. Mobilisation with regard to the EU integration 
Large changes in formal institutions, instability and de-concentration of power have indeed 
made the state capture (or whatever one wishes to call the close relationship between business 
and politics in Ukraine) more difficult, and prompted oligarchs to ‘modernise’ their modus 
operandi and become more outward oriented. As Frye and Mansfield (2003) predict, this has 
also been associated with support for further trade liberalisation. The economic aspects of 
pro-EU business strategies have already been looked at, and the next step is to look at the 
political aspects. 
First of all, one has to admit that regardless of all the prerequisites, there is still no formal 
collective bargaining in Ukraine on the part of business in favour of EU integration or, more 
specifically – trade and investment liberalisation. Neither horizontally – between businesses, 
nor vertically – between business and the government. The former is due to the above 
mentioned problems of collective action and competition between oligarchs, while the latter is 
also more or less clear – there is no formal tripartite bargaining as such. And although there 
are early signs of change – calls by the then President Yushchenko and his administration to 
establish a collective dialogue with large business – they have not yet led to any productive 
cooperation.131 Moreover, the government (indeed under any prime minister) lacks a clear 
foreign policy strategy.  
There are, however, two main channels through which business support for EU integration 
has manifested itself, and they cannot be ignored: business internationalisation strategy per 
se (as discussed in section 7.4.6 above), and a range of measures that can be summarised as a 
complex PR campaign.  
The most prominent of such PR campaigns has been that launched by Viktor Pinchuk. It 
includes Yalta European Strategy – a platform for bringing together high-level European and 
Ukrainian politicians and other stakeholders for making the case for “Ukraine in the EU”, as 
well as YES Economic Advisory Council, a less successful undertaking, but a step in the right 
                                                          
131 Memorandum on Cooperation between the President and representatives of large businesses, signed on 14th of 
July 2007, was criticised for “furthering the interests of the large business instead of those of the economy in 
general”, and for absence of some of the biggest actors, in particular Akhmetov, which reduced the weight and 
symbolic meaning of the event (Vedel, 2007). 
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direction. Its goal is “to create a group of ‘wise men’ to assist the Ukrainian authorities [with] 
the … policy for international and EU economic and trade negotiations”, but the composition 
of the Council so far has not been indicative of a broadly inclusive dialogue. Apart from civil 
society representatives, who are traditionally active in matters of EU integration, the only 
business representative, not related to Interpipe, was from Food Processors’ Association 
(European Business Association was also present, but it mainly represents European business 
interests). And it is highly unlikely that this Council will see representatives of businesses of 
the size comparable to that of Pinchuk on its board.132  
When addressed by one of the Ukrainian think-tanks to organise a joint initiative with other 
oligarchs to promote FTA with the EU, Pinchuk agreed, but the reality is such that oligarchs 
cannot sit on one table. None of the oligarchs attended the YES Annual Meetings or the recent 
FTA Forum. The same lack of dialogue is demonstrated with regard to Euro-2012 European 
Championship project – many of the large businessmen have interests in this project, as most 
of them have investments in football industry, but collective measures are impossible to 
organise. 
Apart from Viktor Pinchuk, who was a pioneer in this respect, other large businessmen – 
namely Rinat Akhmetov and Kostyantyn Zhevago – have repeatedly spelled out their support 
to EU integration in the media (Olearchyk and Wagstyl, 2007). Others, such as Ihor 
Kolomoyskiy and his partner Gennadiy Bogolyubov, Serhiy Taruta and Dmitriy Firtash are 
abstaining from making public their positions, although the latter openly supports closer links 
with Russia.  
Rinat Akhmetov’s SCM has also engaged in an active social corporate responsibility 
campaign, in an attempt to build an image of a company working by world standards. 
Akhmetov has also established the Fund for Effective Governance (FEG) – a think tank 
aiming to promote deeper economic reforms in Ukraine. Jointly with McKenzie it developed 
a Strategy for Effective Governance for Ukraine.  
Interestingly, while Pinchuk’s initiative clearly prioritises EU integration, the recent Concept 
of Economic Development of Ukraine produced by FEG, in the section on foreign trade, 
                                                          
132 Viktor Pinchuk has also been conducting a range of other initiatives aimed at boosting the image of Ukraine 
in Europe and worldwide, such as presenting Ukrainian art pavilion at the Venice Biennale in 2007 and funding 
a documentary on Ukrainian holocaust together with USC Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and 
Education. 
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emphasises the need for simultaneous trade liberalisation with the EU and the CIS. However 
it acknowledges the ineffectiveness of the SES initiative, calling for greater formalisation of 
free trade on a bilateral basis. It also calls for greater involvement of business representatives 
and business associations in negotiations on the EU-Ukraine FTA.  
As to the mobilisation of non-oligarchic business, USPP (Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs) would be the first candidate, due to its large membership and well-established 
lobbying infrastructure. Indeed, advancing EU integration is one of the priorities of its 
external relations strategy, though it seems to be mainly focusing on EU-2012 football 
championship. However no specific activities could be named when a representative of USPP 
was contacted.133  
An example of a strong collective business organisation promoting EU integration is the 
European Business Association. It is probably the most active business association in this 
field, however it mainly represents interests of European organisations in Ukraine (as a quick 
look at the membership list and the range of issues on their agenda shows) and promotes 
inward investments to Ukraine. This also eventually results in greater openness and 
competitiveness of Ukraine, but is not indicative of mobilisation of local business actors.134  
Very little evidence is available as to the attitudes of sectoral organisations to trade 
liberalisation with the EU. The associations of metallurgy and chemicals producers are known 
to have pro-European views and are better organised than others. However the level of 
awareness of EU-Ukraine trade issues appears to be very low in the Union of Chemists. 135 
During years 2006-2007 the International Centre for Policy Studies has undertaken a series of 
round tables with sectoral interest groups to explore their view on the potential consequences 
of a deep FTA with the EU. Most active and informed were representatives of metallurgy and 
chemicals, while light industry, as a sector composed of small or micro-enterprises, was not 
so well represented and less receptive. 136  
Another important aspect, which could become a catalyst of closer integration if better 
developed, is horizontal links between the Ukrainian and EU businesses, or, so-to-say, 
                                                          
133 Anonymous representative of USPP, interviewed in Kiev on 7th of July 2007. 
134 www.eba.com.ua   
135 Interviews with the Deputy-directors of the Union of chemists in July 2007.  
136 Interview with Olga Shumylo, Director of the EU integration programmes, ICPS, 10 July 2007. 
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‘diagonal’ links – between Ukrainian businesses and EU policy makers. Very little evidence 
exists of such links, but where available – horizontal links are less common than ‘diagonal’. 
And here, as with domestic mobilisation, the same argument holds – only the biggest 
enterprises with increasing economies of scale are able to be proactive in this respect. The 
strategies of Viktor Pinchuk have already been mentioned – engaging EU members of 
Parliament into the debate on Ukraine and its EU integration; direct steel-related lobbying in 
Brussels. Some affirmative answers have been given as to the presence of Rinat Akhmetov’s 
lobby in Brussels, both in the European Commission, and in the Parliament, without any 
details, however.137 EU-Ukraine Business Council is also an efficient platform for connecting 
Ukrainian business with EU business and policy makers or politicians. Certain business 
groups have found it useful in reverting business deals in the EU that they found as 
discriminating. One of the examples of horizontal links is BusinessEurope138 being 
approached by the Industrial Union of Donbass – a definite sign of a growing interest in the 
EU towards the Ukrainian market.  
7.6. Conclusion 
Business preferences, and the way they are voiced, affect the trade policy and the extent of 
trade liberalisation. This chapter focused particularly on the attitudes of business elites in 
Ukraine to the EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation. To conclude, what kind of mobilisation with 
regard to trade liberalisation can be observed in Ukraine? 
In terms of political economy predictions, Ukraine is characterised by the following 
interaction of factors – relatively low mobility of factors of production making it more 
difficult for producers to adjust to unfavourable policy changes, while non-majoritarian, 
fragmented political system, as well as formal and informal institutions provide a favourable 
environment for direct lobbying. Such circumstances create conditions for specific industries 
harmed by liberalisation to easily get access to the decision-makers and receive the necessary 
protection. And this is the ‘balance of power equilibrium’ that one could observe at the early 
stages of WTO accession. The process was halted by inefficient political institutions, lack of 
negotiating experience and strong industrial and agricultural lobby.  
                                                          
137 Interview with a representative of the European Commission, Directorate General Relex, Brussels, May 2007.  
138 The main horizontal business organisation at EU level. Includes 40 member federations, representing 20 
million companies from 34 European countries. http://www.businesseurope.eu/content/default.asp?PageID=582  
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However later on, on the backdrop of significant economic growth, favourable external 
economic conditions and structural changes in the key industries, as well as a more favourable 
external political environment (EU being interested in closer political and economic relations 
with Ukraine) the balance of power among business elites shifted towards pro-liberalisation.  
So far, however, it has been only the largest business that demonstrated some form of 
mobilisation in favour of the EU-Ukraine economic integration. Lack of traditions of effective 
collective bargaining has resulted in such intentions being pursued on a direct, vertical 
(business-government) basis. The fact that Ukrainian business attracts EU Members of 
Parliament to build the case for Ukraine in the EU is a positive sign; however collective 
representation of Ukrainian interests in the EU would prove much more efficient. Horizontal 
links between large Ukrainian business and its European counterparts are slowly developing, 
but they have not yet gained any formal status. Therefore, there is clearly some evidence of 
mobilisation aimed at closer economic integration with the EU, but it has not been realised in 
a collective manner, and there are few signs of such collective effort developing. Initial 
mobilisation is already a good trend, compared to the situation observed some five years ago, 
however once negotiations on the EU-Ukraine DCFTA enter a more advanced stage this lack 
of organised business representation may well affect the resulting conditions of the DCFTA. 
This study paid less attention to the Eastern vector of economic integration, primarily because 
at the time of research the project of deeper integration within the Common Economic Space 
was off the agenda and pro-EU attitudes of some important business groups came to the 
forefront.139 However, the conceptual framework developed in this study can equally be 
applied to explain East-leaning business attitudes. For instance, if the circumstances change 
and the aggregate benefits of deeper integration within the CIS turn out to outweigh the 
benefits of integration with the EU, business elites will be expected to mobilise in favour of 
the Eastern vector.  
                                                          
139 In fact, when interviewees (business representatives and analysts) were posed with a question on their 
attitudes to the CES project, the reaction was most of the time indifferent, as to something that is ‘passé’ and not 
worth discussing.  
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND AVENUES FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
8.1. Findings of the empirical analysis 
8.2.1 Subject of research – trends in export reorientation 
While at the beginning of this research, in 2005 (using the available data until 2003), 
reorientation of Ukrainian exports towards the EU and away from FSU appeared to be a 
steady trend, by 2008 the situation changed. Exports to the CIS experienced a U-turn, this 
region regaining its role as a leading destination market for the Ukrainian exports. Eventually, 
although between 1990 and 2008 the share of the CIS declined dramatically (from 81 percent 
to 35.6 percent), the share of the EU-15 in total Ukrainian exports increased by only a small 
margin (from 5.6 percent to 14.4 percent), with the biggest reorientation taking place to the 
rest of the world (from 13 percent to 37 percent). Among the rest of the world the most 
important countries have traditionally been USA, China and Turkey, but by 2008 the role of 
China has diminished while that of Turkey increased from 3 percent to 7 percent of total 
Ukrainian exports. A not less important trend has been a dramatic increase in the role of 
MENA countries as a destination for Ukrainian exports. The role of Turkey and MENA taken 
together has increased from 8 percent to over 20 percent of total exports from Ukraine. A 
somewhat disappointing conclusion, there seems to have been more reorientation towards the 
Middle East than towards the EU.  
Despite this fact, the focus in this thesis has been mainly on the East-West dimension of the 
Ukrainian trade since the motivation of the study was not purely the trade patterns, but the 
deeper economic, political and societal integration processes that are taking place in relations 
with both the CIS and the EU. While with the economies of CIS Ukraine enjoys a free trade 
regime on the basis of bilateral free trade agreements, with the EU it is negotiating a deep and 
comprehensive free trade agreement in the framework of the future Association Agreement, 
which may improve Ukraine’s competitiveness on the EU market in the future. Even if 
reorientation towards the EU has been limited since Ukraine’s independence, it was important 
to explore any positive or negative trends and the possible determining factors thereof, in 
view of the EU’s strategic importance as an economic and political partner of Ukraine.  
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It is important to note, however, that given Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, such low 
degree of reorientation towards the EU is not good news. Integration with the EU is a sub-
criterion in the ‘competitiveness’ condition of the Copenhagen Criteria that European 
Commission uses to assess candidate countries’ fitness for membership; hence, low and 
hardly improving degree of integration with the EU would not be counted as a plus for 
Ukraine should its membership application be submitted and assessed.140  
However, when a more detailed analysis is undertaken, breaking down the trade flows by 
factor content, it appears that medium-technology exports have been growing in trade with 
both regions, but more dynamically in trade with the EU. When the dynamics on the 
destination markets is taken into account, and the role of imports from Ukraine is compared to 
those from the rest of the world, it also emerged that Ukraine enjoys a more intensive 
comparative advantage on the European markets than on the Russian market. Admittedly in 
2000 even with the lower average intensity of the comparative advantage Ukraine enjoyed a 
much more favourable position on the Russian market, having more competitive products 
lines in total and in technology-intensive products in particular. By 2008, however, the 
situation has changed and Ukraine lost a fair share of its comparative advantage on the 
Russian market. At the same time, the number of competitive medium-technology products 
has grown since 2000. 
This apparent contradiction between macro-level trends and trends in terms of factor content 
and comparative advantage is explained by the fact that the latter analysis looks at the 
narrower product categories, and reveals upgrading of the degree of processing that has taken 
place within the same broad commodity groups (e.g. Metals or Chemicals). The loss of some 
of the comparative advantage in medium-technology products on the Russian market is likely 
to stem from Russia’s dynamically growing demand that has had to be met by imports from 
other countries, thus crowding out Ukraine’s competitive position.  
Nevertheless, despite the growing external pressure on the destination markets, the dominant 
role of the CIS and Russia for the Ukrainian trade and economy, in particular in machinery & 
equipment and transportation products – commodity groups that, according to theory, bear the 
highest growth-enhancing potential – has to be acknowledged as a more important trend. The 
weakening relative comparative advantage on the Russian market serves as a warning for the 
                                                          
140 An anonymous representative of the Directorate General Economy and Finance, European Commission.   
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medium- to long-term perspective. On the other hand, the shrinking role of the EU in 
aggregate terms is mitigated by more positive findings on a more disaggregated level (factor 
content) and in relative terms (revealed comparative advantage).  
8.2.2 Macro-level determinants of the Ukrainian exports 
The macro-level analysis has shown that total and per capita income, along with geography, 
explains between 60 to 70 percent of the variation in the value of real exports from Ukraine in 
1996-2004. Since geographic conditions do not change, this finding implies that the level of 
exports from Ukraine is largely determined by economic growth and the level of development 
in partner countries. This finding corroborated the suggestion made in CHAPTER 3 that a 
rebound in trade with the CIS since early 2000s must have been driven by the start of 
recovery in those countries after a decade of recession. Importantly, Ukraine was found to 
trade more with countries of similar level of income than with high-income economies.  
After controlling for the income and geographic effects, belonging to a trade bloc, even if de 
jure not institutionalised, was found to increase further Ukraine’s export intensity. The effect 
of CIS was found to be significantly positive even though it is not a formal free trade area, but 
a network of bilateral preferential trade agreements. In contrast, Ukraine was still under-
trading with the EU, in particular in 2000-2004. However, when steel exports were removed 
from the dependent variable, the effect of under-exporting to the EU was much less 
pronounced, being significant only in 2004. This finding implies that it is primarily steel 
exports that are underperforming in trade with the EU, while the rest of merchandise exports 
seem to be in line with the macro-economic and geographic fundamentals. Under-exporting of 
steel to the EU-15 is not surprising, given the quota regime that the EU maintained with 
Ukraine (as well as Russia and Kazakhstan) until 2008.141 Still, the lack of positive effect of 
the EU trade bloc on Ukraine’s export intensity, which contrasts with a strong positive effect 
of the CIS, indicates that there is an under-utilised potential.  
Interestingly, the effect of the then CEFTA, which until 2004 included CEE economies, was 
insignificant for total exports during 1996-2004, but was significantly positive on non-steel 
exports. However, this positive effect disappeared after 2001. A more detailed look into the 
underlying trade data revealed that the decline was mainly driven by the fall in mineral 
                                                          
141 In 2008 Ukraine joined the WTO and as a member could no longer face quantitative restrictions.  
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exports, which was in turn determined by domestic structural factors in Ukraine, rather than 
by trade diversion from trade liberalisation between the EU-15 and CEFTA.  
8.2.3 Micro-level determinants of exports 
In CHAPTER 6 the focus of the analysis was shifted from preferential trade blocs and macro-
economic fundamentals to the firm-level factors that may explain the performance of 
Ukrainian exports. The factors chosen for the analysis were derived partially from the trade 
theoretical literature, and partially from the corporate governance literature. In broad terms, 
the former focuses on the link and the causality between productivity and exporting, and in 
particular suggests that size, product and/or process innovation, foreign links and higher 
human capital are likely to improve the chances of a firm to internationalise (i.e. to become an 
exporter). Corporate governance literature adds the hypotheses that de novo or privatised 
enterprises (as opposed to state-owned enterprises, in particular in transition economies), as 
well as firms with easier access to finance will be more likely to become exporters.  
The above trade theoretical factors have also been found to have a positive effect on 
productivity, while higher productivity, in turn, has been found to be associated with higher 
likelihood of a firm to enter more advanced markets. The research in this thesis used this 
indirect association to explore whether size, innovation, foreign links and product 
diversification increase or decrease the likelihood of Ukrainian enterprises to export to the EU 
– as a more advanced market – versus the CIS.  
Exploring first the factors that make Ukrainian enterprises more likely to internationalise – 
i.e. to become exporters – the findings were that a typical Ukrainian exporter seems to be a 
large firm with foreign ownership and higher human capital component (measured by the 
level of education of the employees), but which does little product innovation and upgrading 
of capital. It seems that it is well established, large and less dynamic Ukrainian firms that tend 
to enter foreign markets through exporting. Although the negative effect of innovation and 
capital upgrading on export propensity is contrary to the theoretical expectations, this finding 
is not totally surprising given the commodity structure of Ukrainian exports.  
When destination-specific internationalisation is explored – i.e. the likelihood to export to the 
EU as opposed to the CIS – some of the findings of the internationalisation model are 
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corroborated. The effect of the economies of scale142, which can be paralleled with size, also 
has a positive effect in trade with most regions – EU-15 and CIS – although negative in trade 
with the EU-12. Again, contrary to expectations, but consistent with the internationalisation 
model, innovation was found to be negatively associated with the export propensity to all 
regions in question – EU-15, EU-12 and CIS. Foreign ownership, which had a pronounced 
positive effect in the first exercise, in the destination-specific model had a positive effect only 
on the likelihood to export to the EU-15. Higher commodity diversification, on the contrary, 
made a firm more likely to export to the CIS, but not the EU.  
Hence, theoretical expectations have only partially been validated by the empirical analysis. 
Indeed, size (or economies of scale) has been found to be positively associated with export 
propensity, and in particular with the likelihood to export to both the EU-15 and CIS. Foreign 
ownership, likewise, positively affects internationalisation and exporting to the EU-15. 
However, unlike hypothesised, neither process/product innovation, nor commodity 
diversification increase the export propensity or the chances to export to a more advanced 
market (the EU); moreover, they are inversely related to these dependent variables. The same 
holds for capital upgrading and general export propensity. I.e. neither of the variables that are 
associated with industrial upgrading, apart from foreign direct investment, was found to 
increase the chances of exporting to the EU. The positive effect of FDI, however, appears to 
be a positive finding on the backdrop of the anecdotal evidence that the majority of FDI in 
Ukraine is market- rather than export-seeking.  
8.2.4 The role of business elites in the EU-Ukraine trade policy-making 
While the latter analysis was aimed at enlarging the understanding of the determinants of 
Ukrainian exports by shifting the inquiry from the mainstream trade model (gravity model) to 
a newer approach of firm-level determinants, the aim of CHAPTER 7 was to recognise the 
shortcomings of the quantitative firm-level analysis in CHAPTER 6 in a context of a country, 
where business elites play an active role in determining policy-making. Thus, business elites 
were chosen as another potential determinant of exports from Ukraine to the EU, and their 
role was explored in a qualitative manner.  
                                                          
142 In the internationalisation model size was measured by the number of employees, while in the destination-
specific model by the value of total exports.  
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Seeking signs of business mobilisation with regards to the current EU-Ukraine trade policy-
making and the potential EU integration (in particular through the creation of the free trade 
area), little organised business action with regards to either of the processes was found. 
Nevertheless, there was evidence of individual lobbying channels targeting both current trade 
and integration with the EU. While different in nature, both of these lobbying initiatives have 
been pursued by the largest business actors – financial-industrial groups, owned by the so-
called oligarchs. Using WTO accession as an example of trade liberalisation exercise, we also 
found some evidence of mobilisation of large (non-oligarchic) enterprises. Small and medium 
enterprises, on the other hand, were not successful in making their voice heard with regard to 
either process.  
In order to explain the observed business behaviour a conceptual framework was developed, 
which suggests that the degree of business mobilisation will depend on: (i) economic costs 
and benefits as perceived by business elites; (ii) nature of prevalent political institutions, and 
(iii) collective action costs.  
With regard to the economic costs and benefits, it was found that business mobilisation 
observed in Ukraine was in line with the political economy postulates derived from classical 
and new trade theories. The former suggests that when economic agents that are bound to lose 
from the proposed trade policy find it hard to adjust to unfavourable changes of trade policy, 
they will mobilise against trade liberalisation. The resulting policy equilibrium is likely to be 
protectionist. This was observed in Ukraine during the WTO accession process, when 
automobile industry and some agricultural producers mobilised against the required 
liberalisation of Ukrainian trade policy. With regard to the EU-Ukraine trade liberalisation, 
little mobilisation of medium-to-large business has been observed due to the lack of concrete 
legislative proposals by the time of conducting the research, 2007/2008, which is explained 
by an economic concept of high information asymmetry.  
The new trade theory shifts the attention to larger firms, whose economies of scale make them 
interested not only in the domestic market, but also in international markets. Being 
competitive at an international level and having the negotiating power, such firms can act 
strategically, pursuing better access to foreign markets. Moreover, they can do so even in the 
absence of concrete legislative proposals. Thus, with regard to current trade flows, there is 
evidence of Ukrainian oligarchic businesses (steel producers) effectively lobbying for 
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improving access to the EU market (lowering import quotas in the EU). With regard to the 
future bilateral trade liberalisation with the EU, a broader range of factors is at play. Having 
reached the scale of business development when interests on the international markets go 
beyond pure exporting – intentions to conduct IPOs on European stock exchanges, outward 
investment in the EU, plus the need to internationally legitimise assets gained during 1990s 
by often opaque schemes – some FIGs have engaged in direct cooperation with the EU 
institutions or launched pro-European public campaigns. They also, reportedly, facilitated the 
break-through in WTO accession negotiations by abandoning a protectionist stance and 
applying their weight in the parliament. 
In addition to economic considerations, formal and informal institutions prevailing in Ukraine 
also explain the observed mobilisation of oligarchic businesses. Formal institutions – 
fragmented, non-majoritarian legislative system – do not encourage broad dialogue and 
consensus building, while informal institutions – so called ‘state capture’ by business interests 
– also facilitate individual dialogue between business and the legislative and executive 
branches of power. Thus, subject matter support for the EU integration and direct access to 
power reinforce the role that oligarchic business can play in the EU-Ukraine trade policy-
making. 
Such mobilisation was only observed with the oligarchic business, SMEs and stand-alone 
large enterprises remained uninterested in the issue of EU integration at the time of research 
(2007-2008). This appears logical in the light of the proposed political economy framework: 
lack of economies of scale rules out strategic behaviour, while the lack of concrete legislative 
proposals and of apparent negative consequences do not create significant incentives to 
mobilise. At the same time, absence of traditions of effective formal business-government 
dialogue hinders the mobilisation of SMEs with regard to the EU integration further. 
8.2. Interpretation of the findings within a wider conceptual 
framework 
From the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 2 it emerged that for an economy in 
transition like Ukraine (which for analytical purposes can be identified as the South) a 
preferable dynamics would be to trade more with the more advanced markets of the North, 
which in the Ukrainian case in view of the geographic proximity and economic mass would 
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be the market of the EU, and to reorient its commodity structure towards products of higher 
degree of processing and/or technology intensive products.  
The empirical analysis undertaken in this thesis revealed no clear evidence of such evolution 
of trade. Moreover, a somewhat contradicting picture emerges, as the discussion on aggregate 
level trends and factor content vs. revealed comparative advantage suggests. Thus, although 
on a macro-level Ukraine has clearly been undergoing a deepening South-South integration, 
there are some signs of improving South-North integration on a more disaggregated level. It is 
also important to note that the dynamically growing aggregate demand in the CIS is inducing 
diversification of suppliers, posing a challenge for Ukraine in the future.  
At the same time, the empirical analysis of determinants of export flows also yielded little 
support for the idea of deepening South-North integration.  
The macro-level (gravity model) analysis showed that Ukraine tends to under-trade with the 
external trade bloc of the North (the EU) and overtrades with the internal trade bloc of the 
South (the CIS). Moreover, the model showed that Ukraine consistently trades more with 
countries with similar levels of income – i.e. middle-income countries, which can also for 
analytical purposes be identified as the South, than with those that have significantly higher 
income per capita.  
On a micro-level, likewise, the analysis has not revealed that trade with the North has been 
associated with firm-level industrial upgrading. Neither diversification, nor innovation 
increases the chances of exporting to the EU. Admittedly, our various measures of innovation 
have not been shown to increase the chances of exporting to the CIS either, nor does it seem 
to increase export propensity in general. This does not come totally as a surprise given 
Ukraine’s commodity structure of exports, more than half of which consist of resource-
intensive products.  
However, exporting to the South has been associated with higher commodity diversification. 
Diversification, in turn, indicates a better commodity structure of trade, and has been found to 
be associated with higher growth potential (Funke and Ruhwedel, 2001, 2005).  
A positive finding in trade with the North, however, is a strong positive effect of FDI on the 
likelihood of exporting to the EU, especially in machinery and transportation. This contrasts 
with earlier findings that quote market size as a primary motive for inward FDI to the Ukraine 
(e.g. Kudina, 1999).  
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As far as policy lobbying is concerned, analysis in this thesis has shown that business elites 
are becoming increasingly interested in the advanced markets, not only for the reasons of 
market access, but for a whole range of factors ranging from image restructuring (so-called 
‘social legitimisation’, Puglisi, 2008), the need to gain access to international capital markets, 
to secure their property rights in the conditions of political instability. Thus, despite a 
common belief that Ukraine’s industrial East has pro-Russian allegiance, in reality active 
lobbying measures have been launched particularly with regard to the Western integration 
vector, rather than closer integration with the CIS.  
On balance, although the picture is far from straightforward, we have to conclude that the 
anticipated reorientation of Ukraine’s international economy towards the European Union, or 
in other words, greater South-North integration, has failed to materialise. The main 
rebalancing of trade took place in the early years of transition – 1993-1999, when the share of 
CIS fell from over 80 to 28 percent – while the subsequent years have been characterised by 
the rebounding role of the CIS and the increasing importance of the Middle East. Although 
commodity composition has somewhat improved in trade with the EU, as a share of total 
exports the CIS has become a more important market for many product categories, in 
particular technology-intensive products. Hence, to an extent a deeper South-South 
integration moving towards North-North commodity composition is observed.   
As has been shown in the macro-level model, and more generally, such dynamics appears to 
be in line with the Linder hypothesis, which suggests that countries with similar demand 
structures will develop similar industries and thus will trade more with each other in similar, 
but differentiated goods. This is also supported by a high degree of intra-industry trade 
between Ukraine and CIS economies. 
An important reservation needs to be made about the classification of regions into North and 
South. While indeed most CIS economies are specialising in exports of resource-intensive 
products, thus resembling the South, it is a much more dynamically growing market than that 
of the EU. Hence, as the macro-level analysis showed, higher GDP growth is likely to drive 
further increase of exports from Ukraine to the CIS and other middle-income economies. 
Since this South-South exchange is not entirely concentrated in goods of low added value, it 
may, eventually, be growth-enhancing; however the upgrading of an industrial base is still 
likely to be achieved through imports or FDI from the North.  
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On the other hand, if trade with the North, even if growing in importance, remains trapped in 
a typical North-South relationship (relative to the trade with the South), whereby Ukraine 
continues to specialise in low value-added products, is it good or bad for the Ukrainian 
economy? As the discussion in CHAPTER 2 (Conceptual framework) has shown, although 
there is evidence that more trade with the North is growth- (or productivity-) enhancing, it 
usually happens through trade in more R&D intensive products. Besides, growth-enhancing 
effects of trade with the North often come from imports (of technology- and R&D-intensive 
products), rather than exports. Hence, unless Ukraine manages to support the trends of 
marginal improvement in the commodity structure of its exports to the EU, it appears that the 
sharp improvement in commodity composition in trade with the CIS since 2003-2004 is a 
more important factor for Ukraine’s growth prospects than the geographic distribution of 
exports. This conclusion concerns purely trade flows, and particularly exports. However, as 
was discussed in the Introduction and the Conceptual framework, deeper economic 
integration with the EU that goes beyond trade measures is likely to bring about much bigger 
benefits to the Ukrainian economy in the medium- to long-term than pure trade liberalisation 
would. ‘Deep and comprehensive’, however, implies not only deeper liberalisation of access 
to the EU market, but also extensive reform effort, which has so far been missing in Ukraine. 
Preservation of the same limited-reform approach might not only restrict reorientation 
towards the EU, but may also erode Ukraine’s competitiveness on the dynamically developing 
traditional markets of the CIS, as is already happening with the loss of comparative advantage 
in many medium-technology products.  
8.3. Reservations about the analysis and avenues for further 
research 
Referring back to the section 1.5 on methodology (on p.16), the author would like to recall 
that the epistemological approach of this study was not based on positivist, but rather on 
critical realist assumptions. The former would essentially imply that what is measurable and 
observable must reflect the true causal relationships and mechanisms in the explored 
phenomena, and that “the scientist’s conceptualisation of reality actually directly reflects that 
reality” (Bryman and Bell, 2007: 18). The latter, in contrast, posits that “the scientist’s 
conceptualisation is simply a way of knowing that reality” and that the categories employed to 
understand the reality are likely to be provisional (Bhaskar, 1975: 250). Hence, this thesis 
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explored only a set of possible determinants of exports from Ukraine, some of which are part 
of the mainstream trade literature, while others have seen little reflection in the literature on 
the Ukrainian trade.  
The author acknowledges that the techniques employed herein mostly reflected the 
relationship or association between certain phenomena, rather than exact direction of 
causality. Also, the approach taken in the study of micro-level determinants was somewhat 
non-conventional for the regression analysis methodology, however it also relates back to the 
critical realist epistemological position, which admits that there can be “hypothetical entities 
that account for the regularities in the ... social orders” (which would not be admissible in the 
positivist position), i.e. instead of simply stating the relationship established as a result of the 
regression analysis, this study made an attempt to explore the underlying facts that may 
provide better explanation of the relationship suggested by the regression analysis. The 
qualitative analysis of the role of business elites also suggested a provisional theoretical 
framework to account for the observed and very under-explored behavioural patterns of 
business actors; however, other explanations and views on this matter may be equally if not 
more correct.  
Moreover, the author acknowledges the multiplicity of possible explanations for the observed 
export performance of Ukraine and for the failure to integrate closer with the EU. On the one 
hand this thesis took a relatively broad view on this, on the other it unavoidably missed out 
certain, potentially not less important, factors. Moreover, by “observed”, the author implies 
either trends that are measured by official statistics (in a country where the size of informal 
economy may reach as much as 50 percent of GDP)143, or a subjective impression made from 
conducting interviews and analysing the secondary literature. Both of these are not infallible.  
The following avenues for future research can be suggested:  
§ Once Ukraine concludes the free trade agreement with the EU, it will be important 
to explore how much trade liberalisation and institutional reforms will help 
Ukraine to increase its exports to the EU.144 
                                                          
143 E.g. Schneider (2002) and Thiessen (2007) 
144 Even if the premises of the argument for a higher level of exports from Ukraine to the EU can be argued 
about, the need to narrow down the trade deficit with the EU has been repeatedly acknowledged by Ukrainian 
officials.  
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§ When more and better firm-level data becomes available, new opportunities will 
be opened for researchers. Thus, BEEPS dataset provided a wide range of 
measures, but did not distinguish between destination markets for exporters, thus 
making it impossible to explore export reorientation from a firm-level perspective. 
It will be interesting to explore better the role of financial intermediation, non-
tariff and administrative barriers, product quality, as well as corporate governance 
and management practices, to name a few, in increasing or decreasing the chances 
of a firm to export to advanced markets as opposed to traditional markets of the 
FSU. Alternatively, qualitative studies with no preliminary hypotheses made may 
also improve our understanding of the process.  
§ The constantly changing political situation in Ukraine is also changing the position 
of Ukrainian oligarchs, both in terms of their economic situation and political 
influence. A bigger body of research into the issue of political economy of trade 
policy-making in Ukraine and in other economies with young democracies may 
help improve our understanding of the mechanisms involved in this process, which 
would hopefully be useful for other economies as well.  
§ Last but not least, recognising a significant shift in a relatively brief period of time 
from a European orientation back to a Russia-CIS orientation, one possibility 
cannot be ruled out – that a similar shift could happen again. One of the triggers 
could be the 2008 global financial crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis much will 
depend on the relative rates of recovery in the EU and CIS. At the moment 
recovery in Russia and the rest of CIS seems to be below par, while that in the EU 
is, although still lower in absolute terms, better than expected. Again, the 
conclusion of the DCFTA may further boost the chances of this reverse shift 
happening, improving both access to the EU market and Ukraine’s attractiveness 
for investors potentially plugging Ukraine into international production networks.  
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Annex 1. Export sophistication (EXPY) vs. GDP per capita, 2008 
 
Source: Bailey Klinger (2010: 4) based on Hausman et al. (2005). 
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Annex 2. GDP growth in FSU economies, annual %, 1991-2008 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Armenia -11.7 -41.8 -8.8 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.3 7.3 3.3 5.9 9.6 13.2 14.0 10.5 13.9 13.2 13.7 6.8 
Azerbaijan -0.7 -22.6 -23.1 -19.7 -11.8 1.3 5.8 10.0 7.4 11.1 9.9 10.6 11.2 10.2 26.4 34.5 25.0 10.8 
Belarus    -11.7 -10.4 2.8 11.4 8.4 3.4 5.8 4.7 5.0 7.0 11.4 9.4 10.0 8.6 10.0 
Georgia -21.1 -44.9 -29.3 -10.4 2.6 11.2 10.5 3.1 2.9 1.8 4.8 5.5 11.1 5.9 9.6 9.4 12.4 2.0 
Kazakhstan -11.0 -5.3 -9.2 -12.6 -8.2 0.5 1.7 -1.9 2.7 9.8 13.5 9.8 9.3 9.6 9.7 10.7 8.9 3.2 
Kyrgyz Rep. -7.9 -13.9 -15.5 -20.1 -5.4 7.1 9.9 2.1 3.7 5.4 5.3 0.0 7.0 7.0 -0.2 3.1 8.2 7.7 
Moldova -16.0 -29.1 -1.2 -30.9 -1.4 -5.2 1.6 -6.5 -3.4 2.1 6.1 7.8 6.6 7.4 7.5 4.8 3.0 7.2 
Russian Fed. -5.0 -14.5 -8.7 -12.6 -4.1 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 10.0 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.1 6.4 7.4 8.1 7.3 
Tajikistan -7.1 -29.0 -16.4 -21.3 -12.4 -16.7 1.7 5.3 3.7 8.3 10.2 9.1 10.2 10.6 6.7 7.0 7.8 7.9 
Turkmenist. -4.7 -5.3 -10.0 -17.3 -7.2 -6.7 -11.3 6.7 16.5 18.6 20.4 15.8 17.1 17.2 13.0 11.4 11.6 9.8 
Ukraine -8.4 -9.7 -14.2 -22.9 -12.2 -10.0 -3.0 -1.9 -0.2 5.9 9.2 5.2 9.4 12.1 2.7 7.3 7.9 2.1 
Uzbekistan -0.5 -11.2 -2.3 -5.2 -0.9 1.7 5.2 4.3 4.3 3.8 4.2 4.0 4.2 7.7 7.0 7.3 9.5 9.0 
Average -11.7 -41.8 -8.8 5.4 6.9 5.9 3.3 7.3 3.3 5.9 9.6 13.2 14.0 10.5 13.9 13.2 13.7 6.8 
Source: World Bank World Development indicators (September 2009 Edition).  
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Annex 3. Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade (at the 2-digit SITC level) 
Total trade CIS Non-CIS Manufacturing % of trade 
1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 CIS Non-CIS 
Armenia 51.7 54 42.3 38.6 40.8 51 37 66 
Azerbaijan 32.8 20.2 38.5 41 24.2 9.4 29 3 
Belarus 69.8 66.3 60.1 57.1 44.6 44.2 75 54 
Georgia n.a. 36.9 n.a. 54.2 n.a. 20.2 43 25 
Kazakhstan 44.2 30.4 56.1 32.7 22.8 15.8 15 18 
Kyrgyzstan 40.2 42.4 47.8 55.6 25 22.3 31 13 
Moldova 53.6 31.6 50.9 53.7 46.8 16.3 20 56 
Russia 47.6 54.7 75.1 71.5 36.3 44.5 24 22 
Tajikistan n.a. 11.8 n.a. 11.3 n.a. 5.5 15 10 
Turkmenistan 8.1 9.1 8.3 8 8.0 9.6 3 11 
Ukraine 42.5 44.9 58.2 60 27.7 28.7 69 66 
Uzbekistan 26.7 25.3 30.8 26.1 13.8 14.1 20 4 
Note: The index was calculated for manufacturing trade only (groups 5 through 8 minus 68, using SITC V.2 Classification).  
Source: Freinkman et al. (2004 : 24).  
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Annex 4. Correlation between global steel prices and total exports from Ukraine, 
1996-2008 
 
Source: www.crugroup.com, retrieved Jan 2010, UN Comtrade Online Database 
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Annex 5. Commodity and geographical distribution of Ukrainian exports, 1996-2008, % of total unless otherwise mentioned 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 p.p. 
change 
2004-
1996 
p.p. 
change 
2008-
1996 
Agriculture 11% 8% 8% 10% 7% 8% 10% 8% 7% 9% 9% 9% 12% -4 1 
   CIS 58% 48% 32% 43% 45% 35% 26% 35% 34% 29% 17% 26% 20% -24 -38 
   EU-15 14% 21% 23% 13% 19% 22% 28% 18% 16% 19% 24% 26% 25% 2 11 
   EU-12 12% 9% 9% 8% 9% 10% 8% 8% 9% 6% 7% 6% 8% -2 -4 
   Other 15% 43% 35% 49% 27% 55% 38% 39% 40% 46% 52% 43% 47% 25 31 
Chemicals  14% 13% 13% 11% 12% 11% 9% 10% 10% 10% 11% 10% 9% -5 -5 
   CIS 46% 44% 44% 41% 43% 38% 32% 27% 25% 30% 32% 32% 31% -22 -16 
   EU-15 12% 11% 15% 16% 16% 16% 12% 12% 16% 10% 12% 11% 10% 3 -3 
   EU-12 12% 13% 15% 12% 11% 13% 17% 17% 16% 14% 16% 15% 10% 4 -2 
   Other 29% 43% 26% 47% 31% 49% 39% 44% 44% 46% 40% 41% 49% 14 20 
Food products 10% 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 4% 4% 4% 4% -6 -6 
   CIS 93% 87% 84% 82% 82% 79% 77% 76% 72% 80% 78% 74% 80% -21 -13 
   EU-15 2% 5% 6% 9% 7% 7% 6% 6% 4% 5% 5% 7% 3% 1 0 
   EU-12 4% 5% 5% 3% 3% 6% 8% 9% 10% 7% 8% 9% 7% 6 3 
   Other 1% 8% 5% 15% 8% 15% 9% 9% 14% 9% 9% 10% 10% 13 9 
Mach. & Elect. 10% 10% 9% 8% 9% 11% 10% 10% 9% 8% 9% 10% 9% 0 0 
   CIS 78% 73% 71% 66% 60% 54% 55% 49% 51% 68% 66% 64% 66% -27 -12 
   EU-15 5% 7% 11% 11% 9% 18% 14% 16% 17% 8% 9% 9% 9% 11 4 
   EU-12 5% 6% 6% 7% 20% 17% 15% 16% 14% 10% 12% 17% 17% 9 11 
   Other 12% 21% 13% 27% 12% 29% 16% 19% 18% 14% 13% 10% 9% 6 -3 
Metals 33% 41% 42% 42% 44% 41% 40% 37% 40% 41% 43% 42% 41% 7 8 
   CIS 40% 28% 23% 17% 21% 18% 12% 18% 18% 22% 24% 27% 24% -22 -15 
   EU-15 5% 8% 13% 11% 11% 11% 11% 13% 13% 12% 15% 13% 13% 8 8 
   EU-12 7% 6% 9% 10% 10% 11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 11% 9% 10% 3 2 
   Other 48% 66% 55% 73% 57% 70% 66% 58% 58% 56% 50% 51% 53% 11 5% 
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 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 p.p. 
change 
2004-
1996 
p.p. 
change 
2008-
1996 
Mineral prod. 10% 10% 10% 11% 10% 12% 13% 16% 14% 15% 11% 10% 11% 4 2 
   CIS 29% 29% 26% 16% 16% 17% 13% 10% 12% 16% 21% 25% 29% -17 0 
   EU-15 20% 13% 19% 29% 17% 25% 33% 31% 23% 27% 25% 22% 12% 3 -8 
   EU-12 46% 54% 51% 41% 50% 41% 39% 42% 40% 31% 35% 30% 30% -6 -17 
   Other 5% 18% 4% 43% 17% 42% 15% 17% 25% 25% 19% 23% 30% 20% 25%  
Textiles etc. 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 2% 0% -2% 
    CIS 22% 12% 10% 9% 11% 8% 7% 9% 12% 14% 13% 15% 16% -10% -6% 
    EU-15 51% 60% 67% 67% 66% 63% 62% 64% 64% 63% 64% 62% 60% 12% 9% 
    EU-12 12% 10% 7% 9% 9% 12% 17% 16% 11% 12% 15% 18% 20% -1% 7% 
    Other 14% 78% 16% 82% 15% 80% 13% 11% 14% 11% 8% 5% 4% -1%  -10% 
Transport. 4% 4% 5% 4% 3% 3% 4% 4% 6% 5% 5% 7% 6% 2% 2% 
    CIS 70% 55% 44% 33% 49% 53% 58% 50% 49% 64% 77% 81% 83% -21% 13% 
    EU-15 11% 11% 10% 14% 6% 15% 11% 12% 6% 7% 7% 4% 4% -5% -7% 
    EU-12 4% 7% 13% 8% 8% 4% 7% 25% 5% 7% 5% 6% 6% 2% 2% 
   Other 16% 38% 33% 59% 37% 43% 24% 14% 40% 22% 12% 8% 8% 25%  -8% 
Wood etc. 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 1% 3% 
   CIS 52% 51% 44% 36% 38% 41% 41% 42% 39% 43% 49% 48% 53% -13% 1% 
   EU-15 10% 11% 15% 17% 17% 16% 19% 20% 19% 18% 16% 18% 16% 9% 7% 
   EU-12 18% 20% 26% 32% 28% 30% 29% 24% 27% 26% 22% 23% 22% 9% 3% 
   Other 20% 29% 15% 33% 17% 29% 12% 14% 16% 13% 13% 11% 9% -5% -11% 
Source: UN Comtrade Online Database 
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Annex 6. Commodity distribution of Ukrainian exports to CIS, EU-15 and EU-12, 
1996-2008, US$ million 
a)  
 
b) 
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c) 
  
 
Source:UN Comtrade Online Database
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Annex 7. Exports of steel (HS 72) from Ukraine by main regions 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
EU-15 121.9 229.5 373.1 288.2 413.2 468.7 533.3 729.0 1352.6 
% growth p.a.  88% 63% -23% 43% 13% 14% 37% 86% 
CEFTA 171.2 178.0 268.2 347.3 417.9 401.3 369.6 442.3 805.0 
% growth p.a.  4% 51% 30% 20% -4% -8% 20% 82% 
Russia 671.6 470.1 452.6 313.8 549.7 496.9 307.5 575.4 998.2 
% growth p.a.  -30% -4% -31% 75% -10% -38% 87% 73% 
Other CIS 216.0 271.3 223.2 105.5 128.1 143.3 134.4 269.4 486.2 
% growth p.a.  26% -18% -53% 21% 12% -6% 100% 80% 
China 511.7 945.4 685.4 680.9 528.9 378.3 412.3 822.1 587.9 
% growth p.a.  85% -27% -1% -22% -28% 9% 99% -28% 
ASEAN 464.2 309.5 186.0 282.3 345.1 521.2 856.4 728.5 884.8 
% growth p.a.  -33% -40% 52% 22% 51% 64% -15% 21% 
NAFTA 9.1 26.5 30.6 28.5 79.9 37.7 36.3 16.9 189.6 
% growth p.a.  191% 15% -7% 180% -53% -4% -53% 1020% 
Middle East 484.8 626.0 533.0 421.2 638.2 1047.4 998.5 1162.8 1566.7 
% growth p.a.  29% -15% -21% 52% 64% -5% 16% 35% 
ROW 937.2 1603.2 1720.5 1768.4 2348.1 1883.4 2059.5 2424.0 4699.6 
          
Total steel X to the world 3416.6 4481.4 4204.3 3888.8 5031.2 4976.8 5338.3 6728.1 10765.6 
Source: UN Comtrade Online Database, author’s calculations. 
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Annex 8. Exports to CEFTA as a share of respective categories of exports to the World (SITC Rev. 2 classification) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Animal and vegetable oils fats and waxes 2.05 1.58 1.12 0.79 1.11 
Beverages and tobacco 0.35 0.11 0.52 0.08 0.90 
Chemicals and related products nes 10.56 13.32 15.57 15.37 14.75 
Commodities and transactions nes 0.06 0.05 0.12 0.48 0.00 
Crude materials inedible except fuels 26.54 29.15 31.10 32.05 32.78 
Food and live animals chiefly for food 3.42 5.24 4.49 5.32 6.95 
Machinery and transport equipment 4.30 8.42 6.55 8.81 4.54 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials 8.85 8.92 8.82 8.16 8.16 
Mineral fuels lubricants and related materials 43.66 32.86 26.85 26.87 27.14 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles 4.50 6.87 9.36 13.23 6.77 
Source: UN Comtrade Database, author’s calculations 
 
Annex 9. Breakdown of regional groupings employed in the analysis 
EU-15 CEFTA CIS 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom 
Bulgaria, Croatia (2002-), Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, 
Georgia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan 
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Annex 10. Correlation matrix of the variables used in the panel data analysis, Internationalisation Model 
 exporter own_pr~r age~1991 lnft_e~l produc~e lnuni_~e int_qu~t new_la~d inputd~M new_fo~s credit~n lnmach~t 
exporter 1            
own_privfor 0.257 1           
age_pre1991 0.159 -0.101 1          
lnft_empl 0.504 0.233 0.312 1         
product_up~e -0.044 -0.070 -0.008 -0.055 1        
lnuni_degree 0.157 0.104 -0.011 -0.023 -0.047 1       
int_qualcert -0.250 -0.232 -0.039 -0.293 0.048 -0.127 1      
new_land_b~d -0.243 -0.154 0.076 -0.179 0.149 -0.024 0.042 1     
inputdirectM -0.051 -0.086 0.001 -0.013 -0.077 -0.148 0.104 -0.095 1    
new_forpress 0.204 0.106 0.070 0.147 -0.063 0.133 -0.099 -0.074 -0.024 1   
creditline~n -0.064 0.114 -0.083 -0.033 0.036 -0.044 0.074 -0.003 -0.091 -0.031 1  
lnmach_rep~t 0.177 0.034 0.080 0.385 -0.068 -0.155 -0.099 -0.222 0.320 -0.087 -0.057 1 
Source: Author’s calculations using STATA 9.1 
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Annex 11. Correlation matrix of variables used in the Trade Reorientation regression 
analysis 
 eu15 eu12 cis asia fdi_y inn_sum  scale  diversif 
         
eu15 1        
eu12 -0.225* 1       
Cis -0.382* -0.440* 1      
Asia -0.096* -0.111* -0.188* 1     
fdi_y 0.072* -0.003 -0.026* 0.001 1    
inn_sum -0.013* -0.020* -0.021* 0.040* 0.006 1   
scale -0.017* -0.041* 0.030* 0.028* 0.017* 0.281*   1  
diversif -0.083* -0.001 -0.067* 0.058* -0.295* 0.097*   0.106* 1 
Source: Author’s calculations using STATA 9.1 
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Annex 12. Geographic and commodity distribution of exports by Ukrainian firms in the 
Trade Reorientation dataset  
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Source: Data provided by the European Commission project on the Economic and Social 
Consequences of Industrial Restructuring in Russia and Ukraine 
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